Blogs: Paul Pillar

Will the Trump Administration Start a War with Iran?

Paul Pillar

The direct stakes in whether the Trump administration adheres to the agreement that restricts the Iranian nuclear program are important enough, in terms of nuclear nonproliferation.  Also important are the opportunities to build on that agreement constructively to address problems of concern to both Iran and the United States.  But at stake as well, as the new administration makes policy toward Iran, is the need to avoid a potentially disastrous turn, highly costly to U.S. interests, in the U.S.-Iranian relationship.

Recall how the policy options were being framed in American public debate as of about four years ago, before the negotiations that produced the nuclear agreement got under way.  Amid much alarmist talk about an Iranian nuclear weapon being just around the corner, the “military option” was repeatedly and seriously discussed as the principal alternative to negotiations.  In other words, people were talking about starting a war with Iran—although that is not how the option was commonly phrased. 

A military attack, intended to damage the mere potential for producing weapons that others, including the attacker, already have would have been a naked and illegal act of aggression.  It also would have been counterproductive in probably stimulating a decision by Iran to make a nuclear weapon that it had not previously decided to make.  But that is how the alternatives were nevertheless discussed.  Some who talked up the alternative of a military attack may have regarded it as more of a bluff, but for others war was an actual objective.

So in addition to the other setbacks to U.S. interests that would ensue from the United States reneging on the agreement, a U.S.-Iranian war is a potential, and highly costly, additional possible consequence.  The looming danger of such a war is not, however, only a function of how the nuclear agreement is handled.  The danger looms because appointments that Donald Trump is making to senior national security positions are installing at high levels of the new administration a predisposition to stoke permanent conflict with Iran, a predisposition that is far more visceral than analytical and that embodies the kind of fervor and hatred that has the risk of leading to armed conflict.

The most important figure in this picture apart from the president-elect himself is his choice as national security adviser, Michael Flynn.  Flynn’s attitude toward Iran is a corollary of his broader Islamophobic view of the Muslim world, in that it involves perceptions that are out of right field if not downright bizarre.  If his preconceived notions about such topics do not fit the facts, then he tries to make the facts conform.  One incident reported by the New York Times involved the attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya in 2012.  Flynn insisted Iran had a role in the attack, and he told subordinates at the Defense Intelligence Agency, of which he was then the director, that their job was to find evidence that he was right.  (No evidence of any Iranian role in the attack has surfaced.)  We should not be surprised that someone who performed his duties as an intelligence chief in this manner has more recently shown an affinity for fake news of other sorts that fits his political objectives, such as alleged involvement by the Democratic presidential nominee in pedophilia rings.

Other appointments made to date do not provide much hope of providing a corrective to Flynn’s proclivities on anything having to do with Iran.  One cannot expect such a corrective from CIA director-designate Mike Pompeo, who comes to the job with a strongly stated political agenda of trashing the nuclear agreement. 

Nor can it be expected from the nominee for secretary of defense, James Mattis, even though he is more erudite than Flynn.  Mattis has a thing about Iran that appears to let passion shove the erudition aside whenever Iran is involved.  Mark Perry may be right that the passion is a Marine Corps thing and stems from the truck bombing, by Iran’s client Lebanese Hezbollah, of the barracks in Beirut in 1983 in which 220 Marines and 21 other Americans died.  Perry quotes another senior Marine officer as saying about Mattis, “It’s in his blood.  It’s almost like he wants to get even with them.”

Whatever the underlying cause of his passion, the passion causes accurate and realistic appraisals of Iran to suffer.  When Mattis asserts that Iran is not really a nation-state but instead a “revolutionary cause devoted to mayhem,” this indicates a failure to understand, or a refusal to understand, the history of Iranian politics and policy in the four decades since the Iranian revolution and the evolution of Iran’s relationship with the rest of the region.  When he says that “Iran is not an enemy of ISIS” and that “I consider ISIS nothing more than an excuse for Iran to continue its mischief,” this flies in the face of fundamental realities about both ISIS and Iran and how the latter is combating the former, especially in Iraq.

