The recent storms in American-German relations illuminate two basic truths. First, a solid and stable relationship between America and Germany remains, as it has for more than half a century, the indispensable precondition for progress toward European integration. Second, the area now causing the greatest disputes between Germany and the United States--the Middle East--is the area in which the two countries have major interests in common, and where both stand to gain the most by finding their way to a cooperative path. There is a third truth, that in Washington German frustration over its lack of influence in American policymaking represents a threat to U.S.-German relations that both Americans and Germans must address.
German leaders used to be among the most respected world figures in the United States. From the final resignation of Winston Churchill to the arrival of Margaret Thatcher, German leaders and diplomats were consistently more respected and frequently more listened to in Washington than their (admittedly mostly mediocre) British counterparts. Yet, since unification, Germany's standing in Washington has fallen, and recent transatlantic spats over the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Iraq have not helped matters.
Germany's problems today in influencing America can be reduced to the following conclusion: key "Red State" or "American Revivalist" policymakers think Germany's advice is mostly bad, and so want to take as little of it as possible. They will only take German advice when the benefits of German cooperation or the costs of German obstruction are greater than the perceived cost of doing what Germany wants.
