Where the new Russian president travels—and when—is an interesting indicator of Russia's diplomatic agenda.

Medvedev has announced that his first international journey will be to Kazakhstan—which has emerged as one of Russia's closest partners in the Eurasian space—and from Kazakhstan, to then travel to Beijing. China will be the first "great power" destination.

"Medvedev is giving priority to China in Russia's foreign relations with major powers," Professor Xu Tao of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations was quoted as saying in the China Daily.

Complementing this approach to the "south and east," in a few days, the foreign ministers of China, India, Brazil and Russia will meet in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Indian Prime Minister Singh has already extended an invitation for Medvedev to visit India and plans are apparently afoot for Medvedev to travel to New Delhi later this year.

However, he won't neglect Europe, and Russia's closest partner there. Plans are underway for Medvedev to travel to Berlin in June for meetings with Chancellor Angela Merkel. Merkel, of course, was the first foreign leader to meet with Medvedev following his election as president in March.

President Bush met Medvedev in Sochi last month and he will meet the new Russian president again in July at the G-8 summit in Tokyo. But it is quite interesting to see what capitals a new Russian president feels he needs to visit soon: Astana, Beijing, Berlin and New Delhi. 

The composition of the cabinet, as selected by prime minister designate Vladimir Putin for ratification to new president Dmitry Medvedev, is a further signal of the importance of maintaining a united consensus. It also suggests that the message to all Kremlin factions is that it is better to be part of the large tent than cast outside of it.

The cabinet, as noted, will have seven vice prime-ministers serving under Putin; starting with the two "first vice premiers"—the former prime minister Viktor Zubkov and the G-8 sherpa and former deputy chief of staff for Putin, Igor Shuvalov. Putin aide Igor Sechin will now supervise industrial policy. Sergei Ivanov remains a vice prime minister, although no longer one of the two deputies. Putin's chief of staff remains in that position, switching from the presidential administration to the prime ministerial one, while another "Petersburger," Sergei Naryshkin, moves into the position of the presidential chief of staff.

Finance Minister Kudrin retains his portfolio, along with Economic Development minister Elvira Nabiullina, while Sergei Lavrov and Anatoly Serdyukov retain the foreign ministry and the defense ministry, respectively.

Viktor Khristenko, who in the past served as energy minister, is the new minister of industry, and he will supervise a number of key agencies, among the Russian Fund for Federal Property and the Federal Agency for Industrial Development (Rosprom).

Signals so far? A strong sense of continuity—very few personnel shakeups. Second, a desire to avoid radical breaks or conflicts; many of Putin's presidential administration is migrating into the government, freeing up new appointments for Medvedev. Finally, my early read—a "balancing" effect where cabinet ministers are balanced with the deputies to the prime minister.

As readers of TWR know, I have been a strong proponent of closer U.S.-India ties. What I have tried not to do, however, is to assume that India's desire for much closer and improved relations with Washington comes at the expense of what the country will see as its fundamental national interests.

Can India be a close strategic partner of the United States? Yes. Is India on the verge of becoming the next "special relationship" in the way that the UK and Japan have such ties with the United States? At this stage, I would say no. I don't see any evidence that the Indian strategic and defense elite is going to completely overhaul the country's orientations simply to become America's "best friend" in Asia.

India instead is going to want to balance out its relationships. Take this observation, from Commodore Uday Bhaskar, about the U.S.-Iran dilemma faced by India:

India—like China—needs energy from any and every source to sustain its GDP growth and related developmental goals and Iran's importance cannot be ignored. The choice for India is not an 'either-or' option in relation to the US/Iran and the nuclear/oil sector. India needs both and the challenge for Indian foreign policy will be to realise both objectives.

Writing in the Asia Times, Siddarth Srivastava, an Indian journalist, concludes that the “emerging trend” in New Delhi’s approach to international affairs “is a skillful balancing of its strategic relationships with the major powers.”

I think we can work with this—but this certainly does not suggest that India is going to play the role some here in Washington would like it to play.