Pages

George C. Marshall: Statesman, Not a Warrior

Paul Pillar

The direct stakes in whether the Trump administration adheres to the agreement that restricts the Iranian nuclear program are important enough, in terms of nuclear nonproliferation.  Also important are the opportunities to build on that agreement constructively to address problems of concern to both Iran and the United States.  But at stake as well, as the new administration makes policy toward Iran, is the need to avoid a potentially disastrous turn, highly costly to U.S. interests, in the U.S.-Iranian relationship.

Recall how the policy options were being framed in American public debate as of about four years ago, before the negotiations that produced the nuclear agreement got under way.  Amid much alarmist talk about an Iranian nuclear weapon being just around the corner, the “military option” was repeatedly and seriously discussed as the principal alternative to negotiations.  In other words, people were talking about starting a war with Iran—although that is not how the option was commonly phrased. 

A military attack, intended to damage the mere potential for producing weapons that others, including the attacker, already have would have been a naked and illegal act of aggression.  It also would have been counterproductive in probably stimulating a decision by Iran to make a nuclear weapon that it had not previously decided to make.  But that is how the alternatives were nevertheless discussed.  Some who talked up the alternative of a military attack may have regarded it as more of a bluff, but for others war was an actual objective.

So in addition to the other setbacks to U.S. interests that would ensue from the United States reneging on the agreement, a U.S.-Iranian war is a potential, and highly costly, additional possible consequence.  The looming danger of such a war is not, however, only a function of how the nuclear agreement is handled.  The danger looms because appointments that Donald Trump is making to senior national security positions are installing at high levels of the new administration a predisposition to stoke permanent conflict with Iran, a predisposition that is far more visceral than analytical and that embodies the kind of fervor and hatred that has the risk of leading to armed conflict.

The most important figure in this picture apart from the president-elect himself is his choice as national security adviser, Michael Flynn.  Flynn’s attitude toward Iran is a corollary of his broader Islamophobic view of the Muslim world, in that it involves perceptions that are out of right field if not downright bizarre.  If his preconceived notions about such topics do not fit the facts, then he tries to make the facts conform.  One incident reported by the New York Times involved the attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya in 2012.  Flynn insisted Iran had a role in the attack, and he told subordinates at the Defense Intelligence Agency, of which he was then the director, that their job was to find evidence that he was right.  (No evidence of any Iranian role in the attack has surfaced.)  We should not be surprised that someone who performed his duties as an intelligence chief in this manner has more recently shown an affinity for fake news of other sorts that fits his political objectives, such as alleged involvement by the Democratic presidential nominee in pedophilia rings.

Other appointments made to date do not provide much hope of providing a corrective to Flynn’s proclivities on anything having to do with Iran.  One cannot expect such a corrective from CIA director-designate Mike Pompeo, who comes to the job with a strongly stated political agenda of trashing the nuclear agreement. 

Nor can it be expected from the nominee for secretary of defense, James Mattis, even though he is more erudite than Flynn.  Mattis has a thing about Iran that appears to let passion shove the erudition aside whenever Iran is involved.  Mark Perry may be right that the passion is a Marine Corps thing and stems from the truck bombing, by Iran’s client Lebanese Hezbollah, of the barracks in Beirut in 1983 in which 220 Marines and 21 other Americans died.  Perry quotes another senior Marine officer as saying about Mattis, “It’s in his blood.  It’s almost like he wants to get even with them.”

Whatever the underlying cause of his passion, the passion causes accurate and realistic appraisals of Iran to suffer.  When Mattis asserts that Iran is not really a nation-state but instead a “revolutionary cause devoted to mayhem,” this indicates a failure to understand, or a refusal to understand, the history of Iranian politics and policy in the four decades since the Iranian revolution and the evolution of Iran’s relationship with the rest of the region.  When he says that “Iran is not an enemy of ISIS” and that “I consider ISIS nothing more than an excuse for Iran to continue its mischief,” this flies in the face of fundamental realities about both ISIS and Iran and how the latter is combating the former, especially in Iraq.

