September 11 and its aftermath caused many Americanpolicymakers, both Democrats and Republicans, to re-evaluateWashington's traditional emphasis on promoting "stability" in theMiddle East, even at the expense of democratization. Support forautocratic regimes, far from pacifying the region, came to be seenas the root cause for the growth of Islamic radicalism, culminatingin the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. A strategy ofpromoting democracy throughout the so-called Greater Middle Eastwas no longer considered to be an idealist dream but a realistnecessity to ensure the long-term security of the UnitedStates.

The necessity for reform in the Middle East has never been morecompelling. The Arab world faces the real possibility of socialimplosion. The Middle East confronts a demographic revolution, withnearly half of its population under twenty years of age. It isestimated that the region must create 100 million jobs over thenext 15 years to accommodate its "youth bulge." Such a dauntingchallenge requires that governments implement structural reformsdesigned to boost economic growth by promoting investment andtrade. Yet it is difficult to see how any government in the MiddleEast can undertake meaningful economic reforms without politicalmodernization. After all, the preconditions for a successful markettransition, such as the rule of law, accountability andtransparency, are also the essential components of a democraticpolity.

It is customary for U.S. officials to cite the successfulcampaign of unseating the autocracies of eastern Europe as thenecessary paradigm for political change in the Arab world. Yetdespite a bipartisan consensus, America's democratization effortsin the Middle East have historically eschewed any vigorouspromotion of reform in favor of offering technical assistance.Instead of utilizing intensive diplomatic and economic pressure toforce reluctant states to comply with reform criteria, successiveU.S. administrations have opted for dialogue with the incumbentregimes. The region's leaders, far from being viewed as the mainobstacles to reform, are often seen as the necessary partners in ashared progressive enterprise. And so Washington's strategy ofpolitical change, endorsed by both parties, follows a well-wornpath of promoting liberalization rather than genuinedemocratization. And as a result, a strategy of incrementalliberalization necessarily conforms to the parameters establishedby the incumbent regimes.

Herein lies the fundamental weakness of America's approach.Washington has erred in its assumption that the region's rulingelites are prepared to initiate reforms but merely lack theexpertise with which to carry them out. That misconception isevident in the proposals envisioned by the State Department, whichemphasize technical assistance--aid to legislatures, training andexchange programs for civil servants, election monitors and soon.

The central dilemma of the Arab political order is notunfamiliarity with the process of political competition, but anentrenched elite that is determined to retain power. No amount oftechnical assistance can overcome that reality. This is not to saythat the region's elites are unaware of the need for change andadaptation. Yet most Middle Eastern leaders--hereditary monarchs,revolutionary mullahs and perpetual presidents alike--are moreattracted to the Chinese model, which seems to offer the promise ofeconomic growth and development without displacing any of thepolitical prerogatives of the ruling regime. This is not todownplay the value of the Arab world moving along a Chinese path.Liberal autocracies would certainly be an improvement overpolitically repressive, economically stagnant regimes--but theywould not be functioning democracies.

An Enduring Liberal Autocracy

It would be a mistake to claim that there have been no reformsin the Arab world. Indeed, since the end of the Gulf War, a numberof authoritarian states in the Middle East have undertaken programsof guided, selective liberalization. Although democracy advocatesroutinely acclaim measured liberalization as a necessary prelude todemocratization, in the Middle East such liberal autocracy seems tobe an end in itself. In such an order, the rulers may eschewfull-scale authoritarianism for a system that offers periodicopenings in response to a variety of social, political andstrategic challenges. Despite its tolerant pretensions, thisgoverning structure lays down clear "red lines", ensuring that theprerogatives of the executive are not circumscribed by legislationand judicial oversight. A liberal autocracy may hold elections andcountenance critical media, but all actors must agree to the rulespromulgated by leaders who remain unaccountable. Far fromchallenging the reigning autocrats, the current partnershipactually complements their survival strategies.

To be sure, there are still states in the region that subscribeto a totalitarian model. The House of Saud (in its self-proclaimedrole as the guardian of Islam) and the Al-Asad family in Syria (thelast Ba'athi state in the region) sanction their despotictendencies by appealing to a larger ideological mission and retainthe services of security forces to root out any opposition. Bothregimes also have sought to avoid reform by indulging in thepolitics of patronage, buying loyalty from key social actors. Yetthe exponential population growth in both states has eroded thefinancial resources available. The mismanagement of the economy andmassive corruption confront the profligate House of Saud with thereality of prolonged recession and double-digit unemployment. Theson of the Arab lion of Damascus sits uneasily, facing a restivepopulace burdened by the persistent erosion of living standards anda precipitous decline in social services. The era of absolutism ispassing; Saudi Arabia will hold municipal elections next year, andthe remaining holdouts will likely join their more enterprisingbrethren in embracing selective reform.

