The challenge presented by a rising China is the principal issue
facing American foreign policy. This is not always obvious to most
Americans or even to many of our leaders. Since the end of the Cold
War, defense policy has been absorbed in second-order problems of
deterring or defeating mid-level powers such as Iraq, North Korea and
Serbia, and in third-order problems of peacekeeping and humanitarian
intervention. Over the long term, however, the first priority of a
serious foreign policy is to handle challenges from discontented,
nuclear-armed, major powers.
It is hardly inevitable that China will be a threat to American
interests, but the United States is much more likely to go to war
with China than it is with any other major power. Other current or
emerging great powers either are aligned with the United States (NATO
countries and Japan), are struggling against crippling decline
(Russia), or, while having a tense diplomatic relationship with
Washington, have no plausible occasion for war with America (India).
China, by contrast, is a rising power with high expectations,
unresolved grievances and an undemocratic government.
Debate about whether and how China might threaten U.S. security
interests has often been simplistically polarized. Views range from
alarmist to complacent: from those who see China emerging as a hefty
and dangerous superpower, to those who believe the country's
prospects are vastly overrated; and from those who see its economic
growth as an engine for building threatening military capabilities,
to those who see that growth as a welcome force for political
liberalization and international cooperation.
