Blogs: The Buzz

CHAMP: America's EMP Missile That Might Be Able to Fry North Korea's Nukes

The Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Program Needs A Cross Functional Team

The Buzz

Perhaps the solution to this problem is a CFT for the TWV fleet. Determining the size and composition of the TWV fleet is a matter of tradeoff between factors similar to those that will occupy the eight initial CFTs: acquisition costs, capabilities, timeliness, sustainability and flexibility. A CFT could integrate the perspectives of the various acquisition stakeholders, address the desirable mix of new and upgraded platforms, involve the user community-- which is not monolithic-- and improve the cost efficiency of TWV fleet sustainment. Rather than a strategy based on either the JLTV or the Humvee, the Army needs one that is based on a balanced approach to employing both.

Equally important, a TWV CFT could fundamentally change the way the Army thinks about the long-term management of large and varied fleets of vehicles. The Army tends to expend almost all its energy and attention on getting a new capability through development and into production. Yet, it is the period after initial procurement where the Army will spend the most money and when platforms often will undergo repeated upgrades. Modernization is a continuing process, not a singular event that takes place at program start.

 A TWV CFT could pioneer a new way for the Army to manage major programs. A military platform is made up of a set of constituent systems that evolve at different rates. CFTs will need to think in terms of multiple, parallel technology streams coming to fruition over time. For such a CFT the job would not be done when the requirements document is published. This would only be the end of the beginning. A TWV CFT would be responsible not only for the development and procurement of the JLTV but more importantly, for sustaining and upgrading the large and capable Humvee fleet.

Daniel Gouré, Ph.D., is a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute. Goure has a background in the public sector and U.S. federal government, most recently serving as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team. You can follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute at @LexNextDC.

Image: U.S. Army

 

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Battle for Moscow: How Russia Stopped Nazi Germany's Military

The Buzz

Perhaps the solution to this problem is a CFT for the TWV fleet. Determining the size and composition of the TWV fleet is a matter of tradeoff between factors similar to those that will occupy the eight initial CFTs: acquisition costs, capabilities, timeliness, sustainability and flexibility. A CFT could integrate the perspectives of the various acquisition stakeholders, address the desirable mix of new and upgraded platforms, involve the user community-- which is not monolithic-- and improve the cost efficiency of TWV fleet sustainment. Rather than a strategy based on either the JLTV or the Humvee, the Army needs one that is based on a balanced approach to employing both.

Equally important, a TWV CFT could fundamentally change the way the Army thinks about the long-term management of large and varied fleets of vehicles. The Army tends to expend almost all its energy and attention on getting a new capability through development and into production. Yet, it is the period after initial procurement where the Army will spend the most money and when platforms often will undergo repeated upgrades. Modernization is a continuing process, not a singular event that takes place at program start.

 A TWV CFT could pioneer a new way for the Army to manage major programs. A military platform is made up of a set of constituent systems that evolve at different rates. CFTs will need to think in terms of multiple, parallel technology streams coming to fruition over time. For such a CFT the job would not be done when the requirements document is published. This would only be the end of the beginning. A TWV CFT would be responsible not only for the development and procurement of the JLTV but more importantly, for sustaining and upgrading the large and capable Humvee fleet.

Daniel Gouré, Ph.D., is a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute. Goure has a background in the public sector and U.S. federal government, most recently serving as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team. You can follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute at @LexNextDC.

Image: U.S. Army

 

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America Just Launched F-35s Close to North Korea For One Reason

The Buzz

Perhaps the solution to this problem is a CFT for the TWV fleet. Determining the size and composition of the TWV fleet is a matter of tradeoff between factors similar to those that will occupy the eight initial CFTs: acquisition costs, capabilities, timeliness, sustainability and flexibility. A CFT could integrate the perspectives of the various acquisition stakeholders, address the desirable mix of new and upgraded platforms, involve the user community-- which is not monolithic-- and improve the cost efficiency of TWV fleet sustainment. Rather than a strategy based on either the JLTV or the Humvee, the Army needs one that is based on a balanced approach to employing both.

Equally important, a TWV CFT could fundamentally change the way the Army thinks about the long-term management of large and varied fleets of vehicles. The Army tends to expend almost all its energy and attention on getting a new capability through development and into production. Yet, it is the period after initial procurement where the Army will spend the most money and when platforms often will undergo repeated upgrades. Modernization is a continuing process, not a singular event that takes place at program start.

 A TWV CFT could pioneer a new way for the Army to manage major programs. A military platform is made up of a set of constituent systems that evolve at different rates. CFTs will need to think in terms of multiple, parallel technology streams coming to fruition over time. For such a CFT the job would not be done when the requirements document is published. This would only be the end of the beginning. A TWV CFT would be responsible not only for the development and procurement of the JLTV but more importantly, for sustaining and upgrading the large and capable Humvee fleet.

Daniel Gouré, Ph.D., is a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute. Goure has a background in the public sector and U.S. federal government, most recently serving as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team. You can follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute at @LexNextDC.

Image: U.S. Army

 

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How Nazi Germany Could Have Won World War II: Not Declaring War on America?

The Buzz

Perhaps the solution to this problem is a CFT for the TWV fleet. Determining the size and composition of the TWV fleet is a matter of tradeoff between factors similar to those that will occupy the eight initial CFTs: acquisition costs, capabilities, timeliness, sustainability and flexibility. A CFT could integrate the perspectives of the various acquisition stakeholders, address the desirable mix of new and upgraded platforms, involve the user community-- which is not monolithic-- and improve the cost efficiency of TWV fleet sustainment. Rather than a strategy based on either the JLTV or the Humvee, the Army needs one that is based on a balanced approach to employing both.

Equally important, a TWV CFT could fundamentally change the way the Army thinks about the long-term management of large and varied fleets of vehicles. The Army tends to expend almost all its energy and attention on getting a new capability through development and into production. Yet, it is the period after initial procurement where the Army will spend the most money and when platforms often will undergo repeated upgrades. Modernization is a continuing process, not a singular event that takes place at program start.

 A TWV CFT could pioneer a new way for the Army to manage major programs. A military platform is made up of a set of constituent systems that evolve at different rates. CFTs will need to think in terms of multiple, parallel technology streams coming to fruition over time. For such a CFT the job would not be done when the requirements document is published. This would only be the end of the beginning. A TWV CFT would be responsible not only for the development and procurement of the JLTV but more importantly, for sustaining and upgrading the large and capable Humvee fleet.

Daniel Gouré, Ph.D., is a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute. Goure has a background in the public sector and U.S. federal government, most recently serving as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team. You can follow him on Twitter at @dgoure and the Lexington Institute at @LexNextDC.

Image: U.S. Army

 

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