Indeed, today's Middle East is populated by regimes that aretolerant, even liberal. Jordan, Morocco, the Gulf sheikdoms andEgypt are examples of regimes that do not base their power ontransnational ideologies or sacred missions, but on a more adroitmanagement of political society. The prevailing ruling elites havecreated a series of incentives and penalties whereby the oppositionforces are either co-opted or marginalized. It is not so much thatvoices of dissent do not exist; they have accepted the role of aloyal opposition. The loyalists are allowed to organize,participate in elections and share in the spoils of patronage, butthey must display a commitment to the existing system. Conversely,those who challenge executive claims of authority are summarilydismissed, coerced and relegated to the margins of society. Theemergence of a loyal opposition is not unimportant, as they do attimes channel popular grievances to the palace. However, theirself-regulating nature and their investment in perpetuating thestatus quo makes them poor agents of democratization. Indeed, in adivide-and-rule political order, it is difficult to mobilizenationwide opposition that can force further democratization withinan existing liberal autocracy.

A closer examination reveals that some of the region's shiningexamples of reform often cited by both Republicans and Democratsare actually not so stellar. A liberal autocracy creates a system,usually referred to as "managed pluralism", where elections,political alternatives, the ability to replace political leaders,and freedom of speech and the media are all regulated by the rulingexecutive. One manner of imposing the relevant checks is for themonarch or president to retain the right to appoint a significantnumber of seats or an entire upper chamber of an elected parliamentor assembly. Morocco, for example, does have relatively freeelections for the lower house of its parliament. In the lastelectoral contest, the opposition parties--including the IslamistJustice and Development Party--did capture 42 percent of the seats.However, King Muhammad's control over the indirectly elected upperchamber subverts the democratic pretensions of the lower house. Ina similar vein, elections are held in Jordan, but King Abdullahstill reserves the right to appoint the prime minister, vetolegislative initiatives and dissolve the parliament. In Qatar thenew constitution stipulates that the emir has the authority toappoint one-third of the deputies to the parliament. In none of thecountries with elected parliaments does the majority within thelegislature have the automatic right to form the cabinet--executiveappointments remain firmly within the purview of the ruler.

An important precursor for a sustainable pluralistic order isvibrant political parties. The region's reigning autocrats are wellaware of this and have been effective in undermining parties. Forexample, Qatar, another oft-cited case of democratic success,promulgated a new constitution in 2003 that explicitly prohibitsformation of political parties. Throughout the region, theprevailing parties are little more than sanctuaries for regimeloyalists, spending their time acclaiming the virtues of the rulersas opposed to offering a viable alternative to the system. And"opposition" parties understand their choreographed role within thepolitical system--to act as agents of protest but not to seriouslycontest the status quo. Indeed, within the Tunisian system,opposition parties are in essence sponsored by the rulingregime.

As political parties have been undermined, popular energies arechanneled into NGO activity. The Arab world's liberal autocracieshave witnessed a proliferation of advocacy organizations promotinga variety of causes ranging from women's rights toenvironmentalism. Washington, Brussels and the democracy promotioncommunity erroneously see in such activism the nascent signs of aprogressive society deserving assistance. However, given theseorganizations' elite nature, foreign funding and lack of grassrootspresence, they are incapable of mounting sustained opposition tothe ruling regimes. It is political parties, not NGOs that cansustain a popular movement, which is the reason the rulers havecondoned the activities of the NGOs while preventing the emergenceof effective political parties.

