The Atlantic security order is on shaky ground. Bringing peace to the Balkans has proved costly and elusive, and the failure of NATO's air campaign to protect Kosovo from the regime in Belgrade has seriously tarnished the alliance. Even more worrisome, however, is the fact that its members have failed to offer a compelling strategic vision for the future. The end of protracted East-West rivalry requires that analysts and policymakers rethink the purpose of NATO and, more broadly, the logic of America's heavy-handed strategic role in Europe.
This rethinking entails addressing two sets of questions. First, where is NATO enlargement headed? Should the membership of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic be followed by successive waves of enlargement? Where does Russia fit into an Atlantic community defined, for now, by NATO's eastern frontier? Second, what should be the relationship between Europe's own process of integration and the evolution of the Atlantic security order? Can and should the United States remain "Europe's pacifier" indefinitely, or is the time approaching for Europe to begin putting into place its own security order?
Setting the Atlantic relationship on the right course entails proceeding with NATO enlargement. Rather than continuing to focus on adding members from Central Europe, however, NATO must make Russia's membership a top priority. For if NATO is to be the centerpiece of a new Atlantic security order, it must ultimately embrace all of Europe's major powers. At the same time, Europe must gradually assume much more of the burden of managing its own security. More self-reliance, whether or not the Europeans themselves want it, will become a necessity as the next century progresses, for American resources and leadership will be in much shorter supply than today. While it has the luxury of doing so, Europe needs to wean itself of its strategic dependence on the United States.
Russia in NATO
