"Nuclear Abolition, A Reverie," Fred C. Iklé's article from the September/October 2009 National Interest, provoked responses from former-Ambassador Max M. Kampelman and Stimson Center cofounder Barry M. Blechman. Click here to view Kampelman's retort, here to read Blechman's and here to read Iklé's rebuttal to both.
The National Interest performed a constructive public service in publishing Fred Ikle's important article critical of those of us who have been energetically striving to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. Indeed, before writing an essay urging that goal, I consulted with Fred whom I respect. I had been greatly influenced toward the abolition position by President Reagan and by my role as his negotiator on nuclear arms with the Russians. Fred was skeptical. This was disappointing because I consider him to be one of our country's most impressive scholars on the subject. His skepticism at the time has now apparently turned to opposition. In any event, I continue to believe that the strength, stability and possibly the survival of our civilization require our leadership toward ending nuclear weapons.
At the outset, let me express my doubts about Fred's belief that Reagan was not committed to a nuclear free world. That may have been the president's feeling prior to Reykjavik, but I had a number of conversations with him in which he consistently advocated zero nuclear missiles as his goal. I can only explain Fred's belief to the contrary by noting the possibility that the president's ambition to abolish the weapons was strengthened during his negotiations with the Russians.
Fred doubts that we can persuade all the atomic countries to believe in a nuclear-free world and questions whether we can convince states without nuclear weapons not to build them. He also seems to assume that nations such as ours will have to lead the way by setting an example and reducing our stockpiles. Let me assure him that his concerns are unwarranted. The serious and experienced men and women with whom I work toward the goal of zero are well aware of the complexities of achieving that goal. The large numbers of political leaders and scientists throughout the world who associate themselves with the goal of zero are not naïve about the complexity of disarmament. I, for one, would not want to abandon or weaken our current military position unless the elimination of nuclear weapons is world-wide. Fred and your readers should not assume a leadership toward zero which is naïve in the world of politics. We are fully and realistically aware of the fact that the zero goal means that nuclear weapons "must become fully dismantled . . . and safeguarded," a process which is "costly and takes time."
There is a process by which we could eliminate nuclear weapons that is practical and achievable, and necessary if our civilization is to be protected. Our president (with or without the Russians) should submit a resolution to the UN General Assembly declaring the abolition of nuclear missiles to be a fundamental premise of our civilized international body politic. In effect, the role of the General Assembly would be to declare a civilized world without nuclear weapons to be its goal.
It should be remembered that, at the inaugural opening of the United Nations, President Truman declared nuclear weapons to be contrary to the very purpose of the organization and that they should be abolished. I have spoken at three different UN activities in New York and have met with UN officials as well. If such a resolution were submitted by the United States (with or without others), it would be overwhelmingly (if not unanimously) adopted by the General Assembly. I look upon this as a declaration by the world of what "ought" to be our goal. (As a teacher of political science, I told my students that civilization was the movement of the "ought" to the "is.")
The UN General Assembly resolution would also provide that the Security Council should be charged with the task of enforcement and preventing cheating. Such a procedure should also provide a punishment provision of total political, economic and social isolation directed at "guilty" states. The Security Council procedure will and should take careful steps and months of deliberation, but there is no doubt in my mind that the civilized world can move the "ought" of zero to the "is." The United States should obviously not reduce its weapons unless and until it is satisfied that the world is on the same wavelength.
Nuclear abolition is and should be considered as indispensable in a civilized world. The alternative is chaos.
Max M. Kampelman served as U.S. ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1980-1984; ambassador and head of the U.S. delegation to negotiate with the Soviet Union on nuclear and space arms, 1985-1989; Counselor, Department of State, 1987-1989; chairman emeritus of the American Academy of Diplomacy; and chairman emeritus of the Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.
Fred Iklé's airy dismissal of nuclear abolition in the September/October issue of The National Interest is built upon an obvious contradiction. On the one hand, as a self-defined realist, he believes that nuclear weapons can only be eliminated after the creation of an all-powerful international organization-a world government, in fact. Yet, curiously for a realist, he deduces his alternative proposal for the nuclear problem from the following observation (emphasis added):
The fact that nuclear weapons have not been used for sixty-four years gives us hope. This tradition of nonuse is almost miraculous.
In other words, for Iklé, it is unrealistic to believe that nuclear weapons can be eliminated without first creating a world government, but it is realistic to believe that during the decades or centuries until that happens, if it ever does, nuclear weapons will continue not to be used-or at least we can hope for the continuation of such miracles. What nonsense! And so typical of the opponents of elimination: hyperventilate about the potential risks of a world without nuclear weapons, but shut your eyes to the rising risks of the real, proliferating world in which we live today.
