ARE WE pursuing the right strategy to ensure that Iran (or, for that matter, any other aspirant nuclear power) does not cross the threshold to join the ranks of nuclear weapons states?
To deter Tehran, it is essential that there be a united front between the United States, the European Union, Russia and China to prevent Iran from exploiting any differences or finding any sort of wiggle room that would allow it to continue with its program.
The issue, of course, is that under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran--as well as any other signatory of the NPT--is entitled to a fuel cycle as part of its right to peacefully utilize nuclear energy for civilian use. The problem is that the process and equipment for enriching uranium and reprocessing spent fuel for peaceful purposes is identical to that for producing weapons-grade material.
What we need to do, therefore, is find a mechanism that will allow all NPT countries to enjoy all of the benefits of a civilian nuclear energy program while preventing the production of weapons-grade nuclear material under close supervision.
The permanent five members of the Security Council should be prepared to make the following offer to Iran. Acknowledging that Tehran has every right to exploit nuclear energy for civilian use, Iran should be guaranteed an adequate supply of nuclear fuel for its reactors (under a use-and-return system such as that proposed by Russia) in return for abiding by all IAEA regulations. This, in turn, should serve as the basis for a new international fuel-cycle regime that applies to all countries. Any approach to stemming nuclear proliferation that singles out specific countries--such as the Bush Administration is doing with Iran--is not likely to succeed.
