Relations with Saudi Arabia are Risky as Well as Confused
Mainly because of domestic American politics and the workings of the U.S. Congress, everyone has a right to be confused about U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia, including the Saudis themselves. The first Congressional override of any veto by President Barack Obama has come on the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA); Saudi Arabia is the obvious, if unstated, target of this legislation, which permits private lawsuits against foreign governments on grounds of alleged involvement in acts of terrorism. The significant drawbacks of the legislation, motivating the presidential veto, include the precedent it sets for U.S. actions abroad becoming the stuff of foreign lawsuits, and the needless riling of the Saudis with a measure that is unlikely to bring any monetary award to families of 9/11 victims anyway. Most of all, as Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Bob Corker (R-TN) aptly put it, this departure from the principle of sovereign immunity leads to “exporting your foreign policy to trial lawyers.”
Of course, a gesture in favor of the 9/11 families at the expense of the Saudis is exactly the kind of feel-good legislation that no member wants to be seen voting against and to have that vote exploited by an opponent in a future election. So we have the bipartisan spectacle of members voting in favor of a bill with problems that they were openly acknowledging even before their vote, and with the members already talking about the need for further legislation (after this fall's election) to fix the bad law that they were about to enact.
Just one week before the vote on the Saudi-bashing JASTA, the Senate was saying that it has the back of America's Saudi friends by voting down a resolution that would have blocked a sale of tanks and other armaments of the sort that Saudi forces have been using in its military intervention in Yemen. The highly destructive and indiscriminate nature of that intervention, with an alarmingly large and growing number of civilian casualties, motivated the sponsors of the resolution. But a majority of senators evidently were motivated more by other considerations, including the desire to show support for anyone in the region who opposes supposedly nefarious Iranians. Indeed, the political need to “compensate” for doing business with Tehran in negotiating the agreement that restricts Iran's nuclear program was one of the reasons the Obama administration allowed itself to get sucked as deeply into the Yemeni tragedy as it has.
So the political posturing has sent two contradictory messages about U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia, and each in the wrong direction. A bill about suing the Saudi government over terrorism is passed even though no investigation or previously secret 28 pages has shown that government to have been involved in 9/11. And an arms sale is approved that associates the United States ever more deeply with one of the more destabilizing and indefensible things that the same Saudi government has been doing.
While American politicians have been absorbed in these two forms of posturing, they have been giving insufficient attention to larger questions that ought to be carefully considered in shaping America's relationship with Saudi Arabia, which still is commonly labeled a U.S. “ally”. These questions partly involve a weighing of possible benefits of a close relationship such as military access rights against the disadvantages of the closeness, or what may be even more important, the perception by others of such closeness. This gets into such things as region-wide sectarian conflicts that Saudi leaders feel obliged to wage but can never be anything but a losing proposition for the United States.
It also gets to the ways in which Saudi political and social values are vastly different from American ones. In many respects it is hard to imagine two purported partners being more different. Saudi Arabia is a family-run autocracy. (To relate this to a Western context, imagine that the United Kingdom, instead of being the fellow democracy that we know, were a family-run state called Windsor Britannia.) There is no freedom of religion in Saudi Arabia. It is ironic that some in the United States who express worry about the spread of sharia have no problem with taking sides in the Middle East with a regime that considers the Koran to be its constitution and that prohibits the open practice of any religion other than Islam.
Another fundamental, and even longer-term, consideration involves the longevity or fragility of a regime that is an anachronism. This gets to prudent thinking about possible scenarios that, for understandable and legitimate reasons of diplomatic sensitivity, never get openly and officially discussed, but must be thought about nonetheless. The nightmare scenario is that the revolution comes to the kingdom and one day we would face not the family enterprise known as Saudi Arabia but instead a radical-dominated Islamic Republic of Arabia.