The Skeptics

 Jacob Heilbrunn has, as usual, stolen my thunder today (when does he wake up in the morning?). And Paul Pillar and my Cato colleagues—again, as usual—beat me to the punch last week concerning the Obama administration's decision to launch military strikes against Muammar Qaddafi's forces in Libya.

I'm left to ponder—now that Florida State has destroyed my March Madness bracket—several questions raised by the ongoing military operations, in no particular order:

Is the congressional control over the war powers dead? A smart aleck might say, when was it last alive? Congress hasn't formally declared war since World War II. True enough, but one might think that an emboldened and large class of Congressional Freshmen would be as willing to challenge the Obama administration in the conduct of foreign policy as they have been in domestic matters. It is doubly curious that this same Congress that opposes the president and modern liberals on Constitutional grounds has little appreciation for what James Madison declared the document's most important passage: the Legislature's control over the war power. There have been a few voices raised in dissent, including Indiana Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) and House members John Larson (D-CT) and Dennis Kucinich (D–OH), but these objections are notable chiefly because there have been so few. (H/T Grover Cleveland at Pileus)

Does the pottery barn principle still apply? It is doubtful that Colin Powell ever actually said, "If you break it, you own it," but I have never heard Powell object to the concept that a country which engages in military operations against another country incurs some obligation to clean up after the fact. Many people now believe that to be true, not merely as it applies to Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to other U.S. operations, some of which occurred generations ago. Do we believe that Libya will be different? Is it plausible that someone else will be on the hook for cleaning up? And if the rebels who we now celebrate as heroic opponents of Qaddafi turn out to be big fans of someone else who we don't like very much, will we stand aside as that new person/group exacts revenge on one-time supporters of the regime? Will we look on impassively if they make common cause with our sworn enemies? Doubtful, on all fronts. The parallels to Iraq are obvious.

Is the English language, or merely basic common sense, dead? Justin Logan a few weeks ago commented on Barack Obama's problem with adjectives and nouns, but the point bears repeating: there is an urgent need for more clarity of expression, if not actual clear thinking, as it pertains to the Libyan case. For example, I seriously doubt that the president intends to create a universal principle out of the claim that U.S. "decisions have been driven by Gaddafi's refusal to respect the rights of his people and the potential for mass murder of innocent civilians." He might believe it in this particular case, but that doesn't explain why the United States has not acted in a similar fashion with respect to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan/Darfur, or the Ivory Coast. And then there is the troubling question of the actions of our ally in Bahrain, aided by other allies Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to put down a Shiite uprising in the home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. Our obvious unwillingness to stop the violence (admittedly on a much smaller scale) in Manama demonstrates that the U.S. government does not apply a common standard when it comes to protecting civilians from their own governments.

Is the Petraeus question moot? In the earliest days of the Iraq War, Gen. David Petraeus is purported to have said to the reporter traveling with him: "Tell me how this ends." The line was good enough that Linda Robinson made it the title of her book on Petraeus. Notwithstanding the claims by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and JCS Chair Adm. Mike Mullen, I do not see a clearly defined mission, and therefore one that—once achieved—would signal a point at which U.S. military operations would come to an end. The mission of protecting civilians, for example, doesn't present such a clear end point, as the threat to civilians would persist even if Qaddafi and his sons and supporters leave the scene. It could come from 1) rogue elements operating within a chaotic state; 2) a deliberate campaign by rebel forces once they take power to exact revenge (see pottery barn point above); or 3) an act of aggression by a neighboring state. At what point does the United States obligation to defend Libyan civilians come to end?

I'm going to write more on this over at Cato-@-Liberty later today, but I wanted to get my initial thoughts into electrons this morning.

Wonks will only have to wait 14 more days until the publication of the much-anticipated book An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban/Al-Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2010. Written by regional experts Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, the book reexamines the widespread belief that the Taliban and al Qaeda are objectively and ideologically synonymous. Drawing on years of field experience in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban’s heartland, and based on interviews with Taliban decision-makers, field commanders, and ordinary fighters, the authors reveal that the two militant groups diverge as much as they coalesce.

For years Western observers conflated bin Laden’s network—a transnational jihadist organization—with the Taliban—an indigenous Pashtun-dominated movement. This is one of many unshakable, yet spurious, beliefs that has compelled policymakers and pundits to advocate an indefinite, large-scale military presence in the region. The reality, however, as argued by another Afghan expert, Carnegie’s Gilles Dorronsoro, is that “The presence of foreign troops is the most important element driving the resurgence of the Taliban.” The defeat of al Qaeda does not depend upon the defeat of the Taliban, leaving aside whether “defeat” of either is realistically achievable. But more importantly, as Linschoten and Kuehn highlight in their book, their marriage of convenience is not unbreakable.

