China, My China
In the past two issues of The National Interest, there has been a great deal of discussion about "China's rise" in the international system. Let me give a Chinese point of view on China's evolving role in global affairs.
In his address at the United Nations Summit on September 15, 2005, President Hu Jintao declared that China would "actively participate in international affairs and fulfill its international obligations, and work with other countries in building . . . a new international political and economic order that is fair and rational." Indeed, over the last several years, China has been shouldering more and more international responsibilities. From joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) to playing a leading role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Central Asia and the six-party talks in northeast Asia, China promotes a multilateral approach to solving regional and even global problems and accepts the importance of promoting a "rules-based" international system.
China's rapid growth and growing presence are inevitably reshaping Asia; as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China bears responsibility for the maintenance of global peace and stability. But how far does China's willingness to be a greater player in global affairs run, and what is China's capacity to contribute to global governance?
Since the beginning of the post-Cold War era, China's foreign policy has been guided by the maxim of "keeping a low profile" and only taking action "if conditions permit" China to do so with little risk. Moreover, the traditional notions of sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states--points President Hu reiterated in his remarks at the UN--are still dominant in shaping China's approach to international affairs. Most Chinese still view international affairs through the lens of what benefits the national interest, rather than believing that China has any special responsibility for the global order. More recently, some have been concerned that if China assumes a more prominent role in both regional and international organizations, this could stoke up the "China threat", especially in the United States, fanning fears that Beijing is embarking on a campaign to expand its sphere of influence.
China, therefore, is not fully prepared to embrace the notion that it is a custodian of the current international system, with all of the responsibilities that would entail. Significantly, its foreign policy still is largely focused on dealing with regional problems on a bilateral level with its neighbors. To argue that China is on the verge of becoming the "second superpower" of the international system is premature.
Moreover, this raises a second question: Does China have the capacity to play a greater role in international affairs, both in terms of diplomatic and economic power? For the past three decades, China has been portrayed as a globalization success story, with impressive rates of economic growth. China's high-technology industries, its nascent "homegrown" multinational corporations and its space program testify to China's emergence as a force in the global economy.
Nonetheless, China as a whole, while currently the world's fourth-largest economy, still remains a "low income" or "less developed" country. The issue of mass poverty is still a pressing challenge. We must not overestimate China's economic capacity. In recent years, the gap between China's economic development and social progress has widened; economic growth has occurred at the expense of social cohesion (notably between the developed eastern industrial coast and the less developed regions of the West), and growth has also extracted a huge environmental cost.
Therefore, China's top priority at present and for the foreseeable future is to solve domestic problems. Its capacity in dealing with pressing global issues is relatively limited--although China's booming economy allows it, over time, to become a more important contributor in supporting multilateral solutions to problems ranging from terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to climate change.
But more is needed. As an emerging great power, China must be willing and able to take on a larger and more responsible role in global affairs--but this should not occur haphazardly. Chinese universities and think tanks need to do much more in discussing the role China should be playing in the world. Regrettably, China has failed to be an "intellectual actor" in addressing questions of global governance. When President Hu speaks of China desiring to facilitate a "harmonious world", this must be translated from the realm of "good wishes" into formulating policy recommendations, identifying the challenges requiring China to assume a greater role of leadership, and developing the norms, rules and institutions that will define the international order of the 21st century.
China's "peaceful rise" or "peaceful development" has enormous implications for the international system--and in turn, China needs to be prepared to shoulder the responsibilities for global peace and stability befitting a power of its stature.
Pang Zhongying
Director, Institute of Global Studies, Nankai University
Tianjin, China
Contributing Editor,
The National Interest
In "A New Forum For Peace" (Winter 2005/06), Ian Bremmer, Choi Sung-hong and Yoriko Kawaguchi describe an idea that is gaining support among Asian and American government officials, academics and think tankers: establishing a forum based on the six-party talks to address energy security in northeast Asia.