Pages

The Post-Truth President and U.S. Credibility

Paul Pillar

The direct stakes in whether the Trump administration adheres to the agreement that restricts the Iranian nuclear program are important enough, in terms of nuclear nonproliferation.  Also important are the opportunities to build on that agreement constructively to address problems of concern to both Iran and the United States.  But at stake as well, as the new administration makes policy toward Iran, is the need to avoid a potentially disastrous turn, highly costly to U.S. interests, in the U.S.-Iranian relationship.

Recall how the policy options were being framed in American public debate as of about four years ago, before the negotiations that produced the nuclear agreement got under way.  Amid much alarmist talk about an Iranian nuclear weapon being just around the corner, the “military option” was repeatedly and seriously discussed as the principal alternative to negotiations.  In other words, people were talking about starting a war with Iran—although that is not how the option was commonly phrased. 

A military attack, intended to damage the mere potential for producing weapons that others, including the attacker, already have would have been a naked and illegal act of aggression.  It also would have been counterproductive in probably stimulating a decision by Iran to make a nuclear weapon that it had not previously decided to make.  But that is how the alternatives were nevertheless discussed.  Some who talked up the alternative of a military attack may have regarded it as more of a bluff, but for others war was an actual objective.

So in addition to the other setbacks to U.S. interests that would ensue from the United States reneging on the agreement, a U.S.-Iranian war is a potential, and highly costly, additional possible consequence.  The looming danger of such a war is not, however, only a function of how the nuclear agreement is handled.  The danger looms because appointments that Donald Trump is making to senior national security positions are installing at high levels of the new administration a predisposition to stoke permanent conflict with Iran, a predisposition that is far more visceral than analytical and that embodies the kind of fervor and hatred that has the risk of leading to armed conflict.

The most important figure in this picture apart from the president-elect himself is his choice as national security adviser, Michael Flynn.  Flynn’s attitude toward Iran is a corollary of his broader Islamophobic view of the Muslim world, in that it involves perceptions that are out of right field if not downright bizarre.  If his preconceived notions about such topics do not fit the facts, then he tries to make the facts conform.  One incident reported by the New York Times involved the attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya in 2012.  Flynn insisted Iran had a role in the attack, and he told subordinates at the Defense Intelligence Agency, of which he was then the director, that their job was to find evidence that he was right.  (No evidence of any Iranian role in the attack has surfaced.)  We should not be surprised that someone who performed his duties as an intelligence chief in this manner has more recently shown an affinity for fake news of other sorts that fits his political objectives, such as alleged involvement by the Democratic presidential nominee in pedophilia rings.

Other appointments made to date do not provide much hope of providing a corrective to Flynn’s proclivities on anything having to do with Iran.  One cannot expect such a corrective from CIA director-designate Mike Pompeo, who comes to the job with a strongly stated political agenda of trashing the nuclear agreement. 

Nor can it be expected from the nominee for secretary of defense, James Mattis, even though he is more erudite than Flynn.  Mattis has a thing about Iran that appears to let passion shove the erudition aside whenever Iran is involved.  Mark Perry may be right that the passion is a Marine Corps thing and stems from the truck bombing, by Iran’s client Lebanese Hezbollah, of the barracks in Beirut in 1983 in which 220 Marines and 21 other Americans died.  Perry quotes another senior Marine officer as saying about Mattis, “It’s in his blood.  It’s almost like he wants to get even with them.”

Whatever the underlying cause of his passion, the passion causes accurate and realistic appraisals of Iran to suffer.  When Mattis asserts that Iran is not really a nation-state but instead a “revolutionary cause devoted to mayhem,” this indicates a failure to understand, or a refusal to understand, the history of Iranian politics and policy in the four decades since the Iranian revolution and the evolution of Iran’s relationship with the rest of the region.  When he says that “Iran is not an enemy of ISIS” and that “I consider ISIS nothing more than an excuse for Iran to continue its mischief,” this flies in the face of fundamental realities about both ISIS and Iran and how the latter is combating the former, especially in Iraq.