In one of the region's many paradoxes, two of the Arab world'smore oppressive states, Egypt and Tunisia, actually do possess anenergetic NGO culture. In the 1980s it appeared that a newpluralistic framework may have evolved in Egypt, with a collectionof secular and religious parties such as the Wafd and the MuslimBrotherhood contesting parliamentary elections. In the 1987legislative elections, the ruling National Democratic Partysuffered one of its worst showings. Under the guise of suppressingan Islamic insurgency, Hosni Mubarak quickly imposed emergency lawsthat silenced the totality of political expression. However, asparties' fortunes declined, the NGOs flourished, with feministgroups, environmental organizations and human rights associationsdominating the topography of opposition. In a similar manner,Tunisia stands today as one of the most repressive Arab regimes,with President Ben Ali routinely jailing, harassing and exilingeven the most moderate of his critics. Yet Tunisia also features avery active League for Defense of Human Rights, whose advocacy hasbeen noteworthy and not entirely ineffective. All this is not todisparage the function of advocacy organizations, as they have beencourageous in highlighting pervasive discrimination and humanrights abuses, but merely to suggest that the proper agency forachieving pluralistic rule is not non-government organizations.

Liberal autocracies are happy to encourage NGO discussion as asubstitute for political action. In January 2004, 820 delegatesfrom around the Middle East met in Yemen to create the "ArabDemocracy Dialogue Forum." The stated purpose of this organizationis to promote "dialogue between diverse actors, strengtheningdemocracy, human rights and civil liberties, especially freedom ofopinion and expression, and strengthening the partnership betweenpublic authorities and civil society." In March, Egyptian presidentHosni Mubarak even gave the keynote address at a pan-Arabconference convened to discuss the role of NGOs in Arabsociety.

The vast majority of Arab regimes have eschewed completelyclosed political systems that contain the risk of driving theopposition forces underground and radicalizing the voices ofdissent. The reigning despots have learned the lessons of Iran'srevolution, where the shah's draconian policies managed to uniteforces as disparate as Islamists, secularists, communists andnationalists. Instead, the ruling authorities are opting for agoverning order of rewards and penalties that has effectivelyfractured the opposition. The emergence of liberal autocraticregimes in the Middle East is not without its costs and burdens.Such an order causes political society to degenerate, weakenssecular opposition, engenders cynicism among the public andempowers extremist groups (religious and secular) by seeming tovalidate their ideological claims. The palliative to thedysfunction of the Middle East is not autocratic experiments butgenuine democratization.

Democratization vs. Liberalization

Despite all the discussions over the past few years regardingthe transformation of the Middle East, the Washington consensusstill sees the existing strategy of gradual liberalization as themost valid. As such, the focus of America's efforts has beenassisting with election commissions, voter registration programsand supporting civic awareness. The anemic Arab civil society hasbeen the object of perennial fascination for State Departmentbureaucrats and professional democracy promoters, as the lure ofthe NGO community has proven difficult to resist. To its credit,the Bush Administration did stress the need for economic reform butthen proceeded to recommend a set of entirely ineffective measuressuch as the Micro-Finance Consultative Group. Quite naturally,women's rights campaigns, literacy corps and parliamentaryexchanges further complement America's lackluster efforts.

Traditionally, much of Washington's strategy has evolved aroundassisting NGOs and civil society groups and working to changesocial norms (for example, enhancing the status of women andminorities). This strategy is derived from the democracy-promotioncommunity's claim that empowerment of the NGOs and civilassociations will lead them to successfully pressure the incumbentregimes toward progressive change.

This misapplies the Eastern European experience. In one-partystates guided by totalitarian ideology, providing assistance toNGOs was essential to provide room not only for oppositionpolitical forces, but simply for independent social actors. In theUSSR, where the state controlled all forms of public expression,the so-called neformaly (informal associations), even whenestablished to deal with cultural or humanitarian issues, were ofnecessity "political" actors--they challenged the power of thestate to set the agenda. Throughout Eastern Europe, NGOs played acritical role in laying the groundwork for true political partiesto emerge.

Within liberal autocracies, however, there is already somedegree of contested public space and there already exists a"non-governmental sector" in which NGOs function. Arab autocratshave been adept at fending off such pressures and have successfullymanipulated domestic forces to their advantage. Providing aid toNGOs only makes sense if it is a first step in a process ofpolitical transformation.

A genuine strategy of democratization would concentrate, firstand foremost, on placing significant curbs on executive power. Theproper prelude to fostering such a society is to shift the focusaway from NGOs and civil society groups to constitutional reformand an independent judiciary.

