The Coming Resurgence of Russia

The Coming Resurgence of Russia

Mini Teaser: Let us begin by recalling one of the most celebrated predictions in political literature.

by Author(s): Bruce D. Porter

Pandora's Nationalities

The most critical problem facing Gorbachev's government is the Pandora's box of nationalist strife unleashed by glasnost.  Western scholars such as Alexander Bennigsen and H[acu]el[gra]ene Carr[gra]ere d'Encause have long argued that the USSR cannot be the only multinational empire in modern history immune to nationalism's centrifugal forces, that rising national sentiment would ultimately strain and perhaps tear the empire apart.  The scholars certainly had foresight: ethnic strife has claimed several hundred lives and created as many as 500,000 internal refugees.  Many of these refugees live in squalid conditions in tent cities or other temporary shelters in Central Asia and the Caucasus; others have flooded into Moscow, straining the capital city's already overburdened housing and social facilities.

Despite the fury with which "post-Communist nationalism" has struck, there is no reason to believe that the disintegration of the Soviet federation is either inevitable or even likely to occur quickly.  A recent multi-disciplinary study at Harvard University concluded that most large empires have fallen apart only in response to some massive external blow.  Moreover, unlike most multinational empires in history, the Russian Empire is territorially contiguous, a more "natural" political entity than past overseas empires hammered together by Atlantic sea powers.  A fairer comparison could be made with the Ottoman Empire; but, unlike "the sick man of Europe," which relied on diverse types of government in different geographical areas, the USSR employs a uniform administrative system across its entire territory.  It is thus closer to being a true nation-state than most empires.  It is also worth recalling that most Soviet territory was part of the Russian Empire for more than a century prior to the 1917 revolution.  This familiarity may not have led to affinity, but it did forge political, social, and economic bonds that paper resolutions alone will not dissolve.

Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader since Lenin never to have served in the provinces.  From the early months of his tenure, he grossly underestimated the depth of national feeling in certain republics and failed to anticipate how glasnost and a relaxation of totalitarian controls would fan it.  The senior officer corps had fewer illusions, however, and is known to support preservation of the federation strongly and by all means necessary.  There is much evidence to suggest that Defense Minister Dmitri Yazov, Chief of General Staff Sergei Akhromeyev, and General Boris Gromov (popular hero of the war in Afghanistan) lobbied for months prior to the January 1991 crackdown in Lithuania for precisely such a show of force.  That Gorbachev went along indicates his realization that the Baltic states cannot be freed without setting a bad precedent for other restless republics, despite the attraction of settling the last major political issue with the West.  The events of January have left little doubt that the Kremlin is prepared to fight for union, as it was not prepared to fight for Eastern Europe.

In that fight, the Soviet leadership has several points of leverage.  Virtually all republics depend heavily on the RSFSR for various raw materials and commodities, and most Soviet republics have large, extremely loyal Russian populations.  Moreover, outside the Baltic states the most virulent nationalist enmity has not been directed at these Russians, but has flared up between smaller ethnic groups who harbor deep-seeded historical grievances.  The Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute is the most extreme example, but communal violence has also resulted between Meskhetians and Georgians; Tadjiks and Uzbeks; Kirgiz and Uzbeks; Caucasians and Kazakhs; Abkhazians and Georgians; Ossetians and Ingush.  Tribal violence of this nature dramatizes to the public the advantages of union and centrally enforced political order: for most republics, independence would only be a prelude to serious bloodshed.

Public opinion polls conducted by Soviet institutes show that a majority of Soviet citizens now consider the re-establishment of order a higher priority than economic or political reform.  This is especially true in the Russian Republic, where there is a traditional fear of chaos and a proclivity for an "iron hand" at the center.  Such sentiments favor the Kremlin and will bolster public support when force is used to ensure the union's survival.  Though events could yet force Moscow to yield autonomy or independence to certain republics, the odds seem to favor its retaining most of the present federation.

Regime Scenarios

Given the tumult of the past five years, it would be foolhardy to rule out almost any scenario of Russia's future.  Let us consider the five most frequently mentioned ones, their likelihood, and the consequences of each for the future of Russian military power.

Scenario #1: A palace or military coup by conservative, "old guard" forces bent on restoring the pre-Gorbachev status.

Such forces presumably would seek to reimpose Brezhnevite political controls and censorship; crush nationalist movements; and perhaps reassert Russian control over portions of Eastern Europe.  A conservative leadership would inevitably mean increased military spending and at least a short-term resurgence of Russian power.  Ironically, the long-term prospects for Russian power would probably be worse under old guard leadership than under the present regime.  A conservative regime could undermine all that Soviet diplomacy in Europe has recently accomplished, galvanize Western defense spending, and repudiate the reforms essential to sustaining military strength over the long run.

The idea of a conservative takeover has been a constant theme of both Western and Soviet speculation for some five years now.  Gorbachev's nemesis was presumed first to be Yegor Ligachev and then Ivan Polozkov, the new first secretary of the Russian Republic.  There is, however, almost no evidence of an organized right-wing coalition forming around either man.  Though the old-line apparatchiks bear grievances against Gorbachev, and hard-line speeches sometimes win spirited applause in the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev consistently prevails over his right-wing opponents in actual votes, usually by healthy margins.

Because any such coup would require the support of the military, this scenario is highly unlikely.  Though the military press is rife with grumbling these days, most criticism is aimed not at Gorbachev, but at various liberal-minded institutions and publications (such as Komsomolskaya Pravda and Ogonyok).  The military is unhappy with its declining prestige and obviously would prefer that its budget were not shrinking; but the top officer corps, many of them hand-picked by Gorbachev, understand that internal reforms are essential to Russia's capacity to compete technologically with the West.  The word perestroika, in fact, may first have been used in a political context by Marshal Ogarkov in 1982, when he wrote of the importance of restructuring "the entire economy, [as well as] political, social, scientific, and other institutions" in order to enhance Soviet military preparedness.  As for the Soviet military's own painful perestroika, one senior officer has declared pointedly, "We've never reorganized anything to make it weaker."(2)

One sobering footnote: Since at least the Twenty-Eighth Party Congress in July 1990, Gorbachev has been moving to the right.  Last November he granted local military commanders expanded power for maintaining public order; in December he reorganized the Interior Ministry (responsible for internal security) under two well-known hard-liners; also in December, Shevardnadze resigned and warned against the threat of a new dictatorship; in January he invoked additional emergency powers and began a military crackdown in Lithuania, Latvia, Moldavia, and other republics.  It appears that the Soviet president may himself become godfather of a "creeping coup" against reform communism, just as General Jaruzelski declared martial law in Warsaw in order to save his own regime in 1981.  This would make a right-wing coup quite redundant.

Scenario #2: Extreme Russian nationalist forces take power.

There has long been an extreme variety of Russian nationalism that manifests all the characteristic features of an ideology.  Often neo-fascist and anti-Semitic, always chauvinist, this form of Russian nationalism appeals to many elements in the military and has outspoken advocates in the Supreme Soviet.  Several widely circulated newspapers such as Sovetskaya Rossiya, Literaturnaya Rossiya, Molodaya Gvardiya, and Nash Sovremennik espouse stridently nationalist views, as do numerous political organizations of this persuasion.  Of these, the notoriously reactionary Pamyat is most prominent.  The "United Council of Russia," an umbrella organization set up with the help of conservative officials in 1989, unites many of these groups.

Despite such organization, however, Russian nationalist groups have not fared well in the few democratic elections held in the USSR.  In the March 1990 elections to the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, a coalition of Russian nationalist and neo-Stalinist groups called the "Bloc of Russian Public-Patriotic Movements" failed to capture any seats in the first round of voting, qualified for only 16 run-off races out of 65 contested, and captured only about 10 percent of the total vote.(3)  In view of such numbers, the chances of a Russian nationalist takeover by legitimate means are quite small.  There are, however, numerous and growing links between Russian nationalist groups and the old guard in both the party and the military.  These suggest the possibility of a conservative-nationalist putsch, combining features of scenario one and two.  The odds of such an eventuality are small now, but could increase if the present regime missteps badly.

Essay Types: Essay