Cases of near uses of nuclear weapons during the Cold War are well known. There are the many U.S./Soviet crises over Berlin, Cuba and the Middle East, when nuclear use was threatened and a reckless or desperate decision by one side or the other could easily have led to a nuclear exchange. And there were many more instances in which technical errors misled one side or the other into believing that it might be under attack, and therefore should retaliate. Perhaps the most frightening of these is chronicled in Martin and Annelise Anderson's new book, Reagan's Secret War, which recounts how, in 1983, during a time when Soviet leaders were convinced the United States was planning a preemptive nuclear attack, a Soviet radar site detected what looked like the launch of three U.S. ICBMs. If not for a courageous Soviet technician who dared defy the standard operating procedure which required him to announce an attack, there would have been a massive Soviet retaliation.
But as Iklé says, miraculously, we have escaped nuclear war for sixty-four years. For how long can we count on the continuation of such divine interventions? After all, although they were deeply engaged in a furious ideological and political struggle, the U.S.-Soviet conflict was a "cold war." The two great powers did not have a history of bloody conflicts and territorial disputes that spanned generations; indeed, they had been allies only a few years before the Cold War broke out. In contrast, take a look at the new and future nuclear nations.
India and Pakistan, both now adding to their nuclear arsenals, have fought three wars and had numerous lesser skirmishes over the past sixty years. Pakistan views its nuclear weapons as essential offsets to India's vastly superior conventional forces. The Indian government showed admirable restraint in not responding against Islamabad following the Pakistan-based terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008. What if terrorists strike again, and this time political circumstances force India's government to retaliate? Will Pakistan accept conventional defeat and its possible dismemberment, or escalate to nuclear use? On which side would a realist bet?
Speaking of Pakistan, there are far worse scenarios. The country is facing several internal insurgencies, as well as a rising Islamist extremist movement, even in its armed forces. Pakistan's military leaders assure us they keep tight control of the country's perhaps two hundred nuclear weapons. Yet, on October 9, insurgents were able to penetrate the country's military command center-its equivalent of the Pentagon. Should the government fall to an al-Qaeda affiliated extremist group, how long would it take for atomic bombs to begin exploding in Western cities? Is it realistic to believe that nuclear weapons in a growing number of countries will remain under state control indefinitely? And it doesn't take the fall of a government for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons-only a few corrupt officials willing to sell one or two.
Or let's look at a probably-soon-to-be nuclear-armed Iran, a country that supports two terrorist organizations that have killed nearly a thousand Americans and many more Israelis. It wouldn't take more than a handful of nuclear bombs to destroy Israel. Wouldn't a divinely inspired Iranian leader, perhaps one nearing the end of his life on earth, be tempted to do so, or would he be deterred by the thousands of Iranian deaths that could be expected from Israel's retaliation? Alternatively, consider the next war between Israel and Syria/Hezbollah-backed by a nuclear-armed Iran. If either side were on the verge of losing, would they gracefully accept defeat or unleash the "ultimate" weapon. Which is the more realistic outcome?
Nor are nuclear-use scenarios confined to the Middle East; let's not forget our friends in North Korea. During the spring of this year, the world witnessed Kim Jong-il's reckless and defiant behavior. Pyongyang has never renounced its goal of unifying the peninsula under its control. Will North Korea's leader utilize nuclear weapons in support of this goal-either directly or through terrorist organizations? Alternatively, if internal upheavals threatened the regime, would Kim Jong-il or his successor hesitate to utilize nuclear weapons to ensure that neither South Korea nor the United States would intervene? Again, a risky bet, even for a realist.
These are only a few of the near-term contingencies. Looking farther into the future, we can see the consequences of Iran's and North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons. More than a dozen countries in the Middle East are already exploring civilian nuclear technologies in response to the Iranian program. In East Asia, South Korea and Japan-both knowledgeable about nuclear technologies-are unlikely to remain non-nuclear indefinitely if North Korea's weapons are not rolled back. And as atomic weapons become common currency, who else might be willing to make the investment? High on the list would be countries formerly occupied by the Soviet Union who still feel threatened by Russian military power. What about nations possessing advanced civilian nuclear technologies that explored and then cancelled weapon programs in the past-places like Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa? Once the world has twenty or thirty or forty nuclear-weapon states, as compared to the current near-ten, the tradition of non-use, in which Iklé places such faith, passes from the realm of the miraculous to the impossible.
There are many misstatements in Iklé's essay, but one overriding error. Nuclear elimination will not result from abolition being forced down the throats of nations by a world government-whether created artificially or grown organically like the example of the European Union, which he cites. These weapons of mass destruction will be eliminated when the leaders of the key nations of the world recognize that the risks of possessing them not only exceed their potential gain, but threaten the very existence of civilization. As such, in their own self-interest, the nuclear powers will come together and create the organizations and processes necessary to ensure the phased, verifiable reductions of existing arsenals and supporting materials, components and infrastructures, as well as the placement of safeguards on civilian nuclear facilities such that their fuels can not be diverted for weapons purposes. The treaty, of course, will include provisions for its governance, verification and enforcement-to facilitate its implementation, create scripts for behavior in various contingencies and build confidence in the process. But ultimately, the treaty will be effective because the signatories recognize it to be in their own self-interest.
