The Buzz

Duel of the Light Attack Planes: Tucano vs. Texan vs. Scorpion

This July, the U.S. Air Force will be testing turboprop airplanes that look like they came out of World War II, for its OA-X Light Attack competition. Two of the aircraft—the Embraer/Sierra Nevada AT-29B Tucano and the Beechcraft AT-6 Wolverine—are old rivals for the flying branch’s favor. Other competitors include the Air Tractor AT-802, a crop duster upgraded with armor and weapons (no, really!), and a sleek-looking privately developed jet, the Textron AirLand Scorpion.

Whichever airplane receives higher marks in the trials, the real suspense lies in whether the Air Force will follow through on ordering some of the low-cost attack planes and forming squadrons to fly them. A new budget from the Senate Armed Services Committee sets aside more than $1.2 billion for two hundred new light attack planes by 2022, but the money still depends on an Air Force commitment, which may only come after the trials are complete.

For years, the U.S. Air Force has been dispatching high-performance fighter jets like F-16s and F-15Es that cost tens of thousands of dollars per flight hour to operate, in order to chuck costly smart bombs against scrubby insurgents with rusty AK-47s hiding in caves—or, at best, driving a pickup truck slinging an old Soviet machine gun on the back.

Not only is this grossly inefficient, but to add insult to injury, fast and high-flying fighter jets are poorly suited to the low and slow flying ideal for ferreting out insurgent fighters. Jet fighters burn through their fuel extremely quickly, while a good counterinsurgency plane needs to be able to fly for many hours while conducting Intelligence, Search and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions or loitering overhead to provide close air support for troops on the ground.

Furthermore, jet fighters can only take off and land from long and expensive-to-maintain runways—which more often than not means that they must be based hundreds of miles away from the front line, further worsening the endurance and fuel costs, as well as diminishing response and loiter time.

The Air Force does, begrudgingly, operate A-10 Thunderbolt attack jets—despite repeated attempts to defund the plane or sneakily ground them by depriving them of necessary upgrades. These are legendarily tough, very good for low and slow operations, and have a decent three to four hours of endurance. The A-10s cost $17,000 per hour to fly, which is cheaper than any other U.S. jet, but still considerable, and its heavy armor and armament is overkill in many situations. But what alternative is there?

Well . . . decades ago, the U.S. Air Force once flew counterinsurgency planes, such as the A-37 Dragonfly jet and the A-1 Skyraider and OV-10 Bronco propeller planes, that were ideal for long, heavily armed patrols over dense jungles and rocky mountains in Asia and the Americas. These were so good at their role that Special Operations Command even recently combat tested two retired OV-10s against ISIS in Iraq from forward airstrips to evaluate the usefulness of bringing similar aircraft back into service.

Consider, then, old-fashioned turboprop attack planes—or cheap, slower-flying jets—which could land on rough forward airfields close to the frontline, comfortably fly for five to ten hours at low speeds on ISR missions, and potentially cost as little as $500 a flight hour to operate (at least for the turboprops). A loitering light turboprop plane in particular might consume as much fuel in an hour as a jet fighter does in a few minutes.

Furthermore, there’s no reason contemporary turboprop aircraft can’t be outfitted with modern avionics, sensors and weapon systems, so as to deliver many of the same precision weapons an F-16 can at a fraction of the cost. Guided weapons not only have higher lethality and a lower chance of inflicting collateral damage on civilians, but they may also allow light attack planes to strike their targets from a safe distance when facing low-altitude threats, such as man-portable heat-seeking missiles or heavy machine guns.

Of course, you don’t send light attack planes to fight World War III against an opponent with fighter planes and radar-guided surface-to-air missiles. But that’s beside the point: the vast majority of U.S. Air Force combat operations in the last two decades have been against opponents that have very limited antiaircraft capabilities, as evidenced by minimal fixed-wing combat losses since 2003.

Furthermore, a light-attack-plane force would actually improve the condition of the fast jet force, by freeing them from spending thousands of expensive, airframe-wearing flight hours winging their high-tech gas-guzzling turbofan engines over the Middle East and Afghanistan, playing Whac-A-Mole with ISIS and the Taliban.