When the issue is consolidating power in Brussels, the European Union never gives up. The Lisbon Treaty was defeated in a June referendum in Ireland, but Dublin has promised to hold a revote next year. Will the Irish succumb to the EU's blandishments?

The most striking feature about the controversy over the treaty is not whether it deserves ratification. Lisbon offers a complicated restructuring of the EU that concentrates more power in Brussels. The decision is for the Europeans to make based on their assessment of the proper role for continental government. Most extraordinary is the effort being waged to ensure that the common people who pay the bills have virtually no say in the form of government under which they live.

Nations and governments typically rely on referenda to ratify constitutions. But not in the European Union. It started down that road three years ago and struck out in both France and the Netherlands. So the EU jiggled a few provisions, renamed the document a treaty, and abandoned popular ballots. Convincing twenty-seven parliaments appeared to be a lot easier than getting a majority of a half-billion people to assent; indeed, polls suggest that voters in half of the EU members would reject Lisbon. "There will be no treaty at all if we had a referendum in France," admitted French (and outgoing EU) President Nicolas Sarkozy.

However, the Irish constitution required a vote, and a majority of Irish said "no" in June. Brussels erupted in weeping and gnashing of teeth. "How could they!" gasped the Eurocratic elite, which had worked so hard to prevent anyone from voting on the issue. German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäeuble suddenly turned populist: "a few million Irish cannot decide on behalf of 495 million Europeans," he insisted, as if any of the other 491 million Europeans had been allowed to vote on the treaty, let alone had voted yes.

Since approval of the Lisbon Treaty must be unanimous, the Irish vote theoretically killed the measure. But Eurocrats instinctively treated Ireland's nay as an obstacle to overcome rather than a decision to respect. Observed Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission: "I believe the treaty is alive and we should now try to find a solution."

Then began six months of scheming to circumvent the Irish decision. As Mats Persson of the think tank Open Europe observed:

Ever since the Irish voted No to the Lisbon Treaty in June, politicians in Ireland and across Europe have tried to find ways to force this unwanted document through-against the clear will of the people. It's a sad day for democracy when Europe's politicians gang up on their citizens, rather than trying to win over their trust.

The options of revamping or abandoning the treaty were considered too ludicrous to even consider. A new continental elite encompassing bureaucratic, economic and political interests had decided that Europe needed a more powerful, consolidated government and the people were going to get just that.

European politicians, officials, activists and commentators covered the Irish with obloquy and smothered Dublin with attention. Observed Daniel Hannan, a British member of the European Parliament, in the Daily Telegraph,

this is about keeping the project going-a project from which millions now earn their living. The EU employs more than 170,000 officials, on handsome and largely untaxed retainers. And for every formal Eurocrat there are dozens of fellow travelers: the Europe officers retained by every local council, large corporation and NGO. Their salaries might not be paid directly by Brussels but their livelihoods depend on the process of integration.

The conventional wisdom in Brussels and across the capitals of Europe is clear: the Irish voters were largely ignorant and had been easily misled by ideologues, who may have been-in the view of the conspiracy-minded-financed by America's CIA. Wrote Mary Ellen Synon in the Daily Mail: "Welcome to the European Union's version of democracy: Keep voting until you get it right." A "do-over" poll was considered to be the preferred strategy, assuming the correct result would be had.

If that wasn't possible-the Irish government warned that the voters might not be easily cowed-then Eurocrats suggested a variety of steps, such as having the Irish Parliament read Ireland's constitution more narrowly and ratify the treaty or even kicking Dublin out of the EU, leaving Ireland with some form of associate status. With the first risky for the Irish government and the second unlikely to win the necessary EU approval, a revote carried the day. To help nudge Irish voters along Brussels will give Dublin various "opt-outs" from the treaty and preserve a commissioner for every country to allay the fears of the Irish public. Irish Foreign Minister Micheal Martin cites the accord as "a very significant achievement for our country."

Actually, what Dublin won is a present political commitment to make future legal changes, probably through the Croatian Accession Treaty, expected in 2010 or 2011-after Ireland ratifies the Lisbon Treaty later this year. Whether the promised concessions actually make much difference is debatable. Lorraine Mullally, Open Europe's director, warns: "The Lisbon Treaty represents a huge transfer of powers away from citizens to the EU-in areas as diverse as justice and home affairs, the economy, and even foreign policy." She dismisses the changes, warning that "The Treaty will remain intact, with all that that entails-including a massive loss of power to the EU." Thus, in her view the alleged compromise is "a charade to make it look as though people's concerns about the treaty have been addressed."

