Al-Hussein ibn Talal al-Hashem (a.k.a. the King of Jordan) has been many things to many people in his thirty-eight years on the throne. For those charged with managing the foreign policy of the United States, he began in 1953 as the very young ruler of a very small kingdom then seen as a British responsibility. By the early 1960s Hussein had become a relatively minor American ward in a region just on the periphery of the Cold War. After June 1967, Jordan became a key player in the occasionally intense effort to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute, and in September 1970, the eye of a great but mercifully brief storm in U.S.-Soviet brinkmanship over the Middle East.
Since the Arab League empowered the PLO to speak on behalf of Palestinians in November 1974, however, Jordan's potential diplomatic role in Arab-Israeli affairs has slowly diminished. And now, after Jordan's actions during the Gulf War, King Hussein has come to represent one of a distinct breed of allies for U.S. foreign policy: an ally of diminishing returns.
As with other such allies--Syngman Rhee and the Greek junta many years ago, Manuel Noriega and Samuel Doe more recently, and Sese Seko Mobuto today--America has come to expect less of the king. Nevertheless, we deal favorably with him not primarily because he can still do U.S. interests a great deal of good, but because his as yet unknown successors could do those interests a great deal of harm. While the king's seemingly outrageous anti-American behavior during the Gulf War has led to serious criticism of both him and the U.S.-Jordanian relationship, a careful look at both the king's actions and the reality of his position and role in the region demonstrates that he is still an ally with whom we must continue to do business.
