Theodore Roosevelt's foreign policy career lends itself easily both to hagiography and hostile caricature--particularly in a presidential election year. American advocates of the robust use of military force to deal with current challenges ranging from the terror threat to China often cite Roosevelt as a model statesman who wielded military power unapologetically and unilaterally for the sake of the national interest and thus see TR as the precursor of "national greatness conservatism." His swagger is best captured in his ultimatum to the kidnapping of an American citizen, Ion Perdicaris, by Ahmad ibn Muhammad Raisuli, a Moroccan warlord: "We want Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." Carving Panama out of Columbia, winning a difficult counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines, and warning Japan with the display of the Great White Fleet were successful policies that can guide the conduct of a second Bush Administration or any other.
In contrast, liberal detractors are uniformly critical of Roosevelt's perceived arrogance. For example, his aggressive policies in Central America fostered an anti-Americanism that bedeviled U.S. relations with the region through to the 1980s. He (and by implication President George W. Bush) belongs to the 19th-century age of imperialism with its black-and-white verities rather than to the more complicated, multilateral world of today.
While there is some truth to both of these images before he became president, Roosevelt in office preferred to "speak softly and carry a big stick" rather than make good on the braggadocio of his younger days. He carved out Panama as a last resort, not a first; regretted the annexation of the Philippines; and sought to accommodate, as well as to warn, Japan. Thus the lessons that Roosevelt has to impart for today are those of a statesman who combined periodic audacity with methodical political realism.
Early Years
