A New Agenda for Narco-terrorism Propaganda

October 1, 2003 Topic: Terrorism

A New Agenda for Narco-terrorism Propaganda

 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 initiated a new direction in the war on drugs when the Bush Administration began to publicly link the illegal narcotics trade to international terrorism.

 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 initiated a new direction in the war on drugs when the Bush Administration began to publicly link the illegal narcotics trade to international terrorism.  While narco-terrorism is by no means a new phenomenon, the White House now had the green light to further encourage interagency and international cooperative efforts to fight the two wars - drugs and terror - on the same front.  Selling narco-terrorism to the public, however, was more problematic than many anticipated. 

During the broadcast of the Super Bowl on February 3, 2002, the White House's Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) launched a major media campaign introducing viewers around the world to this dimension of drug abuse and, for the first time, graphically illustrated a direct connection between terrorists and drug money.  One advertisement portrayed a terrorist buying explosives and weapons.  "Where do terrorists get their money?" the ad asked.  "If you buy drugs, some of it might come from you."  The Drugs and Terror campaign continued to run advertisements in the following months, taking up 20% of the purchased advertisement time by the National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign in the first half of 2002.  While many observers initially hailed this effort as an unprecedented opportunity to breathe new life into the Drug War, this enthusiasm was short-lived.  The Drugs and Terror campaign came to an abrupt halt within six months, in light of an unfavorable response from both parents and youth.

Nevertheless, the Bush Administration continues to formulate domestic and international drug reduction strategies with an eye on asset seizure and control of funding used by terrorist organizations.  But to be more politically viable, a new, more effective propaganda campaign is required, one that not only fosters public awareness, but also creates an atmosphere of public acceptance by addressing the weaknesses of the first campaign.

Heading this list of weaknesses is its "reactionary appearance," primarily due to the short time span in which the Drugs and Terror media campaign was introduced and subsequently terminated.  While we can assume all war propaganda to be reactionary in its genesis, the extent to which a propaganda campaign is "reactive" can be more destructive than constructive, which is one major concern of narco-terrorism.  Is narco-terrorism simply a reaction to 9/11?  Is it a new phenomenon?  Why are we just now hearing about the drugs-terror connection?  Is the government simply using terrorism to reinvigorate its support for the controversial Drug War?  These are important questions that weigh heavily on the legitimacy of the Administration's efforts. 

Indeed, narco-terrorism as a national security threat is not new.  The 9/11 attacks simply pushed narco-terrorism higher on the President's national security agenda, particularly in light of the connection between the Afghan drug trade and the Al-Qaeda network.  But the propaganda machine vanished from the airwaves, in essence making the Drugs and Terror campaign seem like reactive propaganda, and in the process leaving behind a skeptical public. 

This leads to the second major problem of the propaganda campaign - its inability to address its major critics.  As soon as President Bush began to publicly link drugs and terrorist financing, a number of concerns, and in some cases myths, about narco-terrorism rapidly flooded the internet and other media outlets, thus eroding public support.  While not an exhaustive list, the following does highlight some of the major concerns that were not adequately addressed in the first campaign:

  • Narco-terrorism will increase the use of U.S. military power.  Throughout the history of the War on Drugs, concern over the use of the military in what is typically considered a law enforcement and social issue has overshadowed most other concerns.  Even if the U.S. itself does not place troops on the ground, many are still concerned that increased militarization in any manner will only facilitate human rights abuses by those governments receiving U.S. aid - a critique often levied in the present Colombian crisis.
     
  • Narco-terrorism will encourage a police state.  In the aftermath of 9/11, the Justice Department came under fire from all directions due to concerns over the abuse of civil liberties, particularly with its increasing power to fight terrorism.  Moreover, a new drug agenda emphasizing terrorism alarms many to the possible merger of federal law enforcement agencies, thus derailing the current system of checks-and-balances. 
     
  • Narco-terrorism targets "weak states."  Many allege that narco-terrorism elevated the potential for the U.S. to use its diplomatic weight to force governments to enact stricter anti-drug policies.  This might encourage, either directly or indirectly, a weaker country to move in the direction of becoming a police state, further undermining political and social development.  In addition, this extension of political influence might actually backfire for the U.S. - counter-drug measures might fuel anti-American resentment, increasing the potential for terrorist activity.
     
  • Narco-terrorism makes it difficult to define who the enemy is.  This new strategy, critics allege, changes the perception of domestic drug consumers being simply "victims," who should receive only mild penalties and rehabilitation time, to "the enemy."  Another major concern in defining the "enemy" is directed at countries which may or may not maintain a "U.S. standard" of counter-drug activity.  Are these countries going to be targeted as part of the U.S. War on Terrorism? 
     
  •  Narco-terrorism is simply another way to turn the Drug War into a political agenda.  In foreign relations, critics maintain that the U.S. counter-drug campaign is now nearly inseparable from counter-insurgency efforts in places such as Colombia, thus exacerbating an already volatile situation.  Moreover, the U.S. is being rather bold in designating particular groups as narcoterrorists, but quite conveniently leaving off others such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan.  This will further hinder development and the consolidation of the rule of law in a number of countries. 
     
  •  Narco-terrorism extends the reach of U.S. criminal justice jurisdiction abroad.  Just as critics worry about increasing police powers within the United States, they are also aware of how narco-terrorism could be used to extend the powers of these same agencies into other countries.  This raises the issue of the ability of the U.S. to impinge on the sovereignty of another country, and to dictate international criminal law.
     
  •  Narco-terrorism neglects the reality of the situation.  Quite simply, many critics allege that narcoterrorist connections are indirect and for the most part quite thin.  In addition, critics of prohibition maintain that it is the illegalization of drugs which generates the enormous profits used to support terrorist and insurgent organizations.  Another concern is that narco-terrorism does not address the complexities of terrorism or insurgencies.  Can Colombia be addressed in a narrowly-defined military and law enforcement framework, which can easily neglect political, economic, and social considerations?

Popular support is a determinant in the outcome of any war.  Without it, the Bush Administration will consistently be on the defensive as it moves forth to implement relevant narco-terrorism legislation, such as the Vital Interdiction of Criminal Terrorist Organizations Act of 2003 (VICTORY Act), which is circulating in the U.S. Congress this fall.  This act gives more leeway on classifying some drug offenses as terrorism and, in fact, has itself generated much criticism in its infancy, raising concerns that, if passed, a massive number of drug cases might be able to be prosecuted as terrorism cases.  This is only the tip of the iceberg.  This and subsequent legislation undoubtedly will revive many of the previous concerns - fear of police states, use of the military, impingement on the jurisdiction of other countries - once Americans turn their attention back to the Drug War. 

Moreover, to what extent will the Bush Administration be able to publicly justify such legislation in the upcoming election year, particularly given the fact that the post-9/11 wave of patriotism has given way to other concerns?  Indeed, the Attorney General's hands already have been full defending the U.S. Patriot Act; further drug-related legislation such as the VICTORY Act has the potential to become a political nightmare.

In addition, the Bush Administration should urge the international community to support its counter-drug strategies by directing its propaganda campaign abroad as well.  The U.S. has taken steps to unilaterally broaden the context in which it can support multifaceted problems in countries such as Colombia, while at the same time limiting its scope so as not to support those military factions notorious for violating human rights.  Popular perception of American efforts within countries fighting desperately against domestic drug trafficking organizations is necessary not only for the U.S., but for the legitimacy of those governments dependent on American aid. 

 

Justin L. Miller is a Ph.D. candidate at Baylor University, and is presently working on a dissertation on transnational crime and outside support for insurgencies.