Why America Must Overhaul its Military
The United States needs to make major changes to the composition and structure of its armed forces. Great power competition is reemerging and the threats posed by transnational terrorism and nuclear-armed rogue states are likely to persist, even as U.S. conventional advantages are diminishing in the face of Chinese and Russian military modernization. If the United States is going to continue to effectively deter conflict and defend allies and interests in key areas such as Europe, the Western Pacific, and the Middle East, America needs a future force that is well-adapted to this more challenging landscape. This requires a ready, modern, and balanced force that is more capable against sophisticated adversaries, maintains strategic deterrence and stability, can effectively project military power to key regions, and can simultaneously counter terrorism and enable partners.
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments recently hosted a Strategic Choices Exercise, where defense analysts from a number of think tanks took turns designing their optimum future force. The Center for a New American Security team, composed of Jerry Hendrix, Paul Scharre, and Elbridge Colby (CNAS does not take institutional positions), adopted a strategy of maintaining readiness for today’s threats while modernizing the force for emerging challenges. Both today and in the future, this force is prepared to defend the homeland against terrorist, missile, and cyber attacks; project power globally into anti-access areas; deter and defeat regional aggression; maintain a stabilizing presence abroad; and sustain our nuclear deterrent. By investing in a diverse high-low mix of forces for the range of missions DOD faces rather than attempting to field a one-size-fits-all “utility infielder” force, we modernized the force while maintaining capacity. We grew the total number of ships in the fleet; increased tactical fighter aircraft and stealthy bombers; preserved Army active duty end-strength while modernizing Army capabilities; modernized all three legs of the nuclear triad and associated infrastructure such as command and control; increased investments in critical R&D areas; and preserved special operations forces and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets for counterterrorism. We did this within a modest 2% increase in defense spending above PB17 levels – a realistic level given the political dynamics in the United States. We were able to afford these investments by making hard choices in efficiencies and cuts to legacy forces that are of declining utility.
Navy: The Navy is forward deployed 24/365 defending and promoting the nation’s long-term national interests in 18 maritime regions. It keeps the peace by strongly demonstrating American resolve, serving as both a preventive and a war fighting force. However, dramatically falling fleet numbers have created deployment gaps, opening opportunities for rising powers to destabilize the international order. To answer these challenges, we grew the Navy fleet 27% from today's 272 ships to 345 in ten years by pursuing a balance between highly sophisticated destroyers and cruisers and low-end high-speed platforms outfitted with missiles, lasers, and rail guns. Given America’s asymmetric advantage undersea, we aggressively expanded the Navy’s undersea warfare capabilities, increasing submarines from 58 to 74 and expanding undersea strike capacity by 680 cruise missile tubes. We funded these investments by terminating the Ford- and America-class carrier production lines in light of their costs and vulnerability to anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats. This does not mean that we eliminated aircraft carriers from the force, but rather set up a process of steadily riding the carrier inventory downward over the next 50 years as existing carriers retire. We also curtailed the current amphibious fleet (LPD/LSD) in light the challenging environment in the littorals. We preserved Marine expeditionary and crisis response missions by shifting to cheaper commercial-derivative (“black hull”) expeditionary sea bases, resulting in a larger overall expeditionary lift capacity.