Fortunately, in the past few years, increasing numbers of experienced statesmen and political leaders, liberals and conservatives alike, from countries as diverse as the United States, India, the UK, Germany and Russia, have increasingly spoken out about the urgency of eliminating nuclear weapons, no matter how difficult that goal might appear to be at present. Official statements by government leaders have followed. Articulation of the goal of elimination, as by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in their April 2009 summit statement-and the pursuit of measures toward its achievement, such as deep reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty-build constituencies, awareness, and momentum toward this ultimate objective. They make it realistic.
Nuclear disarmament will no doubt be a long process, requiring decades to achieve, but there are no technical obstacles to it. We know how to verify the dismantling of weapons and facilities; most of the necessary procedures are already practiced as a result of existing arms-control agreements or of various nations' unilateral decisions to get rid of their weapons. We know how to safeguard civilian materials and fuel facilities. All that's required is the political will to move down the pathway toward disarmament, the only realistic way to avoid a nuclear conflagration. Advocating naïve dependence on the continuation of the miracle of non-use is an abdication of responsible policy prescription. Get real!
Barry M. Blechman is the cofounder of the Henry L. Stimson Center.
"Nuclear Abolition, A Reverie," received many comments; some praising it and expressing full agreement, others criticizing it and asserting that its reasoning is wrong. Such a debate is useful.
Max M. Kampelman wrote a thoughtful response to my article. Among all the statesmen and scholars who seek to promote a "world without nuclear weapons," he adduced the best reasons for this goal. Yet-with all respect for my friend Max-some of his arguments are wrong; others incomplete.
For example, Kampelman disputes my assertion that President Reagan was not committed to a nuclear-free world. By recalling that after the Reykjavik summit in 1986 President Reagan "constantly advocated zero nuclear missiles as his goal," he tries to prove that I was wrong on this issue. But "zero nuclear missiles" is not the same as "zero nuclear weapons." Nuclear-armed missiles increase the risk of an accidental, unintended nuclear attack. Unlike bombers, missiles that have been launched cannot be recalled and leave little time to avert an Armageddon. I have always favored the abolition of nuclear missiles. In fact, before the Reykjavik summit Kampelman and I suggested to Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger that they advise President Reagan to seek a U.S.-Soviet treaty to abolish missiles. Reagan accepted that recommendation, but the summit broke up without any agreement.
Kampelman also proposes that the United States submit a resolution to the UN General Assembly declaring "a civilized world without nuclear weapons to be its goal." According to him, the UN Security Council should be charged with enforcing this resolution. How many resolutions by the UN General Assembly have been ignored; how few have been implemented? It is utterly improbable that the Security Council would succeed at ensuring the compliance of all the nuclear-armed nations in the world. It cannot even enforce sanctions with one nation-Iran.
Barry M. Blechman also wrote a response to my article. He needs to be tutored by Ambassador Kampelman in how to debate disagreements about a complex policy issue. Instead, Blechman is seized by a paroxysm if anyone casts doubt that a world with zero nuclear weapons can be realized. Blechman also rejects my proposal that a nuclear-free world would require a powerful international organization to monitor and enforce an agreement on abolition. Then he makes a salad of my clearly separated points, and without any evidence writes that I "deduce" the proposal for a strong international organization (or world government) from the fact that nuclear weapons have not been used for sixty-four years.
Blechman cannot comprehend the importance of non-use. In at least four wars, a nuclear-armed nation fought against an enemy who had no nuclear weapons, and yet the atomic power accepted defeat or a stalemate instead of using its bombs to win the war. Blechman mentions India and Pakistan as countries that might escalate a conflict to the use of nuclear weapons. But if both sides in a war have nuclear weapons, mutual deterrence makes such escalation unlikely.
Blechman is right to warn of the possibility that terrorists could use nuclear devices (for instance by gaining control of Pakistan's arsenal), or that North Korea might use atomic weapons through a terrorist organization. But abolition, unless it is totally successful, will not deprive North Korea of nuclear weapons. Neither sanctions nor massive bribes have given us access to Pyongyang's atomic facilities. We donated over $1 billion to propitiate the North-to no avail.
Finally, Blechman decides to ignore all the difficulties of verification, and to forget all the lessons from the many serious violations of arms-control agreements. Instead, he fantasizes that the "leaders of the key nations" will come together and create the organizations "to ensure the phased, verifiable reductions" of nuclear materials. Then Blechman tells us that "ultimately, the treaty will be effective because the signatories recognize it to be in their own self-interest." But the same can be said about the continuation of non-use; about which Blechman exclaimed "what nonsense!"
Fred C. Iklé is a distinguished scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He was undersecretary of defense for policy in the Reagan administration and director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the Nixon administration. He is also a member of The National Interest's Advisory Council.