Pages

Climate Change and the Priority of the Irreversible

Paul Pillar

The direct stakes in whether the Trump administration adheres to the agreement that restricts the Iranian nuclear program are important enough, in terms of nuclear nonproliferation.  Also important are the opportunities to build on that agreement constructively to address problems of concern to both Iran and the United States.  But at stake as well, as the new administration makes policy toward Iran, is the need to avoid a potentially disastrous turn, highly costly to U.S. interests, in the U.S.-Iranian relationship.

Recall how the policy options were being framed in American public debate as of about four years ago, before the negotiations that produced the nuclear agreement got under way.  Amid much alarmist talk about an Iranian nuclear weapon being just around the corner, the “military option” was repeatedly and seriously discussed as the principal alternative to negotiations.  In other words, people were talking about starting a war with Iran—although that is not how the option was commonly phrased. 

A military attack, intended to damage the mere potential for producing weapons that others, including the attacker, already have would have been a naked and illegal act of aggression.  It also would have been counterproductive in probably stimulating a decision by Iran to make a nuclear weapon that it had not previously decided to make.  But that is how the alternatives were nevertheless discussed.  Some who talked up the alternative of a military attack may have regarded it as more of a bluff, but for others war was an actual objective.

So in addition to the other setbacks to U.S. interests that would ensue from the United States reneging on the agreement, a U.S.-Iranian war is a potential, and highly costly, additional possible consequence.  The looming danger of such a war is not, however, only a function of how the nuclear agreement is handled.  The danger looms because appointments that Donald Trump is making to senior national security positions are installing at high levels of the new administration a predisposition to stoke permanent conflict with Iran, a predisposition that is far more visceral than analytical and that embodies the kind of fervor and hatred that has the risk of leading to armed conflict.

The most important figure in this picture apart from the president-elect himself is his choice as national security adviser, Michael Flynn.  Flynn’s attitude toward Iran is a corollary of his broader Islamophobic view of the Muslim world, in that it involves perceptions that are out of right field if not downright bizarre.  If his preconceived notions about such topics do not fit the facts, then he tries to make the facts conform.  One incident reported by the New York Times involved the attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya in 2012.  Flynn insisted Iran had a role in the attack, and he told subordinates at the Defense Intelligence Agency, of which he was then the director, that their job was to find evidence that he was right.  (No evidence of any Iranian role in the attack has surfaced.)  We should not be surprised that someone who performed his duties as an intelligence chief in this manner has more recently shown an affinity for fake news of other sorts that fits his political objectives, such as alleged involvement by the Democratic presidential nominee in pedophilia rings.

Other appointments made to date do not provide much hope of providing a corrective to Flynn’s proclivities on anything having to do with Iran.  One cannot expect such a corrective from CIA director-designate Mike Pompeo, who comes to the job with a strongly stated political agenda of trashing the nuclear agreement. 

Nor can it be expected from the nominee for secretary of defense, James Mattis, even though he is more erudite than Flynn.  Mattis has a thing about Iran that appears to let passion shove the erudition aside whenever Iran is involved.  Mark Perry may be right that the passion is a Marine Corps thing and stems from the truck bombing, by Iran’s client Lebanese Hezbollah, of the barracks in Beirut in 1983 in which 220 Marines and 21 other Americans died.  Perry quotes another senior Marine officer as saying about Mattis, “It’s in his blood.  It’s almost like he wants to get even with them.”

Whatever the underlying cause of his passion, the passion causes accurate and realistic appraisals of Iran to suffer.  When Mattis asserts that Iran is not really a nation-state but instead a “revolutionary cause devoted to mayhem,” this indicates a failure to understand, or a refusal to understand, the history of Iranian politics and policy in the four decades since the Iranian revolution and the evolution of Iran’s relationship with the rest of the region.  When he says that “Iran is not an enemy of ISIS” and that “I consider ISIS nothing more than an excuse for Iran to continue its mischief,” this flies in the face of fundamental realities about both ISIS and Iran and how the latter is combating the former, especially in Iraq.

