THERE ARE few issues that cause greater friction in U.S.-Russian relations than Iran's nuclear-weapons program. President Bush and other senior administration officials see Russia as critical to pressuring Iran to abandon this program and claim that Russia and the United States are working closely together toward that common strategic goal, although, they admit, there are differences over tactics. But most senior officials who work on proliferation issues, many on the Hill and much of the American political establishment-even if they accept that Russia is critical to dealing with Iran-believe that it is consciously abetting Iran's nuclear-weapons program. The evidence: sales of sophisticated air-defense systems to Tehran to defend nuclear sites; continued work to complete Iran's nuclear reactor at Bushehr and, more recently, the first deliveries of fuel so that Bushehr can commence operation this fall; dogged resistance to tough sanctions against Iran at the UN Security Council and a go-slow approach to adopting even mild ones. The widespread belief is that these actions are intended to undermine U.S. policy toward Iran and, more broadly, throughout the Middle East.
There is some truth to this analysis. Moscow is indeed concerned by what it sees as the Bush administration's unilateralism and propensity to resort to force, and it does seek to constrain the United States. (It would however phrase that as protecting Russian interests. Moreover, many Russian officials and commentators argue that the U.S. approach is more likely to redound to the United States' long-term detriment, much as Moscow sees the case in Iraq, whereas its own preferred course would not.)
