Hezbollah and the Simplistic School of Counterterrorism

August 8, 2017 Topic: Lebanon Terrorism Region: Middle East Blog Brand: Paul Pillar

Hezbollah and the Simplistic School of Counterterrorism

Last month President Trump made a joint appearance at the White House with a visiting head of government, during which Trump spoke of the visitor’s country being “on the front lines in the fight against” an organization that is part of that same country’s governing coalition.  The visitor was Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri and the organization was Hezbollah.  Members of Hezbollah are ministers in Hariri’s cabinet.  Hezbollah has the fourth largest bloc of seats among the two dozen parties that are represented in Lebanon’s parliament.

Trump’s comment could be dismissed as an unsurprising gaffe from someone whose ignorance of the outside world is well known (and whose disorganized White House might have contributed to lousy staff work in preparing the president’s notes for the appearance with Hariri).  Even if Trump had been better informed about current Lebanese politics, he might not have backed off from his comment.  The United States does not have governing coalitions in the same sense as countries with parliamentary systems, but the nearest equivalent might arise with any glimmers of bipartisan cooperation on, say, health care.  Imagine that a foreign visitor came to the White House and praised the United States for being “on the front line in the fight against Democrats.”  Although most observers would consider this to be a ridiculous and outrageously inappropriate remark, Trump might accept it smilingly as a personal compliment.

Where terrorism is involved, however, a simplistic approach often prevails that is broadly held and goes far beyond Trump.  The problem arises in failing to recognize that terrorism is not some fixed set of people, groups, or states.  It instead is a tactic that has been used by many different people and organizations in the pursuit of varying objectives.  Yet the fixed-group attitude persists and frequently is visible in policy discussion and media coverage.  The official U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) is treated as if it were a master roster of organizations that we should never countenance, even though it was created twenty years ago only as a legal necessity to add precision to legislation that criminalized material support to terrorism.

If the United States supposedly were never to do any business with anyone who had used terrorism, it would somehow have to explain away the extensive business it has done with leaders who had been up to their eyeballs in terrorism, including Gerry Adams, Menachem Begin, and Yitzhak Shamir.  The same is true not only of individual leaders but also some groups, such as the African National Congress.  We decide which of the users of terrorism we will countenance and which ones we won’t according to criteria other than terrorism itself.  Only we don’t admit that we’re doing that, so as to preserve the fiction of being steadfastly opposed to terrorism wherever it arises.  And this inconsistency doesn’t even take account of the U.S. acceptance of other applications of political violence that, although they do not meet the formal definition of terrorism because they involve overt use of force by a state, are just as deadly to many innocent civilians (such as the force that Saudi Arabia uses in Yemen, or that Israel regularly uses in the West Bank).

Differences Among Groups

The simplistic view of terrorism fails to distinguish among the vastly different interests and objectives of groups that have used terrorism and that may appear on the FTO list.  This failure was prominent in Trump’s comment at his press conference with Hariri, in which the president listed as the groups that Lebanon supposedly was on the front lines against as “ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Hezbollah”.  There is no comparison between the first two of those and the third.  ISIS and Al Qaeda are transnational terrorist organizations that seek to overturn governing structures in the Muslim world and to impose an extreme form of rule throughout that world.  Hezbollah, by contrast, is focused mainly on sectarian politics and the distribution of power in Lebanon and its environs.  Hezbollah’s participation in a governing coalition with other parties in an existing nation-state is far beyond the realm of anything possible with ISIS or Al Qaeda.

Hamas is another group that undeniably has used terrorism but otherwise has very little in common with the likes of ISIS and Al Qaeda.  Like Hezbollah, it is focused primarily on more parochial political objectives—in Hamas’s case, on self-determination and political power in Palestine.  It has demonstrated its ability and willingness to use peaceful means to pursue those objectives by winning a free and fair election among Palestinians.

The simplistic view tends to disregard the circumstances leading to the use of terrorism and to the emergence of groups that have used the tactic.  Hezbollah was born in the early 1980s in the midst of a civil war in Lebanon.  A major cause of both the war and the birth of the group was strong sentiment among Lebanon’s growing Shia population that it was underprivileged and unfairly underrepresented in Lebanese politics.  A more immediate circumstance underlying the emergence of Hezbollah was Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982.  The invasion was intended to chase the Palestine Liberation Organization to the ends of the earth—or at least to Tunisia, to which it decamped.  A salient episode in the Israeli military expedition was the Sabra and Shatila massacre , in which Israel’s army aided its Phalangist militia allies in the slaughter of hundreds and probably thousands of civilians, including Palestinian refugees and Lebanese Shia—Hezbollah’s constituency.  Any reference to Hezbollah’s hostility toward Israel needs to recall these events for a full understanding.