Are America and Russia adding up positive sums or punching it out along zero sum lines in Central Asia?

An example: after some dramatic haggling, in which it seemed like Russian border guards were about to leave Tajikistan, it was decided on June 4 that the Russians would stay at least until 2006. This ought to be a good thing for all parties - for Russia, for Tajikistan and for the United States, which also has an interest in security along the Tajik-Afghan border. Yet this could also be characterized as a turn by the Tajik government away from a budding American alignment, which had been expressed in earlier attempts to push Russia out. Likewise, a Russian analyst, Sergei Blagov, connected the earlier, anti-Russian moves to Tajik exploration of turning to a U.S. alignment (in "Are Plans for Tajikistan Unraveling?," Asia Times, May 6, 2004). It was the earlier anti-Russian moves that forced the game into a zero-sum mould. If that was America's game, it lost.

Another example: Uzbekistan has reinforced its relations with Russia, dealing the United States a blow in its moves to establish its bases and its influence in the region in place of Russia. This is not a quote from any single source.  Rather, it is how the events of June 15-16 - a Russia-Uzbek pact and a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit - have been interpreted in both the Russian and Western policy analysis communities. The interpretation has an element of truth: there is a new bilateral security pact that says, among other things, that neither nation "will allow a third state to use its territory in a way that can harm the sovereignty of the other." Russian fears shine through in this; but operationally it could dissolve into insignificance if the United States salves Russian fears. And most of the other elements in the enhanced Russian-Uzbek relationship are not zero-sum - not unless made so by the belief on both sides that it must be so. The planned joint anti-terrorism institute is a form of functional cooperation that the United States could consider making itself a part of.

America is going to lose too often in the zero-sum game and ought to stop playing it - or allowing itself to be played off against Russia by the local rulers, as may have happened in the Tajik incident. Given the natural strength of Russian influence in the region, it is simply not a sound game for America.  Russia has too many cards to play - ethnic Central Asians in Moscow whose remittances help keep Central Asia afloat, ethnic Russians in Central Asia who are also essential to the local economy, Central Asian debts to Russia, etc.

Yet month after month, the media - particularly the specialized media of the policy analysis community - report zero-sum moves. If they are Russian media, they report nasty moves by the United States and analyze how these are meant to thwart Russia's legitimate interests. If they are American media, they report ugly moves by Russia and analyze how these are meant to thwart America's beneficent influence in the region. Often they see the moves of both sides as zero-sum - yet they give all the blame to the other side for the zero-sum spirit, and proceed to prescribe (or predict, or praise) a zero-sum response on their own side.

With such "help" from their respective analysis communities, reinforced by Cold War habits, one might expect the two governments to follow completely zero-sum policies in the region. And to end up worse off for it.

Fortunately the reality has, instead, been mixed: some major moves of mutual support and joint policy, alongside some zero-sum moves and some in-between, symbiotic moves. This suggests that there has been new learning from experience, not yet filtered down into some entrenched subcultures; and that there could be a larger space for positive-sum outcomes out there waiting to be tapped, if it could only be explored and analyzed.

The policy analysis community has not been helping with this, neither in Moscow nor in Washington. Not most of the time, at least. But let me paint the scenery of a meeting last month where policy analysts did better.

 

It was a pleasant day at one of the inside-the-beltway think tanks in Washington. A seminar was being held on American and Russian roles in Central Asia. The speakers were competent, reasonable and intelligent. They quickly stumbled into the pit of zero sum logic. Nothing new here. Nevertheless, by the end of the day, the discussion turned itself around, worked its way out of the pit, and climbed up into the sunnier realm of positive sums.

How did it happen? In the early stages, audience questioners as well as panelists were mostly talking within zero-sum frameworks. It did not require a specific effort; it was a default mode for sophisticated analysis. Speakers would sometimes presuppose an inherent natural opposition of U.S. and Russian interests - that is, they would make an unstated zero-sum assumption from the U.S. side - and other times, somewhat contradictorily, would attribute Russian policies to an incorrigible zero-sum outlook in failing to appreciate the wonderful positive-sum approach of the Americans. They would busily develop, tit-for-tat, the implications of these assumptions, depicting mutually opposing past moves, and predicting and prescripting similar future moves. And while they would describe the negativity on both sides, somehow they would always dump the blame for the negativity on Russia.

