Paul Pillar

Foreign Policy in an Ignorant Democracy

Amid the voluminous post-election analysis based on exit polls, and the many observations about such things as how Hillary Clinton fared compared to Barack Obama among blacks or women, one demographic pattern sticks out at least as much as any other in characterizing the 2016 presidential race.  Support for Donald Trump was strongly correlated with low education.  Clinton did substantially better than Obama did in 2012 among college graduates, including white college graduates.  Conversely, a majority of those with no college degree went for Trump even though they mostly supported Obama in both of his races and even though all voters with incomes under $50,000 continued to give majority support this year to the Democratic candidate.  It was with good reason that Trump openly proclaimed during the campaign that he loves the poorly educated.

Educational attainment is not the same as being well informed, but it is highly correlated with it and thus a good, and more easily compiled, substitute variable for it.  And so it is fair to say, as Jason Brennan does, that “Trump owes his victory to the uninformed.”  Although Brennan correctly emphasizes how in any election, most voters have little incentive to make themselves better informed, mass ignorance played an especially large role in this year’s outcome.  That role was enhanced by the winning candidate having plumbed new depths in serial lying.  Many people initially attracted to him out of simple ignorance came to have, by listening to him, more firmly held misbeliefs.

The role of ignorance in the outcome of the election is underscored by how much many voters, even if one places value on whatever satisfaction they got from feeling they were sticking it to The Establishment, voted against their own interests and especially economic interests.  Moreover, this year’s Trump supporters, including the prototypical financially struggling white guy in the Rust Belt, will be among those most likely to be hurt by their hero’s economic policies, such as in ways that Steven Rattner explains.  Notwithstanding all the ink that has been spilled the last few days, and hands that have been wrung in the Democratic Party, over the need to be more responsive to the cri de coeur from the guy in the Rust Belt no matter how misguided and uninformed his cry may be, ignorance has political consequences, and the political consequences have policy consequences.

Like it or not, political charlatanry often works, as this election has demonstrated.  It is possible to fool many of the people much of the time.  But the closer the policy consequences get to pinching those who have been fooled, the more likely that a self-corrective mechanism can go to work.  Those who have been fooled and then pinched conclude that they have been had and start looking for different political heroes. 

The correcting mechanism is most likely to start operating with very direct and visible outcomes, such as a trade war with China not re-opening the factory on the outskirts of town, the closure of which had mostly to do with technological advances and automation, while stagflation makes it even harder for those struggling in the town to make ends meet.  Even less immediately visible consequences can produce comparable changes in mass attitudes and beliefs if the hit to pocketbooks is broad enough, as it repeatedly has been throughout U.S. history.  Financial deregulation and beggar-thy-neighbor international economic policies would provide much of the script for a replay of the last decade’s financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession, which would be enough to stoke another political turnaround in the United States in time for the 2020 election.

With many foreign policy issues—more so than with domestic issues—the impact of deleterious policies on individual American voters is too indirect and sometimes too long-term for many voters, especially uninformed voters, to understand that impact.  Sometimes the consequences for Americans and American interests, although substantial, are too indirect for many citizens ever to become aware of them, which means the political corrective mechanism never comes into play.  Islamophobic policies, for example, may be welcomed by many American voters (and certainly by many Trump supporters) with a simplistic and crude notion of keeping Muslim terrorists out of their neighborhoods.  The prospect of such policies stimulating even more anti-U.S. Islamist terrorism than there otherwise would be is lost on those voters.  The more uninformed they are, the more likely this connection is to be lost on them.  And the politicians who enact such counterproductive measures never get penalized at the ballot box for doing so.