LAST DECEMBER the United States was presented with two breakthroughs, each poised to advance a key U.S. foreign policy priority: the promotion of democracy and nuclear non-proliferation. In Ukraine the "Orange Revolution" thwarted a corrupt government's efforts to use a fraudulent vote count to install a hand-picked successor and brought to power as president Viktor Yushchenko, a leader committed not only to democratic reform at home but to integrating Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community. Iran had agreed with the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) to suspend temporarily its uranium-enrichment activities during negotiations over its nuclear program.
One year later, however, the United States is worse off with respect to both Ukraine and Iran. Ukraine's government did not engage in the kind of reform effort the West had hoped to see, and the Orange coalition has fractured. Negotiations with Iran collapsed in late summer, with little prospect of a deal to place significant limits on its ability to develop and eventually deploy nuclear weapons.
It appeared at the beginning of 2005 that a key component of U.S. strategy in dealing both with Ukraine and Iran would be to use the incentive of membership in major international institutions as a way to bring about positive change. Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and with it normalized diplomatic relations with the Western powers (particularly an end to remaining economic sanctions), was clearly of interest to Iran, while Ukraine hoped that a clear signal on its prospective membership in both the EU and NATO would give the government the credibility it needed to pursue difficult reforms at home. Given the significant financial resources that the United States has committed elsewhere to bring about change in other states' behavior, it made sense to use international organizations to help induce change in these two countries.