However, one audience member, a former American diplomat in Moscow, intervened to observe that Russian officials, while deaf to all his  protestations in the 1990s that U.S. moves in the region were not zero-sum, were not always mistaken in that deafness: some of the moves were indeed zero-sum. It was, he said, a "dialogue of the deaf," meaning that the deafness went both ways.

After that, a few questioners and panelists were of a positive-sum bent. They argued that the United States and Russia had more important common interests than opposing interests in the region; that zero-sum habits were to be found  within the bureaucracies on both sides, and both sides were at fault for this; and  that there were also some positive-sum people on both sides. This led to the point that two kinds of coalitions were possible: zero-sum attitudes could prevail by symbiosis, in the usual tit-for-tat manner, but the space was also open for positive-sum people to make progress, if they would communicate their interest in cooperation and develop initiatives together.

The impressive thing, this group argued, was not the zero sums that remained after the long Cold War years, but how much progress had been made in recent years toward positive sums. Particularly it was impressive how far the Russian leadership had gone toward an open-minded approach in such matters as U.S. bases in Russia's backyard.  Significantly, the chair was on the positive-sum side. This is probably what opened up space even in a think tank milieu toward contemplation of a positive-sum approach.

Already some time earlier, positive sums had begun sometimes prevailing in Washington on other levels. For example, responsible executive branch officials have had to deal with America's pressing security needs and new realities, and have found this incompatible with cold war modalities. It is in the analysis community and in permanent bureaucracies that certain subcultures have had greater difficulty with this. But difficulty is not impossibility. On the occasion in question, they too found themselves in a universe where positive as well as zero sums could be contemplated.

And so, the panelists and the chair took the occasion to think out loud about some ways of enhancing the sum of U.S. and Russian activities in Central Asia. It probably wasn't easy for them: it wasn't in any of the prepared remarks, and there was not much to build on in previous work of the analysis community. It wasn't quite brainstorming or pure improvisation, but there was an element of thinking out loud. And this, in an atmosphere that was not entirely conducive to thinking out loud: for there was by no means a consensus in the room for considering such positive-sum approaches, and several audience members were quite insistent on a purely negative-sum view of the intentions and attitudes of Russian elites. Despite these handicaps, several positive sum suggestions were made, along the following lines:

* Open US bases in the region for Russians to visit; have some exchanges, maybe even joint exercises or training;

* Do not let the local despots play Russia and America off against each other. One could imagine that this would be implemented by U.S.-Russia advance consultations on Central Asian issues, so as to put on a united front vis-a-vis Karimov, Niyazov, etc. (To be sure, this isn't necessarily positive sum in itself, but at least it means not letting the local despots reduce us to zero sums by playing us off. And it sets up communications lines for working out positive-sum approaches if we have the imagination to do it.)

* Set a date for US bases to close.

Actually the last suggestion isn't quite positive-sum per se either. It assumes a zero-sum fear of U.S. bases in the region, but tries to reduce the Russia fears by putting a terminus on the situation. Perhaps something similar is true of the first proposal. Nevertheless, taken together, the result would be to create space for more positive-sum thinking and action to emerge.

I wonder, would it be more than the carrying capacity could hold in Washington at this time, if one were to go on to speculate about some more explicitly positive-sum activities? That is, initiatives where the United States and Russia are truly supporting one another's influence in the region, going beyond the preliminaries of reducing the old negative-sum mutual suspicions? Perhaps it would be too much and people would turn sour in the belly upon hearing of such things. Or perhaps not. After all, the national interests of the United States require it. For policy analysts, it would be a kind of betrayal  of our professional responsibility, if we were to subordinate our analysis of American interests to our personal or social-milieu interests in keeping a distance from Russia. So maybe we should create some space in our minds to think about these things, whether or not we feel ready for it.

The following are some speculations on potential initiatives for advancing the broad American interests in the region and building up a positive-sum relationship:

* Subsidize some Russian bases and troops to stay in the region, or new ones to be set up where the local regime consents. America needs the Russians for border security, drug interdiction, and other stabilizing functions; and maybe also for regional intelligence with a modicum of objectivity, independent of the local regimes.

* In return, Russia could drop any further mention of a need for the United States to eventually get out.  An U.S. presence would give an assurance for ultimate sovereign independence from Russia; but this would no longer be equated with Russia's absence or with protection against Russian influence.

