A strategic retreat is the most difficult of all maneuvers. This is the nightmare that has tormented all Israeli leaders since the modern Arab-Israeli peace diplomacy began after the October 1973 war. But the experience of this diplomacy has taught Israel certain lessons; three are fundamental.
First, as is often pointed out, there is an asymmetry built into the negotiation in that Israel is asked to give up the physical buffer of territory in exchange for political commitments, which are by their nature more easily reversible. Israel's dilemma is that these political quids pro quo, though intangible, can be quite real--not only buffer zones that add to strategic warning, but broader strategic gains such as splitting the coalition of Israel's enemies, keeping international pressures off Israel's back, strengthening the U.S. strategic position in the Middle East, and so forth. These may be not only useful, but vital.
In the conduct of these negotiations, however, Israel can never be seen to yield to force majeure. The same concessions that may be harmless in one context might be dangerous in another, depending on the dynamic of events. It is essential that Israel be seen to negotiate from strength and to make concessions, if any, by its own choice--thus making realism and a substantial quid pro quo mandatory on the Arab side. Should Israel ever be seen to be "on the run", more extreme Arab programs become tempting and Arab radicals gain ground at the expense of Arab moderates.