I am in Philadelphia attending the 8^th annual Trans-Atlantic Editors' Roundtable. Just a few thoughts that have been heard around the table (and by no means exhaustive or even completely representative of the conversations):

—How do we manage a trans-Atlantic relationship when it is clear that while interests may converge in some instances, they don't in other areas? Do we choose to "agree to disagree" in the latter case, or try to find some sort of compromise solution?

—Can we even speak about the trans-Atlantic relationship as its own self-contained world, or do we have to acknowledge that other actors are present? Can we still talk about trans-Atlantic ties without reference to China and Russia?

—Is this statement still accurate in today's world—when the United States and the EU agree on an issue, this forms the basis for a global consensus; when the U.S. and the EU disagree, no such global consensus will be possible?

—What is the best way of making Russia a "responsible stakeholder" in both European and global affairs?

—Would a democratizing China be any more likely than an autocratic one to slow down its economic growth or work to limit its emissions and use of resources? Or, given the large number of poor still present, would a democratic China be even under greater pressure to speed up economic growth? (This in the context that China is building one new coal-fired power plant a week; claims it cannot afford clean coal technology for all of its power needs; and where each additional unit of GDP growth essentially requires 1 to 1.3 additional units of energy).

—Democrats claim to be more multilateral and more solicitous of European concerns, but given a renewed protectionist mood and a desire to revisit trade agreements, would the next Democratic administration clash with Europe over trade?

—Do we have a growing consensus on how to deal with climate change across the Atlantic or not? (TWR readers will recall that at last year's roundtable in London, the thesis was advanced that disagreements over climate change will be to the future of the trans-Atlantic relationship what Iraq in 2003 was—a deeply divisive event.)

Just some thoughts.

I penned a review of Robert Kagan's The Return of History but something kept nagging at me, that I had left something out. And it was this. Kagan explains why China's view of the international order appeals to other autocrats—but neglects to discuss how many democracies might also find Beijing's approach to be useful and even preferable to the one he lays out.

Kagan notes that the Chinese view—and here let me use the words of the 1972 Shanghai Communique—"the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries ..." is music to the ears of autocratic and non-democratic governments around the world. He cites it specifically in the context of Chinese-Iranian relations. True.

But it is also quite attractive to a number of democratic ones as well. It is the basis for India's participation as an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Indonesia, Brazil and South Africa like the idea that their own path to democracy and development not be subject to the control or validation of outsiders. Even for U.S. allies like South Korea, this Chinese view is very welcome—because it means that Beijing's 1950 position—that North Korea did have a right to extend its system by force to the source—has been reversed and that South Korea's right to have a democratic, free-market system is not being challenged by China. And this makes it much easier for Europeans to deal with China—because Beijing seems to be saying, if you want to move to a post-nation state union where EU member-states have freely surrendered some sovereignty to Brussels, that is your affair.

[On a side note, what about the U.S. position in the Shanghai Communique—that "The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention"?]

And, as Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber have been arguing in The National Interest (both the print and online editions) for more than a year now, China offers the vision of a world order based on sovereign states where these states negotiates contracts with one another in achieving their economic and security objectives and where international organizations have no authority to bypass the state on behalf of individuals. For many democratic states, particularly those that have a "John Quincy Adams" view that the fate of democracy in any given country is in the hands of that country alone, a global order predicated on sovereignty is just fine.

And what you may end up with, as Parag Khanna has argued, is a whole series of states—both democratic and non-democratic—that position themselves betwixt "autocratic/sovereign East" and "democratic/internationalist West." We shouldn't be counting on other democracies to automatically flock to our banner.

I quoted Lee Hamilton at the close of my review; but Khanna is more blunt and less polite than the former Congressman. How can America's power and leadership be revived? He complains, "One would expect hard-headed guidance based on experience,
observation and connections, yet instead one hears—from ex-administration officials from the Clinton or Bush eras—the platitudes of detached utopians."

One reason why I continue to think the association of democracies idea is problematic is that the world's "southern democracies" are very ambivalent about breaching the protective wall of state sovereignty. I blogged earlier this week about a pitch that might resonate with some of them.