How this will turn out is anyone's guess. Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Brian Cowen says he is "confident" of victory. President Sarkozy lauded Cowen: "we will make these adjustments, and the Irish government has courageously promised to hold a new referendum of the people before the end of 2009."

However, Declan Ganley, head of the group Libertas, which led the "no" campaign earlier this year, denounced the "bullying" of the Irish people and vowed to battle on: "The Irish government and the powerful elite in Brussels are showing utter contempt for the democratic decision of the Irish people in rejecting the Lisbon Treaty. Not one sentence will change in a ‘new version.' Some non-legally binding texts will be added in an attempt to fool the people." Caoimhghin Ó Caoláin of the opposition Sinn Féin party called the government "arrogant" and denounced deal.

The incoming EU president, Czech President Václav Klaus, is a Euroskeptic, under attack by President Sarkozy and others for refusing to fly the EU flag at his official residence, the Prague Castle. If Ireland again says no, there is no obvious plan B, especially since the United Kingdom faces a national election by 2010, in which the Conservatives may take power-and they have promised to hold a referendum on Lisbon if it has not yet taken effect. Yet countries like France vow to block any further expansion unless the treaty is in effect. A potential deadlock looms.

But the more interesting question is, even if all twenty-seven EU members ratify the accord, will it matter? If the goal was simply slightly improved management, the Lisbon Treaty, which, among many other things, would create a permanent EU president and de facto foreign minister while dropping some of the national commissioners, would be hardly worth the fuss. The real objective, at least of figures like Nicolas Sarkozy, is to-setting aside personal ambition-create a quasi-nation state capable of competing with the United States, Russia, and China.

Whether that's a worthwhile goal is for the Europeans to decide. Whether Lisbon would have that effect is not at all clear.

Irish Foreign Minister Micheal Martin argued: "If Europe wants to be more influential in global affairs then it needs better co-ordination and the implementation of the reforms spelled out in the Lisbon Treaty." In his valedictory address to the European Parliament, President Sarkozy said "the world needs a strong Europe and that Europe cannot be strong if it is not united." He advocated a continent with "big ambitions…because only big projects have the power to overcome national egos." His emphasis on continental ego instead was reflected in his curious observation that the European nations collectively received more medals at the August Olympics than did either China or the United States: "The European Union therefore takes the leading position. It's a victory for sport and for the fundamental and common values of the people of the union."

Yet this claim illustrates the extraordinary weakness of the Lisbon project. President Sarkozy was one of the few people in Europe to exult in the continent's collective medal total. Most other Europeans cared only about how their individual nations did. As with soccer, the teams, loyalty and cheers are national. While a certain new class of peripatetic, transnational Europeans has developed, most Europeans retain their national identity. Which is why even the Lisbon Treaty reaffirms "the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain member states."

Europe's sense of identity could change, but not because of the treaty. The agreement has faltered precisely because average people want to preserve important attributes of their own societies. Irish voters, for instance, were reluctant to risk their traditional neutrality to a European foreign policy. Even if the Eurocratic elite is able to finesse the Irish vote, it will not create a real country of "Europe." Put bluntly, if the only way you can create a new government is by preventing most everyone from voting on it, you will have only created a hollow political shell.

The United States began with far greater cohesion. The original colonies had different beginnings and later developments, but they enjoyed far more commonality than did the independent states of Europe. The EU's problem in this regard continues, as Europeans grapple with the most recent accessions from Eastern Europe as well as the prospect of Turkish membership. Moreover, in America, a stronger, consolidated federal government grew out of increased nationalism, not vice versa. Only as nationalism flourished did people tolerate a more powerful state at home and more interventionist state abroad. It has taken more than a century after a bitter civil war for the uniqueness of the American South, with a strong sense of regional identity, to fade.

In short, Europe is not a de facto country, and the Lisbon Treaty won't make it so. That time might come, but seeming to railroad recalcitrant citizens in order to enact the agreement is more likely to set back the campaign in the long-run by strengthening people's nationalistic loyalties.