Throughout the region, the current constitutions enshrine thepower of the executive and immunize him from any challenge to hisprerogatives. Monarchs and presidents stand in a privilegedposition, as their decisions are unencumbered by eitherparliamentary legislation or judicial verdict. Moreover, many Arabconstitutions deliberately undermine the power of the legislativebranch by granting the executive the right to appoint an upperchamber that can obstruct parliamentary initiatives. Free electionsto such emasculated institutions will not pave the way foremergence of a democratic order, as the existing constitutionalprovisions effectively strangle any viable reform project.

The second imperative of democratic change is an independentjudiciary. Throughout the Middle East, the judiciary is staffed bythe compliant agents of the executive, and the courts have beenused to prevent media outlets and pro-democracy forces fromorganizing. Any attempt to create political parties in the regionis routinely denied legal sanction by the judiciary. Although thesecurity services are often decried for their abuses, it is thejudiciary that provides the legal cover for the arrest ofdissidents and closure of newspapers. Iran is the case study of howa cynical judiciary working in conjunction with the unelectedbranches of government can effectively undermine a progressiveregime and its reformist agenda. Through its contrived proceduresand arbitrary verdicts, Iran's judiciary effectively silenced theregion's most vibrant press and subverted parliamentaryinitiatives. The lesson of Iran is that in the absence of legalreform and independent judges, the hegemony of the unelectedinstitutions is unlikely to be disturbed.

If Washington is serious about democratization in the MiddleEast, as opposed to liberalization, it has to change strategies.Rhetorical commitments to democracy are no substitute for achecklist of steps that can be taken by regimes in the region. Thereality remains that Western governments have been complicit increating and sustaining the current autocratic order. Moreover, themasters from Cairo to Algiers have remained confident of America'sforbearance, as competing geopolitical factors have ensured thatU.S. assistance and loans continue even in the absence of anymeaningful change.

A viable democratization strategy would employ the considerableeconomic leverage that the United States and Europe possess topressure these states toward viable reforms. Preferential tradeagreements, foreign assistance and access to U.S. markets should becontingent on the level of progress that regimes make towarddemocracy. The U.S. experience vis-ˆ-vis Latin America, especiallyMexico during the 1980s and 1990s, and that of the EU towards itseastern periphery make it clear that when political reform islinked to economic benefits, regimes can be induced to introducechanges that lay the basis for a democratic transformation. TheWest should link aid to reforms designed to reduce state controlsover both political life and the economy.

In a similar vein, Washington should press for deep-seatedeconomic reforms designed to strengthen competing centers of power.The cases of Taiwan and South Korea demonstrate that an emergingentrepreneurial class is often a vocal constituency on behalf ofaccountability and transparency. In the 1990s, under the pressureof the IMF, many of the regional states, including pivotalcountries such as Egypt and Algeria, experimented with economicliberalization only to abandon them when they threatened thepolitical prerogatives of the regimes--with the tacit support ofthe West.

The United States can no longer ignore the need for fundamentaleconomic reform. Yet privatization plans that only benefit regimeloyalists and the cronies of the ruling families need to beavoided. And while the system of subsidies which keeps the pricesof consumer goods like bread and gasoline artificially low dodistort the economy, they need to be phased out in a gradual,systematic way that avoids eroding middle-class support forreforms.

Beyond the economic dimension, the United States can also useits political influence to pressure the existing rulers. If U.S.officials make democratic change the foremost item in theirdiscussions with their regional counterparts while the presidentapplies the powers of the bully pulpit, the seriousness of thisissue will be noted in the region. This would imply no more statevisits for President Mubarak and Crown Prince Abdullah until thebehavior of their regimes alters. Although this may seem a symbolicgesture, it is a gesture that will have an impact on the minds ofself-important rulers accustomed to lavish treatment in Washington.Ultimately, this strategy calls for imposing pressures on Arabstates that have too often received a pass from successive U.S.administrations because of their strategic value. If the objectiveof U.S. policy is to foster equitable societies in the Middle Eastand a political culture that does not sanctify violence againstAmerica, then it has to be willing to embrace the risk ofalienating traditional allies and potentially imperiling some ofits tangible security interests. The point remains that there aretradeoffs. One cannot promote democracy in the region whileexempting the House of Saud from responsibility and continuing toprovide generous economic assistance to the Mubarak regime.

