ON MARCH 22, the opposition Kuomingtang (KMT) scored a resounding victory over the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in the Taiwan presidential elections. This historic event marks a key moment in Taiwan's transition from a young to a mature democracy, particularly once the reins of power are returned to the KMT, which has spent the last eight years in opposition. President-elect Ma Ying-jeou won with a 17 percent margin, signaling the voters' discontent with the past eight years of DPP rule in which Taiwan's economy lagged behind the region, the president was tarnished by corruption scandals and Taiwan's international relations suffered. To Beijing's delight, the two referenda proposing Taiwan join the UN also failed to pass, signaling a complete repudiation of President Chen Shui-bian and the DPP.
Ma Ying-jeou's presidency presents a historic opportunity for tangible improvement in cross-straits relations, as well as Taiwan-U.S. relations.
The Election Results
MA YING-JEOU'S victory represents a shift in the political landscape of Taiwan, signaling the rise of moderate and pragmatic policies and international relations. During his campaign, Ma pledged "three no's": no unification, no independence and no use of force. Focusing on the domestic economy and strengthening relations with China and major countries, Ma stood in opposition to Chen Shui-bian's ideological "identity politics" which created ethnic tensions, needlessly provoked China and strained relations with the United States and Japan. Ma's landslide victory established that the electorate is not worried that he will "sell out" Taiwan to China, and that the peaceful status quo is preferable to either unification with the PRC or "Taiwan independence."
Following the Presidential inauguration on May 20, Ma's honeymoon will be short, with voters fed up with eight years of economic stagnation and political infighting within the DPP. President-elect Ma has promised economic growth, new infrastructure projects and reduced unemployment. He will have to quickly demonstrate that he can get things done.
To do that, Ma will have to carefully manage his allies in the Legislative Yuan, where the KMT holds 81 of the 113 seats. There is some risk that the KMT will be seen by the public as exercising absolute control and not accountable to the electorate, harking back to the decades of one-party rule and marshal law following the KMT's defeat at the hands of the Communists in 1949. Taiwanese voters in 2011 will enthusiastically support the opposition if the KMT becomes a bully or is tarnished by corruption scandals. A KMT insider said that the most important qualification for obtaining a position in the new government is high ethical standards and a strong reputation for honesty. Ma Ying-jeou's reputation as a clean politician was an important asset in his run for office as the KMT seeks to shake its historical image as a corrupt and autocratic organization.
Likewise, the KMT's treatment of outgoing president Chen Shui-bian will be closely watched. President Chen faces criminal charges of embezzlement, while his wife and son-in-law have cases currently on appeal. The Taiwanese constitution does not protect a former president from prosecution, and some KMT lawmakers might be tempted to seek revenge on President Chen. Ma Ying-jeou can not forestall a trial as the president does not have the power to pardon until after a conviction has been made. A bitter trial will prevent reconciliation and any likelihood that the DPP will be a constructive loyal opposition in Ma's first term. Furthermore, perceptions of persecution of a former president could have a chilling effect on other countries that are transitioning to democracy. The new president will have to strike a balance between protecting Taiwan's rule of law with the KMT's and the island's image.
Ma's strategy to engage the mainland using the "one China, different interpretations" model provides a gateway for talks with China. At a post-election press conference, Ma said, "we are trying to adopt a middle of the road, mutual non-denial agreement; that is, we won't deny their existence but we cannot recognize them. . . ." This construct will enable Ma to follow up on domestic economic investments by building economic links with the mainland. Direct flights and cargo services are a high priority, as is reducing investment restrictions on Taiwanese companies, opening financial markets and increasing tourism.
Once economic issues are addressed, political détente is the next objective, and ultimately military confidence building measures and potentially even a peace treaty.