Some experts might use the empirical findings expounded in this book to argue for substantive steps to reintegrate the Taliban into a power-sharing government in Kabul. After all, one of the main obstacles to talking with the Taliban was Washington’s political rhetoric, demonizing the movement by claiming it was attached to bin Laden’s hip. Indeed, the authors themselves also explore why engaging the Taliban—sooner rather than later—would be more prudent than a prolonged campaign of night raids and decapitation strikes that pushes the groups to unite.

With the acknowledgment that parochial fighters with no global mission can be separated from those that attacked America on 9/11, it seems that the avenue to negotiations may have finally opened.

Diplomatic engagement with the Taliban would certainly be wise, but the mechanics of negotiation may run into problems.

The first obstacle is the structure of the Taliban itself. As Afghan expert Antonio Giustozzi writes in a recently released Century Foundation report “Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects”:

The Taliban can be described as a decentralized organization (as opposed to a fragmented one). The predominant mode of organization used by the Taliban is personal networks, formed around charismatic leaders. At the lowest level, the networks consist of a local commander with a few fighters gathered around him, usually recruited personally by him on the basis of his reputation as a leader. A variable number of these small groups are networked together around a larger figure, for example a district-level Taliban leader. In turn, this network would be linked to a larger network through its leader, who would pay obedience to some greater figure, for example a province-level leader. The figures at the center of these larger networks might well be nationally renowned Taliban leaders; they might or might not be further networked around some of the top Taliban leaders.

The Taliban is fluid and decentralized, yet discernible and quite robust. Is the power of high-level militants adequately strong enough to enforce the terms of a negotiated settlement? Since the administration likes to say that we cannot fight our way out of this war, yet insist that we must weaken the insurgency’s momentum before we engage in negotiations, the question becomes: Can the coalition peel away enough low-level militants from the senior leadership to compel higher ups to negotiate? If we succeed in doing so, will the senior leadership still want to talk to us?

A second problem is that there is no way to prove that negotiations will resolve the complex blend of other intangible motives that spur many to fight. An issue rarely discussed is the extent to which factionalism, tribal vendettas, and group exclusion from power are powerful motivators for taking up arms. For example, in Helmand province, writes The Economist ‘s Afghanistan correspondent Tom Coghlan, President Karzai rewarded sub-tribes within his dominant Durrani Pashtun confederation (including Alokozai, Popalzai, and Barakzai) with district governor positions, police chief posts, and appointments in the intelligence service, and other critical government departments. Because of Kabul’s systematic exclusion of the Ishaqzai and some smaller tribes—who were influential during the Taliban period—much of the local conflict is driven by group disempowerment. In Kandahar, much like in neighboring Helmand, many fighters also come from communities systematically excluded from the Karzai-appointed local government. Would engaging fighters also involve changing the policies and structure of the very government we helped to create?

A third problem is that any steps toward a meaningful settlement must involve Pakistan, which raises its own set of issues too long to discuss in full here.

Lastly, in terms of a negotiated settlement, for the U.S. and NATO the red line is the Afghan constitution. Not only is this document the foundation of Afghanistan's democratic political institutions (wobbly and imperfect as they may be), but it also enshrines the legal and political rights of the Afghan people we ostensibly seek to protect. Peace talks will either not be all-inclusive (which we would have to be prepared to accept) or peace talks will implicitly demand a third-party with the wherewithal to enforce the terms of any power-sharing agreement—since there is no assurance that the Taliban will adhere to these new political and social conditions.

Indeed, for peace talks to be successful the residual presence of foreign troops long after America’s official date of withdrawal, 2014 would be necessary. Separate of this, the Taliban would have to acquiesce to the norms introduced since the 2001 invasion, otherwise there is little to stop them from committing actions in flagrant violation of any shared agreement. No agreement, law, treaty, or contract is self-reinforcing. And unless the United States is prepared to enforce the conditions of a power-sharing agreement, advocates of engaging the Taliban must also be prepared to renounce America’s commitment to spread the legal rights articulated in the Afghan constitution.

Moammar Gadhafi’s forces appear to have gained the upper hand in the ongoing conflict in Libya. The Associated Press and New York Times report today that having consolidated control of the West, Gadhafi’s forces are turning east and concentrating heavy fire power on the town of Ajdabiya. Their push east is gaining steam after the fall of Ras Lanuf and the rebel’s apparent retreat from Brega.

The apparent ascent of the pro-government forces has coincided with an increase in calls for Western—specifically U.S.—intervention. While the Arab League has endorsed a no-fly zone, France and Britain can’t seem to gather enough support for a broad “coalition of the willing,” let alone bring a resolution on military action before the UN Security Council. A compromise appears to be in the works in the form of a UN resolution offering “support for the rebels.”