The Lisbon project, at least as envisioned by those desiring to turn the Eurostate into an international power, has a second, equally serious problem. While Europe has markets and money, it does not have a military. And that won't change however Ireland votes on the Lisbon Treaty.

True, one of President Sarkozy's initiatives was to create a sixty-thousand-man EU expeditionary force, but that is about as likely as Vladimir Putin inviting Georgia's Mikheil Saakashvili to stop by Moscow for tea. EU ministers recently agreed to this goal-but "in the years to come," meaning a century or two. Most European states face negligible security dangers and are quite happy to rely on the United States for protection. The European members of NATO consistently failed to fulfill their promises to increase military outlays during the cold war; the likelihood of them doing so today, especially in the midst of economic crisis, is nil.

The issue is not just spending but creating effective professional forces. The Europeans conduct a lot of peacekeeping missions but have little ability to prosecute a real war. During the war against Serbia analysts figured that the European members of NATO possessed just 10 to 15 percent of America's combat capabilities. German troops operating in Afghanistan have distinguished themselves by their beer drinking and sausage eating; 40 percent of German soldiers in the country are overweight and 10 percent are obese. America's past representative to NATO, Nicholas Burns, figured that just 3 to 5 percent of European military forces could be deployed overseas, compared to roughly 75 percent of American personnel. Bastian Giegerich of the International Institute for Strategic Studies reports that "The majority of EU member states appear unable to deploy formations of even battalion size (500-800 troops) on a single mission."

That means Europe has had to turn to Russia for logistical support in some peacekeeping operations. No wonder leading EU members have resisted committing to a goodwill mission in Congo. Worse, the major European powers of NATO are unprepared to actually provide military backing for alliance members or would-be members along Russia's borders. Brussels has even proved reluctant to offer assurances of future EU membership or other aid to Ukraine and rejected Tbilisi's request that the EU turn its peace monitoring force into a peacekeeping mission in Georgia. Most European states are variously unable or unwilling to take up more of the load in Afghanistan. Here the EU's reputation may be most at risk: Daniel Korski of the European Council on Foreign Relations suggests that "Afghanistan will be viewed in Washington as a litmus test of whether Europeans should be taken seriously as strategic partners."

And the EU will almost certainly fail to meet the test. Even absent the ongoing economic crisis, there is little stomach in Europe for increased military spending or activity. Explains Jeffrey Simon of the Institute for National Strategic Studies:

But as European militaries have shifted to smaller, all-volunteer forces concentrated in fewer caserns, significant social and political consequences resulted. Public unease over the expeditionary use of military forces that one might have expected with heavy reliance upon young conscripts has not eased with the shift toward professional soldiers; if anything, those anxieties have increased. As defense was no longer the priority that it had been during the Cold War and armed forces were becoming less visible to their publics, many European societies began to raise questions about their utility. This was particularly the case when used in unpopular expeditionary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

None of this means that a more unified Europe wouldn't have some influence internationally. But the continent's role will remain limited so long as it lacks the most basic assets of hard power. There isn't a lot of use having a "High Representative" for the Union in foreign affairs and security policy if the EU has neither the ability nor the will to employ military force. If Europe's most potent weapon against Russia is to halt already long-delayed negotiations over forging closer relations, then Moscow isn't likely to care much what the Europeans think. Nor will most anyone else, irrespective of the specific governing structure in Brussels.

Americans have paid a high price for national consolidation. Europeans should ponder well the potential costs in personal liberty and national autonomy before approving the Lisbon Treaty. Bruno Waterfield, the Brussels correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, notes that the current decision-making processes "are designed to provide maximum privacy for heads of state and government, and to close off their decision-making from the scrutiny of their voters." Indeed, he adds, "the EU is not a system of representation or a public authority. It is a set of institutions and relationships organized for the convenience for national state bureaucracies, on the basis of mistrust of the people." But the decision on whether the price is worth it is theirs alone.

In making that decision, however, Europeans should have realistic expectations about what Lisbon is likely to achieve. It will not turn Europe into the next superpower, sitting as an equal at the table with America. That would require the development of a national identity-a willingness to die for Brussels, if you will-as well as a willingness to devote the resources and effort to create a corresponding military capability. Neither of these is likely in the near-term, no matter how the Irish vote in the expected referendum rerun.

 

Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative Defense Alliance. A former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (Xulon).