Implications for China
OUTCOME OF the election and failure of the referenda is the ideal outcome for Beijing and undoubtedly a relief for China's Taiwan-watchers. It is expected that Chinese officials will shift their strategy towards Taiwan from one of crisis management to a new "opportunity management." However, China's political ship of state is ponderous at best and will move very cautiously. An important question is whether China can capitalize on the new government in Taipei, particularly when faced with difficult internal political challenges throughout China. Furthermore, there are strong lobbies within China that will still seek to subjugate Taiwan and force a unification agenda or play up a "Taiwan independence" threat that may no longer be there. Likewise, there will be a temptation for Beijing to have high expectations that Ma will make concessions to the PRC and support moves that bolster China's claims of sovereignty. It would be a mistake to underestimate Ma's "Taiwaneseness" and clear motivations to protect Taiwan's current status quo.
For their part, China can make some important gestures that improve Taiwan's security and encourage the new president to carry through with his promise to improve cross-strait relations. Freezing the deployment of new ballistic missiles across the strait from Taiwan would be an important first step. Other offensive-weapons procurement programs can also be scaled back, and eventually, redeployments of PLA units away from the coast can be considered. Track II dialogues between China and Taiwan should be expanded, including political and military dialogues. Further confidence building measures can also be implemented, including reduction of military exercises or patrols that present the risk of accidental contact or miscommunication.
In response to Ma's commitments not to seek independence, China should also plan to permit Taiwan greater international space. In particular, observer status at the World Health Assembly and ultimately an appropriate form of membership in the World Health Organization is feasible and advisable because membership in the WHO is not predicated on statehood. China should also support a greater role for Taiwan in the World Bank among other institutions.
While China has important opportunities to bring Taiwan closer, it must be careful not to overplay its hand. A majority of Taiwanese support the current peaceful status quo, while only small minorities support unification, just as a small minority supports de jure independence. China can not push Ma Ying-jeou too hard. Likewise, it will also have to adjust its rhetoric, which has been tuned to a shrill pitch after eight years of Chen Shui-bian's presidency.
Implications for the United States
AFTER THE election, President Bush's congratulatory statement hints at the relief felt at the KMT victory, reflecting the optimism that the greatest potential "hotspot" in Asia is now less likely to draw the American military into a conflict.
In his message to the people of Taiwan after the election, he stated:
It falls to Taiwan and Beijing to build the essential foundations for peace and stability by pursuing dialogue through all available means and refraining from unilateral steps that would alter the cross-Strait situation. I believe the election provides a fresh opportunity for both sides to reach out and engage one another in peacefully resolving their differences.
Clearly, the United States does not benefit from a Taiwan that is more anti-China than it needs to be. Ma has made rebuilding ties with the United States and other major powers a priority and it will take some time to rebuild trust. The United States and other countries have seen Taiwan more as a problem that needs to be managed, rather than a constructive and valued partner. However, greater trust between the United States and Taiwan will not be difficult to build, and will likely be measured by U.S. signals, such as permitting Ma Ying-jeou to "transit" the continental United States on his way to visit Taiwan's diplomatic allies in the region.
The new administration in Taiwan gives cause for optimism. However, the there will be many challenges to overcome before peace in the straits can be assured. The KMT victory reduces the threat of military intervention across the straits, though maintaining Taiwan's defense will be a tricky proposition for the United States. Arms sales will continue to be a contentious issue, such as the possible procurement of F-16s for Taiwan. Likewise, Beijing will have to learn to accommodate a strengthening Taiwan-Japan relationship, which will include a security dimension in addition to the commercial and political relationship. The United States will encourage and support a Taiwan-Japan relationship, while seeking to reassure Beijing that its interests remain intact.
TAIWAN'S MOST recent election demonstrates that democracy is not mutually exclusive to Confucian or Chinese culture and liberal political systems contribute to the peace and stability of the region. The KMT's experience also shows that a dominant political party can give up power and peacefully regain it again. The 2008 election was a vitally important social safety valve, ensuring the accountability of leaders and ensconcing the role of civil society, free media and freedom of speech in Taiwan. These freedoms are some of Taiwan's greatest assets and a clear signal to the world that Taiwan enjoys an independent identity and a proud and dignified population. The PRC claims Taiwan as part of its sovereign territory. The election process increases the likelihood of a peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status and ensures that the interests of Taiwan's people will be assured, regardless of the definition of "one China."
Drew Thompson is the Director of China Studies and Starr Senior Fellow at The Nixon Center.