The other facet of a democratization strategy is to focus on theresolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is not tosanction the cynical Arab leaders' ploy of employing the conflictas a means avoiding reforms, but to acknowledge that the continueddisenfranchisement of the Palestinians has a corrosive impact onthe Arab body politic. The region's populace has visceral sympathyfor the plight of the Palestinians, and the perception of America'scollusion with Prime Minster Sharon has systematically destroyedthe peace process, fueling the radicalism that has proven soinimical to change. The region simply cannot move to its democraticfuture without resolving the remaining legacy of the OttomanEmpire's dissolution.

The Islamists Are Coming

One reason Washington has been historically reticent to pressfor democracy in the Middle East is its inordinate fear ofIslamists. More than any other factor, the specter of Algeriainforms and distorts the democracy debate. The ill-conceivedAlgerian democratization of the early 1990s led to the electoralsurge of Islamists, culminating in a civil war that costapproximately 150,000 lives. The reigning autocrats routinelyinvoke the "lessons of Algeria" as they claim that opening thesystem would only benefit religious zealots determined to usher ina theocratic order. In a strange nexus, the Western governments'fear of Islamists and the dictatorial regimes' cleverrationalizations have conspired to defer much-needed reform of theregion's political order.

As with most ideological tendencies, the complexion of Islamismis changing, as more temperate forces are assuming the leadershipof this movement. In states as varied as Turkey, Morocco andBahrain, moderate Islamist parties are coming to the forefront,calling for participation in the political process as opposed towaging violent campaigns against the state. Indeed, beyond theglare of Western media, a subtle intellectual transformation isunderway in many Islamist circles, with leading figures such asIran's Muhammad Khatami or Egypt's Hassan Hanafi calling forharmonization of Islamic injunctions with democratic precepts. Tobe sure, given the retaliatory power of the state and the inabilityof radical Islamists to dislodge the regimes through violence inthe early 1990s, such reconsiderations may seem a tacticalconcession to an altered balance of power. Nonetheless, theinclination of many Islamists to reconsider their ideologicalstrategies should not be discounted. De-radicalization is not a newtrend, as leftist forces in Latin America moderated theirobjectives once presented with the opportunity to participate inthe political process. Once part of the governing order, theimperative of getting re-elected led many leftists to actuallyabandon their disruptive and costly utopian schemes in search ofmore practical solutions to their societies' conundrums. It is timeto test the premise of "moderate Islam" and not continuously invokethe Algerian trauma as a justification for prolonging a deficientautocratic rule.

Whatever success Islamists may have in revitalizing their creed,it is important to appreciate how Islamism is proving a fadingideology in today's Middle East. Given the Islamists' inability tocraft viable solutions to problems such as economic inequality andlack of political representation, they are proving a pooralternative to the prevailing regimes. The best manner of furthermarginalizing Islamism is to expand the marketplace of ideas andenhance competitive politics. Islamism has succeeded only becauseit has managed to survive in an authoritarian political landscapeand thus assumes the mantle of opposition. The reality remains thatover the past three decades, the Arab populace has gradually grownweary of radical ideologies and their self-proclaimed truths. Frompan-Arabism and its promise of Arab renaissance to Islamism and itsquest for salvation, the beleaguered populace has come toappreciate that the primary effect of such ideologies is repressionand stagnation. After much experimentation, the Arab masses mayfinally be ready for democracy with all its burdens andrewards.

As the strong bastions of authoritarian rule in eastern Europeand Latin America have been overwhelmed by democratic forces, theMiddle East remains in the trenches of despotism. However, the Arabpredicament is not only inconsistent with the global trends, butwith the region's own history. During the first half of the 20thcentury, Arab states such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq did have vibrantcivil societies, lively presses and assertive parliaments. To besure, this was elite politics, with Western-educated landowners andmerchants interacting easily with the colonial powers. Nonetheless,the Arab world did have its own fleeting "liberal age", with checksand balances and power-sharing arrangements. The rise of militarystrongmen and dictatorships is a relatively new phenomenon, belyingthe notion that the region lacks its own pluralistictraditions.

Even more anomalous is the embrace of democracy as the foremostregional objective of the United States. In the contest betweenAmerican values and interests, the latter has historically beenpredominant. The centrality of the oil economy, the imperative ofresolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and the need for allies in theWar on Terror have pushed U.S. administrations toward unsavoryallies who pledged stability and cooperation. Last year, PresidentBush called for the end to the usual compacts and the need for afundamental reformation of the Arab order. However, a crestfallenAmerica entangled in the Iraqi quagmire seems to have abandoned itsown idealistic aspirations in favor of returning to the old statusquo.

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