Here Is How the Battle of Britain Was Really Won
It was a battle fought without armies. No rifles, no tanks, no barbed wire. In the summer of 1940, the skies above Britain served as the battlefield for the British Royal Air Force and the German Luftwaffe. The Nazis had conquered most of Western Europe, and Britain stood alone. The Luftwaffe represented the first arm of the German military juggernaut to take a swing at the British Isles. Its mission was simple: repeat the performances in Poland and France and eliminate the enemy air force.This would facilitate an invasion, which the Germans had no reason to believe would fail. The Luftwaffe’s crack pilots, many of them experienced since 1936 in the Spanish Civil War, included men like the dashing and headstrong Adolf Galland and deadly tactical genius Werner Mölders. The RAF stood grossly outnumbered, outgunned, and outmanned. Therein lies the importance of the Battle of Britain. The RAF, subsequently nicknamed “The Few” by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, held the responsibility of not only defending Britain from the Luftwaffe but also defeating the German pilots and thwarting Hitler’s plan for invasion. Despite German numerical and tactical superiority, higher echelons of leadership in the RAF proved more strategically flexible and adapted to the situations and parameters of the battle better than their Luftwaffe counterparts.
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“The Battle of Britain is About to Begin”
By the spring of 1940, World War II had begun only months earlier but looked to possibly end within the year. The French defense against the Germans ranged from abysmal to nonexistent, and the British Expeditionary Force evacuated Dunkirk in mid-June, as French Marshal Philippe Pétain sought an armistice with Germany. Resiliently, Churchill declared to Parliament on June 18, “The Battle of France is over. I expect the Battle of Britain is about to begin.”
With France removed from the picture, Germany looked to attack Britain, the last bastion of resistance. In preparation for a decisive victory, Hitler issued Directive Number 16, which charged Luftwaffe chief Hermann Göring with the task of softening up Britain. Arrogant and pompous, Göring guaranteed the destruction of the RAF. Göring fully expected the RAF to flounder and fall from the sky.
Göring had little reason to assume the RAF could withstand a full-force assault. During the battles over France and Norway, the RAF lost 1,020 planes, 509 of which were fighters. According to the battle order of the RAF on July 1, 1940, this left 900 fighters in 10, 11, 12, and 13 Groups, responsible for the defense of England. Of these, 151 (17 percent) were Bristol Blenheims and Boulton Paul Defiants, although the majority of the squadrons were equipped with Hawker Hurricanes, and to a lesser extent, the Supermarine Spitfire. To add to these numbers, fighter production in June of 1940 was 446. The count of Hurricanes and Spitfires would increase to 972 in July and August.
Pilots of the RAF
In terms of pilots, the RAF faced a bleak situation. Planes were available, but pilots were not. Since 1939, the British had produced only 200 new pilots every month. Those men were not likely to be considered veterans, since the only combat they had encountered was over France and Norway. In all, Fighter Command could muster 591 serviceable (combat ready) fighters and 1,200 pilots. As optimistic as these figures were, one must remember that several squadrons would be rotated out for rest if the head of Fighter Command, Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, could spare them. This was not often, as the pressure from the Germans forced all available aircraft to remain at the ready.
It was more likely that individual pilots were sent for rest when they reached the limits of their nerves, suffering from exhaustion. This was done on an individual basis since the stress of combat affected each man differently.
RAF pilots came from a few different strands before they manned a squadron. Pilots were schooled at Cranwell, which was the pinnacle of British flight schools. Also, Halton trained those who were of a social position that was not high enough for Cranwell. Halton specialized in ground crew rather than pilots. Short service commissions were another option, with the promise of an officer’s rank for six years followed by four in the reserve, with all the accoutrements such a position carried. This method proved very popular, offering instant social advancement in the stratified English society.