But the current UN Security Council wrangling over Myanmar/Burma is quite instructive. France, as TWR readers may know, wanted to invoke the "responsibility to protect" to get the Security Council to authorize relief efforts that would bypass the Burmese military junta.

We are told that, in addition to Russia, China and Vietnam, South Africa also argued strongly behind closed doors that the Security Council should get involved. Panama also doesn't see a role for the Security Council, according to its ambassador, while Indonesia's representative seems to feel that relief work can best be undertaken by the Asian states.

First on Kosovo, now on Burma. So far, "southern democracies" still seem to place a greater premium on preserving state sovereignty and integrity. This is something that I am frustrated that so many of the advocates of the LOD/COD idea just won't address. But ignoring it doesn't make it go away.

Yesterday, Xie Feng, deputy chief of mission of the Chinese Embassy in Washington, spoke at the Nixon Center. He gave an optimistic view of the future of Sino-U.S. relations, grounded in common interests and, perhaps even over a time, a narrowing values gap.

But I don't know how receptive some are going to be to his viewpoint. Because, listening to his on-the-record remarks, Beijing's view of partnership with Washington is one where the relationship is defined by equality. One where, especially in economic terms, the U.S. and China are the "twin engines" (rather than the U.S. being the hub); one where both countries will have to work together on a number of issues but where it must be accepted that "we do not see eye to eye on everything" and where both sides will have to engage in dialogue to minimize differences. "We hope that the U.S. will meet us half-way" was a point made.

Diplomacy, anyone?

Earlier today, I passed along a news tidbit from The Hindu about the Indian-Brazilian-South African joint naval exercises.

Now, The Hindu is reporting:

"The Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) will meet exclusively for the first time in the Russian city of Ekaterinburg on May 14 with economics and cooperation at multilateral fora topping the agenda.

"A meeting of Foreign Ministers of Russia, India, China (RIC) will take place at the same venue the next day as a follow-up to their regular interactions, the latest being in Harbin, China, last year. Although the BRIC Foreign Ministers have discussed the prospects of mutual cooperation on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, the agenda here will be solely focused on promoting the concept of BRIC."

Folks, we live in a dynamic world where powers keep open their options and hedge their bets. India does joint military exercises with the United States, reaches out to other middle powers to do their "own thing" and schedules regular consultations with the foreign ministers of China and Russia. India disproves the thesis about countries choosing and sticking with "blocs" and instead seems to indicate countries feel safer with multipolar options.

So two southern democracies, one sovereign democracy/managed pluralist state and one state still under the guiding role of the Communist Party are seeing whether they have common ground for policies.

Read the full Hindu piece, it is quite interesting.

For those of you who are interested (and didn't hear Michele Kelemen's report on NPR's Morning Edition).

Igor Yurgens, vice president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, was quoted as saying, "He's a young guy, Internet generation leader—from this point of view, more open."

Mark Medish, of the Carnegie Endowment, feels that both outgoing presidents—Putin and Bush—have left their successors, in terms of the U.S.-Russia relationship, "a list of things to be done in the future, things that have not been really accomplished ..."

My takeaway? "This is the first Russian leader who was trained in instruments of power that are not military and not intelligence. So for the 20th century, the fear was Russian tanks are going to be coming across the border. We're now dealing with the 21st century Russian leader who understands that energy and currency are the tools of power."

My colleague Paul Saunders has this to say on the subject.

Yesterday, I posted a note about the "southern democracies" and today I read in the Hindu about the start of joint naval exercises between India, Brazil and South Africa that are being conducted along the coast offshore from Cape Town. This is the first time military maneuvers have been undertaken under the aegis of the trilateral IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) forum.

First, given the nature of the exercises—dealing with terrorists and pirates—it is interesting as a demonstration as to how rising powers are beginning to take steps to ensure their own security rather than simply relying on the U.S. It is also important for what it signals about the interest of the "southern democracies" to work together and to develop independent capabilities.

