In March 1975, the second Sinai negotiation between Israel and Egypt broke down. After several months of further labor, it was reconstructed successfully when a new element was added: Some Israeli warning stations in the heart of the Sinai were replaced by U.S. warning stations, and an American flag was flown over others. Both sides were reassured. For Egyptians it was a political gain to replace Israeli positions with something more palatable. For Israelis it was a reassurance that positions they vacated were filled by Americans.
Thus, a small but pivotal U.S. role made the difference, producing an agreement in September 1975 that was the foundation for the Camp David breakthrough three years later. The question now is whether the United States should be willing to play a similar role on the Golan Heights, if Israel and Syria should request it and if it should prove a necessary ingredient of a peace treaty between them.
It goes without saying that the United States has the sovereign right to decide if it wants to participate in this way, regardless of the parties' wishes. The U.S. is also entitled to its own assessment of the risks to which any likely treaty would subject its personnel. And the State Department needs to talk to the Pentagon--and to Congress--before it makes a concrete commitment.
But what in the end is a sensible analysis of those risks?
