There May Be No Way to Counter North Korea's Missiles
Just days after North Korea tested an intermediate range ballistic missile that overflew Japan, the U.S. Navy intercepted a medium range ballistic missile target on Aug. 30 using a Raytheon Standard SM-6 missile. The weapon, which was launched from USS John Paul Jones (DDG-53), intercepted the target in its final seconds of flight.
"Earlier this year, our customer requested an enhanced capability to deal with a sophisticated medium-range ballistic missile threat," Mike Campisi, Raytheon's SM-6 senior program director, said. "We did all this – the analysis, coding and testing – in seven months; a process that normally takes one to two years."
Unlike dedicated ballistic missile interceptor versions of the Standard missile, the SM-6 is a multirole weapon that can perform anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare and the ballistic missile defense (BMD) at sea. According to Raytheon, this marked the third time that the SM-6 missile successfully engaged a ballistic missile target in its terminal phase. The weapon was first tested in the ballistic missile defense role in August 2015, and then again in late 2016.
Raytheon has delivered more than 330 SM-6 missiles with production continuing indefinitely. However, while the SM-6 will become the mainstay of the fleet, the dedicated ballistic missile defense role falls to the SM-3 variants of the Standard missile. The Standard missile family—and indeed most U.S. theatre missile defenses—has a good track record, but they only offer a limited defense. In the event of a war, thousands of North Korean ballistic missiles would likely overwhelm the system.
Indeed, a 2016 report from the Pentagon’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation bears that out. "The Regional/Theater BMDS demonstrates a limited capability to defend the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) areas of responsibility for small numbers of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats (1,000 to 4,000 km), and a fair capability for short-range ballistic missile threats (less than 1,000 km range),” reads the report.
Kingston Reif, director for disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association told The National Interest that he agrees with the report. “Even though these systems have good test records, the capability of our and Japan's regional defenses (Patriot PAC-3, Aegis capable ships armed with SM3-IA and IB interceptors and THAAD) against small numbers of missiles that travel within the defended area of these systems is limited,” Reif said.
Moreover, shooting down North Korean test missiles would be even more difficult—despite the ill-informed pontifications of various commentators. “Shooting down a North Korean missile on a test trajectory—as was the case with the 8/29 HS-12 test—is an entirely different and even more difficult challenge,” Reif said. “Our BMD systems are not designed or postured to defend the open ocean. And we couldn't rely on THAAD, since there are no THAAD batteries in the Japan. Patriot is also a no go, since it is designed to defend against slower short-range missiles during their terminal phase.”
In theory, it might be possible to shoot down North Korean ballistic missiles below the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) class using the U.S. Navy’s Aegis cruisers and destroyers. However, it would be extremely difficult—and would compromise the defenses of populated areas.
“Shooting down a North Korean non-ICBM test might theoretically be possible using SM-3 interceptors launched from Aegis ships in the region,” Reif said. “But it would be a highly demanding task and entail a significant amount of guesswork, as the ships would have to be in the right place at the right time to stop a test at sea. Doing so also would mean taking them away from optimal positions to defend actual targets on land.”
But even then, Reif notes that the SM-3 has only been tested against an IRBM target once. “According to Missile Defense Agency data, the existing Aegis interceptors have only been successfully tested once against an IRBM-class target. The faster SM3-IIA under development by the United States and Japan will provide much great capability versus IRBMs, but it is not yet deployed.”
At best, the SM-3 would be able to intercept a ballistic missile in the mid-course part of its flight. “We'd have no shot against an IRBM, or a MRBM or SRBM for that matter, during the missiles boost phase as that is beyond the capability of the SM-3 interceptor,” Reif said. “For a midcourse intercept, that would depend on the trajectory, how much warning we had, and how many ships were deployed and where (Note: that the recent accidents involving the Aegis-equipped USS Fitzgerald and McCain how many ships the U.S Navy could bring to bear in the region).”