Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons has taken on a new level of urgency in the last two years as crises in Iran and North Korea continue to make headlines.  In the September 10 issue of In The National Interest, Peter Huessy makes the case for looking beyond arms control to prevent proliferation in "Séances by Candlelight."  Unfortunately, Huessy ignores the unique role that the arms control approach can play, a role that recognizes the absolute necessity of international cooperation for a realistic proliferation prevention strategy.

Huessy begins by describing two different approaches to preventing nuclear proliferation - arms control vs. Bush's counter-proliferation strategy.  Arms controllers, Huessy argues, attempt "peace through paper" by relying on international agreements and their enforcement bodies to prevent proliferation.  The Bush strategy, on the other hand, relies on a broad toolkit that includes robust nuclear deterrence, missile defense, preemptive threat of force and, occasionally, arms control treaties.  Huessy makes two basic arguments in favor of Bush's strategy.  First, the lack of a credible enforcement method for arms control treaties makes them an ineffective tool for prevention.  Citing Iran, Iraq and North Korea, Huessy argues that the arms control approach merely rubber stamps clandestine nuclear programs, legitimizing nuclear programs that should be stopped.  Second, he argues that, in the 21^st century, the US faces new and unpredictable threats that require a more flexible approach to preventing proliferation.

Before going into more depth, the arms control approach should be more clearly defined.  Arms control attempts to constrain the spread of military nuclear technology through a network of formal bilateral and multilateral agreements.  These agreements are reached through international negotiation, ratified by member-states, and actualized through international enforcement bodies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and International Monitoring System.  The cornerstone of nuclear weapons arms control is the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  Other important measures include such agreements as the Limited Test Ban Treaty, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (I and II), and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.  Historically, the arms control approach has had mixed results.  On the one hand, the NPT was central in preventing or reversing nuclear programs in South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, several former Soviet states, and South Africa.  On the other hand, India, Pakistan, Israel, and (probably) North Korea successfully developed nuclear weapons under the treaty's watch.

Huessy does not mince words in his criticisms of the arms control approach.  While he raises some valid points, several of his complaints are based on over-simplifications or outright inaccuracies.  The most obvious of these is his attack on the IAEA.  He argues that the IAEA declared North Korea nuclear-free, then proceeds to argue, several paragraphs later, that the IAEA never attained enough access to declare North Korea nuclear-free.  Which is it? Huessy concludes the article by writing that the IAEA was unable to inspect the North Korean nuclear program because of a lack of "full cooperation" from Pyongyang; yet his second paragraph makes the claim that the IAEA "was sound asleep while North Korea, Iraq and Iran, all signatories to the NPT, developed clandestine nuclear weapons programs while being given a clean bill of health by the IAEA."  In truth, the IAEA never gave North Korea a "clean bill of health."  In fact, it was the IAEA's refusal to issue such a clean bill of health that nearly precipitated a war on the Korean peninsula in 1993-1994 - hardly the behavior of a negligent doctor. 

Huessy's article raises, but does not address, a much larger debate about the reasons states seek to acquire nuclear weapons and what those motives mean for nonproliferation strategies.  Not all states seek nuclear weapons for the same reasons-some for immediate national defense, some as a way to hedge their bets against change, some as a power grab; likewise, most states do not seek nuclear weapons for one singular reason.  The hardest efforts to stop are those motivated by immediate, regional security threats from a rival country.  Pakistan is a good example. Once Islamabad came to believe India's nuclear capability was inevitable, Pakistan's drive to proliferate was nearly impossible to halt.  Less difficult to stop are states attempting to gain international prestige or regional hegemony via nuclear weapons, such as Brazil and Argentina.  Finally, there are instances where a country's proliferation is driven primarily by the threat posed by the US arsenal itself, the Soviet Union being the most obvious example.  The arms control and Bush approach have strengths and weaknesses in different scenarios.

In many cases, arms control can play a special role that unilateral tactics, such as deterrence and dissuasion, cannot.  One unique function role arms control can play is on the supply-side of proliferation prevention.  Multilateral arms control agreements, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, are the only ways the US can reliably restrain the many potential sources of equipment and nuclear materials.  Solely relying on a unilateralist approach that shuns paper proposals significantly reduces the US ability to pressure governments to regulate sensitive exports. For example, persuading the German government to crack down on a firm exporting equipment used for uranium enrichment is much easier within the framework of commonly agreed upon guidelines. This ability to shore up restrictions on engineering and nuclear supplies is especially important when the motive for proliferation is based on regional security rivals, for it is in regional arms races that unilateral US counter-proliferation strategies are least likely to work because these proliferants make their decisions based on a rival's threat, not US doctrine.

Arms control can make a unique contribution through effective and internationally legitimate inspections.  As the current clash with Iran illustrates, US support and IAEA enthusiasm produce uncompromising demands for access and explanations.  More importantly, when Iranian obstructionism arises-a likely scenario if agreement on inspections is reached-the US will find the task of assembling a coalition, either inside or outside the UN structure, far easier than in the case of Iraq.  The IAEA and other enforcement bodies of the arms control network are literally what the US makes them.  If they are treated as stumbling blocks on the path to war, they become just that; if they are treated with enthusiasm, they can be unique tools to endow US initiatives with the legitimacy they need and often deserve.

Lastly, arms control treaties generate international support for proactive proliferation prevention in another way: by broadening the scope of national interest.  Absent a network of international arms control agreements and inspectors, the politics of proliferation prevention would be dominated by local and regional concerns.  For example, South Korea would view Iranian nuclear proliferation as a remote national security threat and would express little genuine interest in its prevention.  This narrow view of national interest would frustrate American attempts to assemble large coalitions to prevent proliferation-coalitions that are essential given the global nature of trade.  However, within a framework of arms control treaties and inspectors, many countries gain an interest in preventing proliferation in distant regions.  Again, using the South Korean example, the effectiveness and credibility of the IAEA is of crucial importance to the South Koreans because of the agency's relevance to the North Korean nuclear crisis. This in turn creates a South Korean interest in a thorough and credible IAEA effort to prevent proliferation in Iran.  American coalition-building to enforce proliferation prevention becomes easier when each country that seeks to maintain the nuclear status quo has a vested interest in preventing proliferation, wherever it occurs.

Future US policy must recognize the need for international support in its efforts to prevent proliferation.  One essential lesson from the last 50 years is that a determined proliferant, if given access to the equipment and expertise, will produce nuclear weapons.  Programs in India, Pakistan, Israel, and even Iraq were all built with the help, at one time or another, of corporations based in Western countries.  With enthusiastic support from the US, and American willingness to act on its own when the system has genuinely failed to work, a strategy of proliferation prevention using arms control as its first line of defense can help keep the genie from growing to dangerously large proportions.

 

Austin Carson is a Research Analyst in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic & International Studies.  He specializes in non-proliferation and arms control with a focus on South Asia and the former Soviet Union.