The NATO and European Union spat with Russia over Estonia demonstrates the great dangers in the current dynamics of the East-West relationship.

Let me start with the obvious. Russia’s response to the Estonian decision to move a monument to an unnamed Russian soldier and the remnants of Russian servicemen buried under him to a military cemetery was unacceptable. First, as a sovereign country, Estonia is entitled to decide which monuments to keep and where. Second, it is perfectly understandable why a country that was occupied in 1940 by the Soviet Union as a result of a deal between Hitler and Stalin in 1939 and then victimized by purges and suppression of local culture after the Nazi defeat would not view Soviet troops as liberators. It is equally understandable that many in such a country would not necessarily want to see a monument to Soviet soldiers in the center of its capital. Finally, attacks on the Estonian Embassy in Moscow by Kremlin-supported youth groups raise troubling questions about possible incitement by the Russian government of Russian militants in Estonia. Russian efforts to use Russian minorities in the former USSR to undermine their governments could destabilize the whole post-Soviet space and would further complicate relations between Russia and the West. Accordingly, it is perfectly appropriate for the United States, NATO and the European Union to communicate to Russian President Vladimir Putin their strong concern over Russian actions.

But Western governments went beyond expressing concern. They opted to side with Estonia, failing to see the other side of the coin in the Estonian-Russian dispute and sending the wrong message to Moscow (and Tallinn) in the process. What Moscow’s critics have failed to acknowledge in this instance is that the conflict over a monument was a manifestation of a larger issue—the treatment of the Russian minority in Estonia since the country became independent in 1991.

Mind you, it was not the United States, Ronald Reagan or George H. W. Bush who provided the greatest help to the Estonian people in re-establishing their state. The greatest help came from Moscow, from Mikhail Gorbachev, who allowed people in the Baltics and elsewhere to hold free elections that produced pro-independence governments which demanded splitting from the Soviet Union altogether. And it was Russian leader Boris Yeltsin who issued an order prohibiting Russian citizens serving in the Soviet armed forces from obeying orders requiring violence against people in the Baltic nations. Yet, the Estonian response to this Russian assistance was to disenfranchise one-third of its population, mostly ethnic Russians and other Slavs, including those who had been born in Estonia but whose parents and grandparents had not lived in independent Estonia before it was occupied by Stalin in 1940.

It is that marginalization of the Russian minority that is at the root of ethnic tension in Estonia. This marginalization actually encourages Estonian politicians like Prime Minister Andrus Ansip to use the issue of moving the monument to exploit nationalist sentiments in Estonia for electoral advantage without fear of reprisals from disaffected voters—because those most troubled by the decision don’t have the right to vote. Knowing that a considerable minority of those who live in Estonia would view this action as a further attempt to de-legitimize them, leaders in Tallinn intentionally proceeded with an action highly provocative both internally and vis-à-vis Russia for domestic political gain.

Also, the way the Estonian police responded to the demonstrators in Tallinn—some, but not all, of whom were violent—would certainly be called excessive force if it happened in Moscow or even in Los Angeles. But somehow, neither Western governments nor the Western media were prepared to criticize beating up ethnic Russians in Tallinn. Serious people, like those at The Economist, may acknowledge that the Estonian government "has blundered" and its "tactics were gravely mistaken." But they still seem to think, as The Economist does, that the West had to support Estonia because it is "a commendably keen member of the European Union, and a loyal member of NATO." Little imagination is required to understand how statements like that are read in Moscow, which has been told for years that bringing its former satellites into Euro-Atlantic economic and security institutions is not a danger to Russia. Unqualified support of Estonia clearly sends a message to Russia—and not just to the Putin government, but to the public at large—that these assurances are false, that the process of NATO expansion is directed against Russia, and that Russia should view a possible NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia as a serious threat to its vital interests.

Is this really the lesson we want Moscow to learn? And are we sure that we will like the consequences? As The Economist writes, "The importance of this goes far beyond Estonia. If the Kremlin concludes that former Soviet satellites are not real members of Western clubs, but will be dumped by their allies once they blunder, the consequences for Europe’s peace and stability will be lethal." Fair enough. But do we conversely want Russian neighbors to conclude that they are entitled to provoke Moscow needlessly, hiding behind NATO’s security umbrella or possible EU sanctions? Are we certain that other leaders in the region will not overestimate their leverage in dealing with Moscow—like Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili in his efforts to re-establish control over the de facto independent enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Will Moscow eventually call the West’s bluff and respond militarily there or somewhere else? If it does, will the United States go to war with Russia—or will it abandon a target of Russian military action the same way as it abandoned Hungary in 1956?

These are not questions any American President would like to answer. But blind and uncritical support for Russia’s neighbors in virtually every dispute with Moscow makes them increasingly important—and our own failure to think about these issues now makes it more and more likely that if we have no answers, someone else will.

Posted by Dimitri Simes at 05/08/2007 06:21:06 PM |