Mussolini's World War 2 Tanks: Super Weapons or Super Duds?
Although it suffered, like all combatants, from the costly stalemate and horrendous casualties of trench warfare during World War I, Italy never used tanks during that conflict. The mountainous terrain that dominated the front along which Italy and the Austro-Hungarian Empire fought each other was unsuited for such vehicles, and none saw action during the war in the Italian theater. Nevertheless, the use of this military innovation on the Western Front did not go unnoticed by the Italian Army.
From September 1916 through the end of the war, Major Alfredo Bennicelli, an Italian officer serving in France, kept his government informed of the use of tanks by the British and French, thus fueling an interest in the new weapon within the Italian General Staff. During the war, at Bennicelli’s urging, the Italians ordered a number of Schneider and Renault FT17 tanks from France in order to explore the possibility of forming their own armored force. The result was the country’s first experimental tank unit, the Reparto Speciale Dimarcia Carri d’Assalto, or Special Detachment of Assault Cars, created in the summer of 1918 from the 60 available French machines still operational. Soon afterward the Italians started manufacturing their own Renault FT17s, known as the Fiat 3000, under license.
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Entering service in 1921, the Fiat 3000 weighed 5.5 tons, had a top speed of 15 miles per hour, and carried two machine guns. As the only Italian tank built for many years, by default it formed the basis of the country’s initial armored doctrine. Its sole purpose was the close support of the infantry, such as breaking down barbed wire obstacles and cleaning out enemy machine-gun nests so the foot soldiers could advance. The tanks were not initially organized to fight in concentrated units. They were parceled out to the infantry commands to be used as circumstances warranted.
As more Fiat 3000s became available, the first tank unit in the service, the company-size Reparto Carri Armati (Tank Detachment), was formed in 1923 and expanded to a regiment, the Reggimento Carri Armati, or Tank Regiment, in 1927. It comprised five companies, each containing 20 Fiat 3000s and 100 men.
During the early 1920s, Italian armored doctrine was evolving, although not straying far from its roots as an infantry support element. Colonel Enrico Maltese, chief of the Tank Detachment, formulated the early ideas about the proper use of tanks. While still advocating that they be firmly tethered to the slow-moving infantry, in 1924 he did recommend the development of self-propelled artillery, as well as suggesting the use of tanks of different sizes— heavy, medium, and light—for different combat missions.
Between 1925 and 1928, Maltese wrote about tanks acting as scouts for the cavalry, reducing antitank defenses, and their deployment in the initial assault phases of an attack. What was absent from his commentaries was any mention of tank versus tank combat and how to conduct it. The constricted nature of the Italian terrain and the predominant mindset among commanders that infantry and artillery were the primary weapons of land warfare before and after World War I, made it highly unlikely that the Italian General Staff thought much about offensive mobile warfare. Thus, the rather passive and defensive armored doctrine emerged in the 1920s. It was not until the 1930s that this began to change with the advent of Italy’s newfound territorial ambitions.
In 1933, Benito Mussolini, Italy’s Fascist dictator, declared that his nation was going to become “a warrior state” and forge an army with which to reconstitute and maintain a new “Roman Empire” encompassing the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and northeastern Africa. What Il Duce needed was an army that could go on the offensive with tank forces and deliver speedy and decisive victories. What he had was an army high command that was not confident in the merits of motorization, let alone mechanization. This reluctance would retard the growth of a viable armored doctrine and the weapons to implement it right up to the time Italy participated in World War II.
Throughout the 1930s, the senior Italian army leaders debated the worth of motorization for the army. When it was finally adopted, it was only applied to the moving of men, supplies, and equipment prior to battle, but not using transport assets in actual combat. Having disposed of that problem, the high command deferred any final judgment on mobile battlefield operations. There were, however, some forward-thinking officers who stressed the need for an aggressive armored doctrine. One such person was Colonel Sebastino Visconti Prasca, who in 1934 published La Guerra Decisiva, which called for armored units aided by artillery and air power, although still only acting in a supporting role, to break the enemy’s front, allowing friendly infantry and cavalry to pour through the gap created.
The L3/33 was Cheap and Allowed for Quick Production, it also Served as the Basis for Experimenting with Variants Like Flamethrower and Bridge Layer Models.