We are having to talk about Russia's foreign policy at a time when it has yet to recognize itself as a state and has yet to shape the attributes of statehood--an army for instance; it does not have borders fixed in accordance with the practice of international law, does not have a sensible and formulated system of national interests on which foreign policy might be built, and has not recognized its particular historical mission.
Foreign policy with us does not emanate from the precepts and priorities of evolved statehood. On the contrary, foreign policy practice, frequently based on search, analogies, and intuition, is helping Russia become Russia. Dealings with the surrounding world are helping shape Russian statehood and helping Russia recognize its interests.
Categorical assertions to the effect that Russia is required to immediately renounce messianism have been heard increasingly often of late. If what is meant by this is a renunciation of the global mentorship of the communist rulers who stinted on neither others' money or others' lives for the sake of the universal establishment of the totalitarian utopia, there is no point arguing with this proposition. But what if we should rush to the other extreme: go so far in our denial of messianism as to jettison the similarly sounding, but not identical concept of mission.
A policy that is built on interests alone is highly vulnerable, and in Russia, in my view, it would be simply disastrous. Aside from interests, a mission, not degenerating into messianism, of course, is needed.
It is said that pragmatism should be the leading principle, virtually, of our foreign policy. This assertion is in need of particular reservations and limitations. Pragmatism not balanced by healthy idealism would with us, alas, most likely degenerate into extremes and cynicism. Russia's foreign policy cannot fail to provide for goals and tasks elevated above opportunist pragmatics.