Pages

Ideology is Supplanting Intelligence

Paul Pillar

The direct stakes in whether the Trump administration adheres to the agreement that restricts the Iranian nuclear program are important enough, in terms of nuclear nonproliferation.  Also important are the opportunities to build on that agreement constructively to address problems of concern to both Iran and the United States.  But at stake as well, as the new administration makes policy toward Iran, is the need to avoid a potentially disastrous turn, highly costly to U.S. interests, in the U.S.-Iranian relationship.

Recall how the policy options were being framed in American public debate as of about four years ago, before the negotiations that produced the nuclear agreement got under way.  Amid much alarmist talk about an Iranian nuclear weapon being just around the corner, the “military option” was repeatedly and seriously discussed as the principal alternative to negotiations.  In other words, people were talking about starting a war with Iran—although that is not how the option was commonly phrased. 

A military attack, intended to damage the mere potential for producing weapons that others, including the attacker, already have would have been a naked and illegal act of aggression.  It also would have been counterproductive in probably stimulating a decision by Iran to make a nuclear weapon that it had not previously decided to make.  But that is how the alternatives were nevertheless discussed.  Some who talked up the alternative of a military attack may have regarded it as more of a bluff, but for others war was an actual objective.

So in addition to the other setbacks to U.S. interests that would ensue from the United States reneging on the agreement, a U.S.-Iranian war is a potential, and highly costly, additional possible consequence.  The looming danger of such a war is not, however, only a function of how the nuclear agreement is handled.  The danger looms because appointments that Donald Trump is making to senior national security positions are installing at high levels of the new administration a predisposition to stoke permanent conflict with Iran, a predisposition that is far more visceral than analytical and that embodies the kind of fervor and hatred that has the risk of leading to armed conflict.

The most important figure in this picture apart from the president-elect himself is his choice as national security adviser, Michael Flynn.  Flynn’s attitude toward Iran is a corollary of his broader Islamophobic view of the Muslim world, in that it involves perceptions that are out of right field if not downright bizarre.  If his preconceived notions about such topics do not fit the facts, then he tries to make the facts conform.  One incident reported by the New York Times involved the attack on the U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya in 2012.  Flynn insisted Iran had a role in the attack, and he told subordinates at the Defense Intelligence Agency, of which he was then the director, that their job was to find evidence that he was right.  (No evidence of any Iranian role in the attack has surfaced.)  We should not be surprised that someone who performed his duties as an intelligence chief in this manner has more recently shown an affinity for fake news of other sorts that fits his political objectives, such as alleged involvement by the Democratic presidential nominee in pedophilia rings.

Other appointments made to date do not provide much hope of providing a corrective to Flynn’s proclivities on anything having to do with Iran.  One cannot expect such a corrective from CIA director-designate Mike Pompeo, who comes to the job with a strongly stated political agenda of trashing the nuclear agreement. 

Nor can it be expected from the nominee for secretary of defense, James Mattis, even though he is more erudite than Flynn.  Mattis has a thing about Iran that appears to let passion shove the erudition aside whenever Iran is involved.  Mark Perry may be right that the passion is a Marine Corps thing and stems from the truck bombing, by Iran’s client Lebanese Hezbollah, of the barracks in Beirut in 1983 in which 220 Marines and 21 other Americans died.  Perry quotes another senior Marine officer as saying about Mattis, “It’s in his blood.  It’s almost like he wants to get even with them.”

Whatever the underlying cause of his passion, the passion causes accurate and realistic appraisals of Iran to suffer.  When Mattis asserts that Iran is not really a nation-state but instead a “revolutionary cause devoted to mayhem,” this indicates a failure to understand, or a refusal to understand, the history of Iranian politics and policy in the four decades since the Iranian revolution and the evolution of Iran’s relationship with the rest of the region.  When he says that “Iran is not an enemy of ISIS” and that “I consider ISIS nothing more than an excuse for Iran to continue its mischief,” this flies in the face of fundamental realities about both ISIS and Iran and how the latter is combating the former, especially in Iraq.

Pages

Pages