"In the wake of such general conflicts as the Napoleonic wars or World Wars I and II, two conditions prevail that are virtually essential to the fact, or the illusion, of collective security: (1) The victorious powers are momentarily in concert; this provides the basis for equating their provisional coalition to a disinterested concern for universal world order. (2) The defeated powers, are by consensus of the victors, clearly labeled the 'aggressors.'"
--Earl Ravenal, "An Autopsy of Collective Security," Political Science Quarterly (Winter 1975/6).
Earl Ravenal's rule applies equally in the wake of the Cold War. Buoyed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, proponents of collective security have been writing up a storm, producing literature full of hope for the future. Central to this new vision of collective security are new roles for two familiar Cold War international organizations: the United Nations, now freed from a paralyzing standoff between two superpowers with vetoes in the Security Council; and NATO, the victor over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, now reaching to embrace new friends and missions.
Much of the hope placed on the UN in a new era is grounded in the belief that it can finally provide for collective security. The hopeful cite the collective expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait as evidence of this. As a function of its only unique virtue, all-encompassing membership, the UN becomes the natural instrument for the wishful tinkerer in trying to implement collective security.