It appears the situation is still very fluid and changing constantly. Yes, the Arab League has called for a no-fly zone, but key powers—Russia, China, and Turkey—still remain skeptical. But this did not stop former State Department official Anne-Marie Slaughter from asserting in yesterday’s New York Times that the debate over the use of force in Libya is over; it is time to act. She claims that the main issues regarding the use of force have been answered. But as Justin Logan points out, the Dean of Liberal Interventionism did not answer these questions. In my latest Forbes.com column, I address these concerns in depth; chief among them, the claim that the conflict in Libya is somehow a threat to U.S. national security:

The Libyan crisis is a tragedy, but is important to America only in the usual Washington game of threat inflation. President Barack Obama claimed the Libyan imbroglio posed "an unusual threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States." The former is errant nonsense.

Libya always has been peripheral to American security, especially after the Gadhafi regime dropped its terrorist attacks and nuclear program. The latter is irrelevant-much of which goes on around the world conflicts with the "foreign policy of the United States." Neither is cause for war.

Tepid intervention like a no-fly zone might offer just enough aid to prolong a civil war, causing even more casualties and destruction. Then the U.S. would have to decide whether to double down, creating a "no-drive" zone for Gadhafi's tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery, arming the rebels, training insurgent forces, attacking Libyan airfields and air units, inserting Special Forces and/or sending in ground troops. In both the Balkans and Iraq, no-fly zones acted as steps to much more extensive military involvement.

How the Libyan people would respond to U.S. or Western intervention is not clear. Some want a no fly zone or even air strikes, though many insist on UN approval. Others reject any outside intervention, even suggesting that they would oppose foreign troops as well as Gadhafi's minions. American intervention would risk discrediting friendly forces in any succeeding power struggle.

We should wish the Libyan people well. But their war is not our war. And military intervention risks their future.

Click here to read the full column.

I am continually amazed by the shenanigans people get away with in the think tank community. Take, as one recent case, a sentence from the recent “Defending Defense” report on China’s military buildup:

If one uses the purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate, which accounts for [differences between personnel and manufacturing costs in China and the United States], the Chinese core military budget may well approach $300 billion, making it the second largest in the world. (emphasis mine)

That sentence is tied to an endnote which reads, “Calculating defense purchase power is inherently an imprecise science. The $300 billion figure represents the conclusion of no one study, but rather a rough average of several, including those sponsored by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.”

Wednesday afternoon, I emailed the only person whose name was listed on the report, Richard Cleary, an AEI research assistant, asking which studies the authors used to arrive at this figure, because it is wildly out of step with every serious estimate of Chinese military spending I have ever seen. I have received no response from Cleary.

I am forced to conclude that Defending Defense has chosen not to defend the $300 billion figure because they know it is indefensible.

I have dealt with wild claims about Chinese military spending before. In 2007, John J. Tkacik, Jr., then a senior research fellow at the Heritage Foundation, and Heritage President Ed Feulner both alleged that Chinese spending amounted to roughly $450 billion. (Heritage appears to have reorganized their website, so the link to Tkacik in my original piece goes to a different article. Another version of Tkacik making the claim is here.)

The problem with what Tkacik and Feulner were doing is that they were using extremely high-end estimates of Chinese military expenditures at market exchange rates (MER) and then blanketing that total figure with the PPP deflator, yielding a figure around $450 billion US. As I noted at the time, you can’t do that. I realize that defense economics is boring, but this stuff is important. To make a complex story simpler, you use PPP for defense expenditures that are indigenously produced (labor, for instance) and MER for goods and services that touch world markets.

I have long considered the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance to be the lodestar for working on this problem. As they have long made clear, and as they note in their current report,

No specific PPP rate exists for the military sector, and its use for this purpose should be treated with caution. Furthermore, there is no definitive guide as to which elements of military spending should be calculated using the limited PPP rates available. The figures presented here are only intended to illustrate a range of possible outcomes depending on which input variables are used.

This is a very conscientious attitude toward a very tricky problem. The current IISS estimate places Chinese expenditures at approximately $166 billion, using what they view as an appropriate mixture of PPP and MER for calculations. (The latest IISS figure that was available when the Defending Defense report was being prepared was $114 billion.)

It is entirely possible that the IISS researchers are wrong, but are they wrong by a factor of two? And if Defending Defense wishes to allege that they are, shouldn’t someone be willing to make the argument why? If Defending Defense wants a reputation for producing good scholarship, rather than being an advocacy group, someone needs to step up and defend their numbers.

Until and unless that happens, I simply note that people would not be allowed to get away with this sort of thing in the academy, and we should not allow it in think tanks, either.