A Political Earthquake in Seoul and Its Repercussions for U.S. Policy

A Political Earthquake in Seoul and Its Repercussions for U.S. Policy

The time has come to find a middle ground and set up a new common policy toward North Korea.

The impending change of administration in Washington and the presidential impeachment roiling Seoul has put relations between the United States and South Korea in a tough spot. The pressures felt by both countries, which include North Korea’s growing nuclear threat and Beijing’s efforts to expand its sphere of influence, make the relationship all the more vital to the historical allies.

Amid those tensions, the political turmoil in Seoul is amplifying fear and anger toward the status quo. As new prospective leaders in Seoul jockey for position, they may work to reverse current South Korean policies on North Korea and China that were made in close cooperation with Washington.

Impeachment of President Park Geun-hye would likely lead to a shift in policy in Seoul to better align with opposition parties’ views that have pushed for economic cooperation with the North, closer ties with Beijing and a relative distancing from Japan. Three key decisions by the Park administration also would likely come under scrutiny—the closure of an industrial complex along the military demarcation line with North Korea, the deployment of an anti-missile defense battery by the U.S., and a military information-sharing agreement between South Korea and Japan. To formulate a path forward with South Korea, the United States needs to understand the causes and implications of these policy choices.

A change in South Korean policy on the aforementioned issues would pose serious challenges to the new administration in Washington for some time to come, just as the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump and its new policies would do to policymakers in Seoul. Despite the formidable task of bridging the possible gap, one thing is clear—the two administrations will have to cooperate for four years or more. Both countries need sophisticated and careful synchronization of policy across the Pacific more than ever.

Three Key Decisions in Question

The existing South Korean policies most likely to be challenged by the new South Korean administration carry weight for the United States because they represent tight U.S.-South Korean cooperation regarding U.S. policy toward North Korea. The Obama administration’s North Korea policy focused on containment with periodical addition of pressure on North Korea and emphasis on the proactive role of China. There are signs that the Trump administration might want to bring more pressure to bear on North Korea and China. Rex Tillerson, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, said in his confirmation hearing: “The U.S. must compel China to crack down on North Korea.”

The three Park decisions likely to be reconsidered by an incoming South Korean administration were made in response to North Korean nuclear and missile tests in order to defend against—and put more pressure on—North Korea. However, the abrupt and secretive manner in which those decisions were made has already generated aggressive responses from opposition parties. Last February, South Korea shut down the Kaesong Industrial Complex to retaliate against North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests. The complex, an industrial park jointly run by both countries, provided economic benefits to South Korean companies as well as to North Korea, and the opposition blasted the shutdown as “ineffective and rash.” The second decision, also made in February, was announced in July by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense and the U.S. Forces in Korea—a U.S. battery of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missiles would be deployed in South Korea. More recently, the opposition has requested postponement of THAAD implementation until the next South Korean administration is in place. Lastly, in October, South Korea and Japan signed a General Security of Military Information Agreement that allows both countries to exchange classified military information. The agreement was reached when President Park was on the verge of impeachment despite strong resistance from opposition parties. The agreement angered the opposition leaders so much that they threatened to dismiss or impeach the defense minister.

The significance of the three decisions should be understood in terms of U.S. North Korea policy. Closing the industrial complex was justified as a measure to cut off any possible inflow of cash to the North Korean regime, which it might use to promote its weapons program. Deploying the U.S. THAAD anti-missile battery in South Korea also was said to be essential to U.S. policy toward North Korea because it enhances deterrence and defense against Pyongyang while putting political pressure on Beijing. Finally, the General Security of Information Agreement was warranted as an essential tool to improve the joint responses of Japan and South Korea against possible provocations and attacks by North Korea. By sharing the information on North Korea, both countries can expect to be better prepared for contingencies. For a long time, the information-sharing arrangement between Tokyo and Seoul was regarded in Washington as a missing link in trilateral security cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea. Some observers have called it “a final touch for the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia.

Challenges to the Three Policies

The post-impeachment political change expected in South Korea poses a dilemma for Washington. The disgraceful fall of the conservative forces in South Korea will likely bring back to power the so-called Sunshine Kids, former protégés of late presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. Opposition leader Moon Jae-in, who leads in presidential election polls, was a chief of staff for President Roh. Likewise, the People’s Party—the third-largest party in the National Assembly—is packed with followers of Kim.

It would not be surprising if a consensus arises within the opposition bloc as to the need to reconfigure North Korea policy. Interestingly, even Ban Ki-moon, the current front-runner among the potential conservative candidates, is also stressing the need to engage with North Korea, claiming that he is the “sole person who has kept the dialogue channel between the South and the North.”

Both Kim and Roh apparently wanted to strike a delicate balance between Washington and Beijing because they probably realized they needed Beijing’s cooperation to successfully implement their Sunshine package. That was exactly why Kim refused to allow U.S. missile defense, which Beijing dislikes. In a similar vein, Roh used to define the role of South Korea as a “balancer.” This legacy of balancing is likely to return if the Sunshine Kids of Kim and Roh return to power.

South Korean opposition leaders would likely want to restart economic cooperation with North Korea and be more politically accommodating to the Chinese. They seem to believe that engaging and interacting with North Korea is the sole way to change their main foe—and bring long-term peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula. In their scheme, one key to the success of this strategy is securing cooperation from Beijing.

This change goes against existing U.S. strategy toward North Korea and China. If, for example, the industrial complex is reopened and the THAAD is removed from South Korea, deterrence against North Korean threats as well as U.S. pressure on Beijing would likely weaken. In response to such reversals, if Washington tries to persuade Seoul to reconsider them, the new leaders in South Korea would probably seek to secure some security gain in exchange, perhaps asking for a viable alternative to restore its deteriorating nuclear balance with the North.

In the eyes of South Koreans, the U.S. strategy of containment or pressure seems to be failing to stop the growth of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. From a military standpoint, North Korea is the main enemy of South Korea. That main enemy now has the absolute weapon, which South Korea does not. This simple and obvious imbalance creates fear among many South Koreans. The conservative administrations in Seoul have managed to deal with this fear by aligning with the U.S. policy of strategic patience, and highlighting the reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

New leadership in Seoul, however, would likely want to present a new alternative to dispel the nuclear fears of South Koreans. One immediate solution will be its traditional policy of engagement and cooperation with North Korea. That path could be blocked by U.S. opposition, potentially propelling Seoul toward an independent way to restore the nuclear balance with its northern competitor—its own nuclear weapons.

Are these misgivings exaggerated? True, at this moment, few South Korean presidential hopefuls are arguing for an independent nuclear weapons program. However, the Sunshine Kids value independence and want to establish their country’s autonomy vis-à-vis superpowers. And how can South Korea be a regional balancer without nuclear weapons? Therefore, they may find it more alluring to seek an independent nuclear weapons program if they believe that the path to engagement with the North is impeded by their most important ally.

The Court of Public Opinion  

While the South Korean political elites are raising issues with the three main foreign policy choices of Park, the general public is turning against the three choices, too. A late 2016 poll showed that 59 percent of respondents prefer dialogue with North Korea to pressuring the country, and 64 percent support cancellation or reconsideration of the THAAD policy. Overall public opinion on military cooperation with Japan has never been positive. If a post-impeachment presidential election is held soon, the political campaign might amplify these opinions.