I was greeted in March 2006 by Manmohan Singh in a small sitting room in the quite modest prime minister's bungalow in New Delhi. The prime minister of India wore a broad smile, for he had just days before concluded a revolutionary nuclear deal with George W. Bush. Probably outside of Israel, no foreign capital is as pro-Bush as Delhi. Singh was basking in the glory of the Bush deal.
Indeed, India's political and strategic elite, even more than America's, understands the epic nature of the new strategic relationship with Washington. It has been rightly compared with Nixon's opening to China in the 1970s. It's different in many ways, but it has the same potential to reshape almost all geostrategic equations, particularly those involving China.
The economist academic who happens to be India's prime minister is still not really a politician-that's one of Singh's great strengths-but he was prepared to accept a little gentle praise for the Bush deal. In Washington, there is much (reasonably justified) self-congratulation over the India initiative, which is rightly seen as a masterstroke, but America has scarcely recognized India's own complex and many-faceted motivations for entering the new relationship. One, which political correctness prevents both Indians and Americans from publicly discussing much, is India's growing strategic competition with China. With a characteristic Asian feel for the balance of power, New Delhi has reached out to the superpower to counter-balance, in part, its giant neighbor and inevitable rival China. I predict that throughout the rest of this century India's strategic competition with China will intensify and become almost as fundamental a part of the global order as the Sino-American contest.
Asia's international orientation contrasts diametrically with Europe's. No one in Asia wants to pool sovereignty or find refuge in postmodern, trans-state associations. Asia's politicians have come up through hard schools and amid hard neighbors. They appreciate hard power; the U.S. position is much stronger in Asia than anywhere else in the world.
For some time India was something of an exception to this Asian rule. For most of the Cold War it took the Non-Aligned Movement seriously and indulged to no end in moralizing on foreign policy. But just as the market has liberated India's entrepreneurs, the booming economy has bolstered state power and brought to the ruling class a realistic sense of opportunity and an appreciation for classical national-interest calculations.
This may seem an eccentric moment to argue the inevitability of Indian-Chinese strategic competition. The two giant neighbors have made progress on their festering border disputes and have even reopened a land trade bridge along the Silk Road, which had been closed for decades. Two-way trade is booming and may reach $20 billion next year, with a substantial trade surplus for India. At one moment of delirious fatuousness the two nations' leaders even referred to each other as "strategic partners", though that formulation has quietly died.
All of that is to the good. But the national personalities and demographics of each country consign them to deeper competition. Half of India's billion-plus people are younger than 25, forming a much younger profile than China's population. Very soon, perhaps by 2020, it will overtake China as the most populated nation in the world. And then there is India's effusive regard for the United Nations (the last gasp of the Non-Aligned mentality) and determination to ascend to Security Council membership, which China implacably opposes.
Or take India's nuclear deal with the United States. China is strongly opposed to that as well, on the pretext of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt). Under the deal, the United States will presumably support only India's peaceful nuclear energy program (which will come under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency), but New Delhi will maintain its nuclear weapons program. The npt holds that only the five recognized nuclear weapons states (the United States, China, Russia, the uk and France) are permitted to have nuclear weapons.
The U.S.-India deal will bring 65 percent of India's nuclear program under iaea supervision. Since there is no way any Indian government would ever give up its nuclear weapons, this represents progress on counter-proliferation. India, after all, has never proliferated nuclear-weapons technology to another nation or party, something that cannot be said of npt member China-to say nothing of Pakistan. The ban on supplying nuclear technology to India has been accompanied by a range of technological restrictions that have hurt India's economic and industrial development. Most of those restrictions have been phased out, but Singh was delighted to see the last of them eliminated with the U.S. deal.
In his discussion with me, Singh made clear that he would like to buy Australian uranium. Australia possesses about 40 percent of the known reserves of uranium and is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, so Singh was making more than a mere theoretical proposition. But China immediately said it wants the npt preserved and opposed the selling of uranium to any party outside npt provisions, which would exclude India from purchasing uranium.
In other words, China opposes the emergence of Indian power. Indeed, China has played its diplomatic hand brilliantly, getting the world to accept its own estimation of itself (an emerging great power), while thwarting any such projected status for India. Objectively, as the old Marxists might have said, Indian power contradicts Chinese power.
