The Buzz

Russia's Navy Might Be Modernizing—But It's Overstretched

President Vladimir Putin’s speech on the first of March revealed a whole panoply of new nuclear capabilities, from cruise missiles with nearly unlimited range to unmanned undersea vehicles also operating with extraordinary range, together with unprecedented speed and depth capabilities. While the speech was no doubt intended to burnish his reputation for toughness ahead of the mid-March election, these revelations will give Western strategists plenty to talk about as the New Cold War grinds into high gear. Yet these dramatic revelations should not obscure the daily interactions between Russian and U.S. forces in ever closer proximity that could lead to a crisis or worse.

Along the maritime periphery of Russia, tensions continue to escalate. Russian warships sortied en masse into the Baltic Sea on 20 February as part of a readiness drill, and in January, Russian news reported that a U.S. drone made a long-range intelligence-gathering sortie along Russia’s Black Sea border in the vicinity of Kerch, Sochi, and the Crimea. Now, it is reported that two U.S. Navy destroyers have been patrolling in the Black Sea. Predictably, Russian media reports have been critical of this deployment, suggesting that it is a provocation similar to those that occurred during the Cold War.

In particular, they do not appear to have taken well to a Pentagon spokesman’s apparent suggestion that Moscow should get used to the presence of the U.S. military in that particular area. One such Russian analysis quotes a foreign commentator, explaining that “… if the situation worsens the bottom of the Black Sea could become a cemetery for American destroyers” [что при осложнении обстановки дно Черного моря может стать кладбищем для американских эсминцев.]

Putting aside the bellicose rhetoric amidst escalatory moves, a remarkably interesting short article appeared in the Russian naval press on Valentine’s Day. This article reports out on an apparently annual estimate of Russian fleet combat power compared to that of the U.S. Navy. This is not quite the Russian equivalent of the famous “Soviet Military Power” report of the 1980s, but it is nevertheless interesting to see how Russian naval strategists evaluate the naval balance. The intriguing bottom line is that this report places Russian fleet combat power at 47 percent of that of the U.S. Navy. According to the article, last year “… the Russian fleet not only succeeded in maintaining its position, but it even strengthened its situation with respect to the U.S. Navy” [российскому флоту удалось не только не потерять позиций, но даже несколько укрепить свое положение относительно американских ВМС].

That number has fluctuated considerably in recent years, according to a colorful bar graph in the same article, reaching as high as 63 percent in 2010, but then falling off quite precipitously and reaching a low of 42 percent in 2012 before beginning a slow climb to the present figure with the exception of another major drop during 2014–15. These drops are not explained in the article, but likely are the result of the on-going problem of “block obsolescence” that has plagued the Russian Navy for decades as Soviet-era ships reach the end of their service lives. A relatively clear and simple methodology for calculating these figures is provided that applies a combat power weighting to each type of ship. For example, nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) have a combat value of five, while corvettes have a value of just one.