There are two main reasons for believing that the U.S. government will find it hard to translate military superiority over Iraq into a lasting political victory.
First, traditional American instincts in time of war militate against the delineation of a long-term strategy. Americans see war not as a continuation of diplomacy, but as its replacement. We tend to believe that war should be used only as a last resort. (For the same reason, American generals and admirals have often preferred to have nothing to do with policy issues, believing that they have no role during time of war.) We have a tradition of wanting total war, regardless of political considerations. Moreover, our leaders often let emotions hold sway, with expensive consequences. It was gratifying in World War II to impose unconditional surrender on the Germans, then to learn that Hitler committed suicide in his bunker. But this indulgence extended the war, cost innumerable lives, and permitted the Soviets to grab Eastern Europe.
The second reason for concern about American planning regards the specifics of the war with Iraq. The build-up to the war included little thinking about long-term goals. By all accounts, the hurly-burly of managing the Gulf Crisis--formulating a response, building a coalition, holding it together, exploring diplomatic options, devising a war plan, and winning domestic support--prevented the president and his advisers from thinking much about the aims of the enterprise.
