Eternal Clausewitz

Readers needn't agree that the correlation of forces in the former Yugoslavia--that the Bosnian army, "properly armed, and given limited assistance from the air...could have regained the territory itself"--or that preventing the establishment of G

Issue: Spring 1995

One of the strengths of Noel Malcolm's essay that opens this issue of The National Interest is that it is clearly, if mutedly, a Clausewitzian analysis of the crisis in Bosnia. Readers needn't agree with Malcolm's assessment of the correlation of forces in the former Yugoslavia--that the Bosnian army, "properly armed, and given limited assistance from the air...could have regained the territory itself"--or his contention that preventing the establishment of Greater Serbia was of such interest to the United States or Western Europe to allow for intervention. But they are obliged to appreciate the essential sanity of his larger point: war is an instrument of politics.

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