It's bad for America, not just for Russia and for Tajikistan, that Russian bases are closing and troops leaving from the Tajik border area. Even if one takes the view - as most commentators, who enjoy the tit-for-tat, do - that America has been promoting this turn of events, it's not too late to realize it's a blunder and turn around and do the right thing. How much better off we would be today, if we had realized we were mostly wrong in our enmity to British power in all areas overseas half a century earlier, instead of waiting to wise up only in the Falklands war. The harsh realities after 9-11 ought to impel us to wise up faster about our positive interest in Russian power and influence in some regions.

* Quietly encourage the Georgians (moving our discussion temporarily across the Caspian for this point) and Russians to make the following deal: Georgia stops demanding withdrawal of Russian bases; in return Russians start supporting restoration of Georgian territorial integrity in Abkhazia and Ossetia and stop making noises against U.S./NATO presence in Georgia. In other words, the United States and Russia both stay there, instead of each trying to push the other out.

This would build on the momentum of the recent role of Igor Ivanov in getting Abashidze peacefully out of Ajaria. It would fulfill the hopes of Georgians for Russia to play a similar role in the other, deeper crises of Georgian territorial integrity. At the same time, it would build on the reality that Georgia did much to provoke those crises: Georgian nationalism has been far from healthy in its handling of ethnic matters since 1991. Russian mediation will continue to be needed for reassurance of the ethnic Abkhaz and Ossets if they are to consent freely and peacefully to reunification with Georgia despite their actual preference to join Russia.

* American support for rights of ethnic Russians in Central Asia. US democratization subsidies to Russian-language media and ethnic Russian-led civic organizations and parties. This would free them from the charge of being advance agents of Russian imperialist reconquest; if only by turning them into "US agents", so to speak.

* American public protests and pressure against discrimination against "ethnic Russians" in Central Asia in matters of employment in government positions, in this region, the label "Russian" is put also on Ukrainians, Jews, and most other post-Soviets, along with Germans and all other Europeans living there.) This would earn us tremendous credit with Russians, not just regionally but in

Moscow. It would show that we mean our "human rights" rhetoric for real, with at least a modicum of objectivity, even when it's to the benefit of Russia not just against it. And that would be a darned good thing for the reputation of human rights in Russia, where the democratic cause has suffered by being connected too often with the weakening and humiliation of the nation, and "human rights" has too often come to seem like a code word for hostile activism.

* A regular practice of Washington-Moscow consultations on policy in the region, aimed at joint policy and a united front when speaking to the local regimes. Phone calls to Moscow before Rumsfeld or Powell heads off to Central Asia. In return, some consultation, mutatis mutandis, prior to Central Asia visits by Lavrov or Ivanov, although - realistically speaking - their visits are somewhat more routine.

* A U.S.-Russia "working group" on the region, akin to - or merged with - the one set up on Afghanistan and terrorism in 1999. The group would prepare joint initiatives for positive sums; and meanwhile keep track of activities of both sides in the region, and make sure there is the advance consultation on those activities that's needed for avoiding suspicion on either side of what the other is doing there.

More points could be added, to be sure. I've limited myself here to some basic ones that could be initiated in Washington that it would be hard to imagine Russians refusing. That's an atypically high standard of realism, restricting what can be considered perhaps too tightly. With a bit more idealism or at least a balanced view on Russian intentions, one could ask Russia to couple these points with some others which, while also to mutual benefit, would be most specially and obviously to the American benefit; e.g., help in getting oil pipelines through, getting security on the line, and stabilizing the countries along the route -- presumably still from Baku to Ceyhan, although some other route or routes may be found more optimal once the zero-sum geopolitics are really put aside.

There are also higher levels of cooperation and integration that are worthy but go beyond the cautious limits I have set for the proposals above. Ian Bremmer and Nikolas Gvosdev have written persuasively of the logic of shared bases under joint institutional auspices.

Even without these additional points, however, the ones laid out above would add up to a pretty hefty positive sum. One that enhances substantially the ability of both countries to realize their vital interests -- promotion of stability and modernization in the region and winning the war on terror.

It's the kind of thing our policy analysis community might want to be  bringing into its field for contemplation. After all, we're supposed to be in the business of helping our government think things through and see the way to realizing our society's true interests. Isn't that what policy analysts are for?

 

Ira Straus is U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO.