THERE ARE few issues that cause greater friction in U.S.-Russian relations than Iran's nuclear-weapons program. President Bush and other senior administration officials see Russia as critical to pressuring Iran to abandon this program and claim that Russia and the United States are working closely together toward that common strategic goal, although, they admit, there are differences over tactics. But most senior officials who work on proliferation issues, many on the Hill and much of the American political establishment-even if they accept that Russia is critical to dealing with Iran-believe that it is consciously abetting Iran's nuclear-weapons program. The evidence: sales of sophisticated air-defense systems to Tehran to defend nuclear sites; continued work to complete Iran's nuclear reactor at Bushehr and, more recently, the first deliveries of fuel so that Bushehr can commence operation this fall; dogged resistance to tough sanctions against Iran at the UN Security Council and a go-slow approach to adopting even mild ones. The widespread belief is that these actions are intended to undermine U.S. policy toward Iran and, more broadly, throughout the Middle East.
There is some truth to this analysis. Moscow is indeed concerned by what it sees as the Bush administration's unilateralism and propensity to resort to force, and it does seek to constrain the United States. (It would however phrase that as protecting Russian interests. Moreover, many Russian officials and commentators argue that the U.S. approach is more likely to redound to the United States' long-term detriment, much as Moscow sees the case in Iraq, whereas its own preferred course would not.)
Nevertheless, the situation is more complex than the prevailing analysis would have it. Most important, there is sufficient overlap in U.S. and Russian interests for a much more cooperative-and one would hope effective-approach to ending Iran's quest for a nuclear-weapons program. That would require some changes in U.S. policy toward Russia, based on a clearer understanding of Moscow's own interest calculus regarding Iran and the ways we could accommodate Russian interests without jeopardizing our own. Given that Iran's nuclear-weapons program poses one of the gravest threats to the United States, common sense would seem to dictate such an approach.
MOSCOW STARTS from a simple proposition: Iran is the dominant regional power in its neighborhood, able to project power not only into the Persian Gulf region, but also into the Caucasus and central Asia, that is, into regions Moscow believes should lie in Russia's sphere of influence. For that reason, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Moscow has valued Iran's decision to meddle little in central Asia and its refusal to support the Chechen rebels or otherwise fuel instability in Russia's North Caucasus region (contrary to the thrust of U.S. policy in those regions, from Moscow's standpoint). Friendly ties and moderate support for Iran's regional ambitions have been a way for Moscow to reinforce those Iranian policies.
But there are clear limits to that friendship and support. In particular, Moscow has no interest in Iran developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. President Vladmir Putin and other senior Russian officials have stressed that point in public and in private conversations with American officials. They fear-as do we-that a nuclear-armed Iran would spark a nuclear-arms race in the Middle East close to Russian borders, something that would inherently pose a grave threat to Russia's own security.
The evolution of Russian policy on nuclear cooperation with Iran tends to support these claims of opposition to an Iranian nuclear-weapons program. Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation began in the 1990s with the signing of a contract to complete the nuclear reactor at Bushehr, which was abandoned by the Germans a decade earlier due to pressure from the United States. Moscow agreed to this project on the condition that it be placed under international safeguards, which it was. In connection with Bushehr, Moscow also offered other services-such as education in nuclear physics for Iranians-of marginal value in developing nuclear weapons that were well within Iran's rights and Russia's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
To be sure, in the 1990s, Russian entities engaged in cooperative efforts with Iranian counterparts that were of direct value to Iran's weapons program, and the Clinton administration put great pressure on Russian President Boris Yeltsin to rein in that cooperation. Throughout the U.S. government, the prevailing view was that the Kremlin could not have been unaware of this cooperation and supported it, despite official denials. That view, however, ignored the extreme disarray in the Russian government and its inability to monitor-let alone discipline-rogue elements that pursued their own parochial interest in self-enrichment, even if their actions ran counter to official policy. This changed dramatically under President Putin, as the Kremlin regained control over the government and improved export controls. The last several years have witnessed the gradual cessation of programs of direct value to a nuclear-weapons effort, ones that caused us the most concern. Moreover, as we have learned more about Iran's nuclear program, it has become clearer that others-especially Pakistan's A. Q. Khan-played a much larger role in Iran's effort than did Russian entities.
Under President Putin, Moscow's policy toward Iran's nuclear program has been dominated by two concerns: first, maintaining insight into the program to assess Iran's intentions and capabilities with regard to nuclear weapons; and second, preventing a military operation against Iran's nuclear facilities, which Moscow believes would be both profoundly destabilizing and unsuccessful.
