As virtually all the readers of this magazine will agree, the Cold War was a conflict of monumental importance. It defined an era. We believed that the fate of Western civilization--and thus of civilization as such--depended on its outcome, that it could fairly be represented as a conflict between democracy and totalitarianism, freedom and tyranny, good and evil.
Because of this, the Cold War called for an unprecedented commitment on the part of the United States. It was in terms of the conflict's extraordinary, Manichaean, life-threatening character that the overriding priority given to foreign and security policy needs over forty years--a priority that involved the subordination and neglect of many other needs--was justified, and rightly so.
Bearing all this in mind, consider a simple proposition: If the Cold War was a happening of such monumental, compelling importance, one that profoundly shaped American policies and priorities, then surely the end of the Cold War was a happening of comparable importance, calling for an equally profound reassessment of American policies and priorities.
If you have not been paying close attention to recent arguments about foreign policy, your first reaction to this proposition may well be that its truth is so obvious, so banal, that it is hardly worth stating, and certainly not worth discussing at length. If so, you are wrong. To a marked degree current arguments about the foreign policy of this country--particularly arguments among conservatives, Republicans, and what remain of the old Scoop Jackson Democrats--turn on the question of whether this proposition is or is not valid.