A South African naval commander, Captain Charl Coetzee, is quoted as saying the exercises are designed to facilitate a "common understanding of interoperability" and to strengthen multilateral cohesion between the three powers.

An interesting development.

I have noted in the past that "southern democracies" like India or South Africa are nonetheless very receptive to China's contention that respect for state sovereignty must still serve as the fundamental basis of the world order. They are suspicious of claims that other states can and should intervene in the domestic affairs of a state, even on human rights grounds-and this was manifested by reluctance to intervene in Zimbabwe or Burma.

So an interesting "pitch" is underway—to argue that the international community has no right to intervene in the affairs of democracies, only non-democracies. Also a useful doctrine for Americans suspicious of EU style legal interventionism (e.g. The ICC).

I was recently asked what happened to the "realist" agenda for the U.S.-Russia relationship. I think that Alexey Pushkov's comments last week are quite apropos: the core fundamentals—anti-terrorism, promoting stability in the international system, stemming nuclear proliferation, and so on—were never really operationalized with clear criteria and where both sides took the "in principle" and moved to "what we do" (e.g., from Moscow's statement that, "in principle", Russia does not want Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon, to what Moscow actually thinks is the problem and what it is prepared to do about it).

Both sides could still try to move forward to provide more definition—and the documents agreed at Sochi last month do give us a framework—but I doubt we will see much action.

One of the major stumbling blocks as well was the question of what both sides should expect to get. Over the last several years, Washington has, at times, become more comfortable with the idea of one-off coalitions and groups that come together to focus on only one issue—and therefore, this assemblage of states who come together to work on a particular issue are NOT expected to support the positions or interests or prioriteis of member-states on issues UNRELATED to the specific issue at hand. Take the Proliferation Security Initiative. Cyprus, for instance, is under no illusions that because it is part of the PSI—given its large merchant fleet and that it is an international banking center—other members of this initiative, working together to stem the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist attack which would have negative economic consequences for the PSI's members, even if they were not the actual recipient of the attack—are somehow obligated to support Cyprus' position on OTHER international issues (especially resolution of its territorial integrity). The same might be said of the Six-Party Talks on North Korea.

This runs up against a prevailing Russian interest that weighs cooperation alongside the continued restoration of Russia's great power status and interest—so that if cooperation with other states undermines that quest, it must be questioned.

I wrote in 2002 for TNI about this problem—where U.S. and Russian interests might collide—and think that the analysis holds up for 2008.

But what it also means for today is that I do think that the realist agenda for the U.S.-Russia relationship shifts. Now, an American realist wants to focus on preventing problems from opening up in the trans-Atlantic relationship OVER Russia. That is to say, most of the principal European countries are following a track vis-a-vis Russia that is similar to ours (and of most Asian states) vis-a-vis China. Yes, they have a number of complaints about a number of Russian internal and external policies; but those complaints don't lead them to assume that a more confrontational stance towards Moscow is justified. So, if the U.S. thinks that Russia's resurgence is now a problem—it may find it more difficult to find a consensus with the Europeans. The Bucharest NATO summit was a foretaste of this—and then begs the question, what political capital does the U.S. want to spend with Europe on the Russia account? At Bucharest, for instance, the president didn't "get" MAP for Georgia and Ukraine but got approval for missile defense and at least token increases for Afghanistan.

Just some thoughts.

It appears that China and representatives of the Dalai Lama are set to begin talks.

French president Nicolas Sarkozy had made his attendance at the Beijing games conditional on the start of an official dialogue; will this suffice? And, of course, starting a dialogue is no guarantee of any solution. Starting talks is not the same as reaching a settlement that would be acceptable both to China and the Tibetans.

But would this give him sufficient cover to say he has made a stand on human rights-something he'd promised to do as a presidential candidate, with limiting the damage done to Franco-Chinese ties over the past few months?

Some follow-up thoughts.

Beyond the democracy caucus at the UN, a majority of General Assembly members are classed as democracies-but it is clear that regional alignments, especially with non-democracies, still takes precedence.

Would those patterns change in a differently-configured international organization?