The appointment of the Primakov government in September represents
more than a change in personalities or a shift in Russian economic
policy. It reflects profound changes in Russian politics, some of
which have serious implications for the United States.
Since its first days in office the Clinton administration has made
"strategic partnership" with Russia a focal point of its foreign
policy. But the administration's interpretation of strategic
partnership has gone far beyond what is conventional in
state-to-state relations. It has included de facto intervention in
Russia's domestic politics on behalf of President Boris Yeltsin and
the so-called "radical reformers", particularly former acting Prime
Minister Yegor Gaidar and former First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly
Chubais.
Of course, as long as Boris Yeltsin remains Russia's president, he
deserves to be treated with appropriate respect and attention. And it
was only natural that Gaidar's and Chubais' enthusiasm for the
economic prescriptions of the U.S. Treasury Department and the
International Monetary Fund should be appreciated in Washington. But
the Clinton administration has not merely favored Yeltsin and the
radical reformers; it has acted as if their success would, almost by
definition, be good not only for Russia but for the United States as
well. As a result, President Clinton and his advisers have gone well
beyond whitewashing Yeltsin's personal transgressions--including his
excessive drinking and his propensity for grandstanding--and have
consistently urged him to stay on course with radical reform at
almost any cost.
