LEBANON IS caught in a vortex of sectarian storms, fomented largely by outside players (within and beyond the region) that are now, in turn, impacted by the country's upheaval. The question remains: What will this maelstrom mean for the greater Middle East in the coming years? As one Lebanese observer put it, "Lebanon has entered the tunnel of political uncertainty for years to come." It would hardly be surprising if the contest within and for Lebanon ends as badly as it potentially could for all involved. But the prospect of those dire possibilities in the Levant could also create the impetus for resolution-if a more adaptive Washington recognizes and acts upon it. Barring such realism from Washington and others, the panoply of consequences includes: civil war in Lebanon and even violent infighting within the groups themselves; the strengthening of Al-Qaeda close to Israel's border; another Israeli invasion of Lebanon (in Hizballah's view) and, of course, a general escalation of foreign involvement in Lebanon, particularly by Iran.
According to numerous reports, since the end of the Israeli-Hizballah war of July and August 2006, thousands of Sunni Muslims have converted to Shi‘i Islam out of adulation for Hizballah head Hassan Nasrallah and his resistance to Israel's invasion. However, there is also an economic factor at play, since Iran subsidizes the $200 doled out to each poor and converted Syrian-Sunni household across the border. The Syrian-Alawite regime appears to tolerate this financially subsidized conversion.
The primary challenge for Hizballah may now be resisting the temptation to capitalize on its popularity by attempting to cross bridges that simply should not be crossed. Such a temptation may be hard for Hizballah to resist, driven as it is by a fervent sense of religious righteousness.
