Projections of the rise and fall of nations form an indispensable element in the conduct of diplomacy, yet such estimates of what power is and how it is changing are very uncertain. Some observers, indeed, have suggested that we are nearly destined to get it wrong. The English statesman Henry St. John, Lord Bolingbroke, noted that those "who are in the sinking scale do not easily come off from the habitual prejudices of superior wealth, or power, or skill, or courage, nor from the confidence that these prejudices inspire. They who are in the rising scale do not immediately feel their strength, nor assume that confidence in it which successful experience gives them afterwards."
There are undoubtedly perils associated with either underestimating or overestimating one's power. The former mistake may lead to departures from an otherwise sound position or to a failure to exploit opportunities. The latter mistake is also familiar. History is littered with the examples of states that, acting on the "habitual prejudices of superior wealth, or power, or skill, or courage", undertake enterprises that prove the cause of their undoing. Though common sense suggests that these opposing traits would seldom be found together, historical experience often finds them joined at the hip. In Vietnam, for instance, both errors were committed. At the outset of American involvement, U.S. policymakers overestimated their ability to beat an ostensibly third rate power into submission and underestimated the true strength of the American position vis-à-vis the communist powers, mistakenly believing that if Vietnam turned communist the entire structure of peace would crumble.
The Bush Administration is committing the same dual error in its approach to Iran. It has vastly exaggerated the dangers associated with the development of an Iranian nuclear weapons program and underestimated the deterrent capacity of American military power. It has also vastly underestimated the potential perils of a preventive war against Iran.
Lessons of the Iraq War
One of the most remarkable features of the Iraq war is that it did not discredit the argument that preventive war must remain "on the table" as a way of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the aftermath of the American invasion, when it was discovered that there were no weapons to be found, attention was focused instead on the colossal intelligence failure that lay behind the American effort. Mainstream critics made hay with an administration that had "stovepiped" intelligence to fit preconceived opinions, not with the underlying assumption that force would indeed have been justified had Iraqi WMD been found. Whether the administration deceived others or simply deceived itself became the vital question to disentangle, and Democratic critics looking to score political points did not directly challenge the underlying logic of the war.
The curious failure of the political opposition to meet the administration head on is also apparent in what emerged as the second great rationale for the Iraq war, which justified the enterprise as a noble crusade to depose a tyrant and to bring democracy to the Middle East. It is not exactly true to say that the administration switched rationales for the war once the banned WMD were not found, for the "we shall transform the Middle East by bringing democracy to Iraq" argument was present from the very outset, but it is undoubtedly true that the missing weapons did lead the administration to place far greater emphasis on the democratizing rationale. As with the argument over the weapons of mass destructions, critics in the main did not challenge the idea that bringing democracy to an oppressed people via external force was a noble and legitimate enterprise. Instead, they stressed the ham-handedness, lack of planning and operational errors that attended Operation Iraqi Freedom. Had Rumsfeld not displayed such hubris and had the advice of the generals for a larger force been heeded, they implied, it would all have worked out nicely in the end.
The Iraq War has become deeply unpopular with the American people, and only a third of the public approves of the Bush Administration's handling of the conflict. Despite these misgivings, however, it is remarkable that the swelling public disapproval has not really reached either of the two major rationales the administration adopted in making its case for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The critique has focused on operational execution rather than the great objectives of national policy. It is probably fair to say that any future war justified simply on the supposed benefits of extending democracy would have great difficulty commanding public support, for the anticipated costs of such an enterprise would likely be seen by the public as outweighing any potential benefits. But a war to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a much different proposition. This meets, or appears to meet, the security test that the public imposes on projected uses of U.S. military power.
John McCain's formulation--"there is only one thing worse than military action, and that is a nuclear-armed Iran"--may well reflect a majority in public opinion. He appears to be joined in that perception by the "national security Democrats" and their new spokeswoman, Hillary Clinton, who has argued that "We cannot and should not--must not--permit Iran to build or acquire nuclear weapons."
