The Skeptics

Washington Shouldn't Sweat Latin Leftists

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, officials in the United States and other hemispheric countries with moderate or conservative governments have been troubled by the surge of support for so-called Bolivarian populism. In retrospect, the triumph of Nicaragua’s Sandinista revolution in 1979 may have been the first major manifestation of that trend. But the defeat of President Daniel Ortega in the 1990 elections (and the willingness of the Sandinistas to accept that electoral rebuke) suggested that the initial leftist victory did not signal a trend. Indeed, the 1980s and 1990s seemed to epitomize the growing strength of neoliberal or conservative political forces in Latin America.

The election of Venezuela’s populist champion Hugo Chávez in 1999, however, heralded the emergence of a countertrend. That became even more apparent in the years that followed, when new, radical leaders took office in Ecuador and Bolivia, and Ortega returned to power in Nicaragua with a new electoral mandate in 2007. Chávez and his allies quickly became a thorn in the side of the United States. U.S. officials began to fear that a Bolivarian populist revolution might sweep Latin America.

Washington’s worries have been directed against three aspects of the populist regimes. First, those governments tend to engage in shrill anti-U.S. rhetoric reminiscent of the Sandinistas in the 1980s and, to some extent, even Fidel Castro’s communist regime throughout the Cold War. Chávez’s insulting mockery of President George W. Bush during a September 2006 speech to the UN General Assembly was a relatively mild version of the comments coming from Caracas and other Bolivarian capitals. Beyond engaging in verbal bashing of the United States, Chávez and his allies were openly hostile to Washington’s political and economic values and objectives.

Equally unsettling, the left-wing rulers employed increasingly authoritarian tactics to consolidate their domestic power and weaken political opponents. Chávez systematically eroded Venezuela’s democratic foundations—bypassing the legislative branch, ruling by decree, closing or taking over media outlets critical of his conduct and harassing political opponents and leaders in the business community. Similar, albeit somewhat milder, abuses have been committed by Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia.

Perhaps most troubling from the standpoint of Washington’s policy objectives, the Bolivarian governments developed ties with radical armed insurgent groups in neighboring countries and forged increasingly close relations with countries such as Russia, China and Iran—countries that U.S. officials viewed with suspicion or (in Iran’s case) open hostility. The connections that the leftist governments developed with Moscow and Beijing even raised concerns about peer competitors of the United States gaining economic, political and perhaps even military footholds in the Western Hemisphere. The onset of ties with Iran added worries about state-sponsored terrorism.

Chávez was the chief offender in that regard. In the summer of 2008, a Russian general spoke of the possibility of Russia acquiring a military base in Venezuela. While civilian leaders in both Caracas and Moscow quietly disavowed such intentions, in the following months Russian naval forces conducted joint maneuvers with Venezuelan units, and there was a proliferation of arms sales, which topped the $4 billion mark by September 2009. In 2012, Chávez announced another $4 billion “loan” from Russia to purchase tanks, air-defense missiles, and other hardware.

Washington also has been keeping a wary eye on China’s relationship with the populist regimes. The $4 billion loan that Beijing extended to Caracas in the summer of 2011 was just one sign that the PRC might be fishing in troubled political waters. That trend continued with additional multibillion-dollar loans to Venezuela in late 2014 and early 2015, under Chávez’s successor, Nicolás Maduro. U.S. officials also are concerned about China’s involvement in the proposed construction of a $50 billion interoceanic canal across Nicaragua that would compete with the Panama Canal. Although the principal contractor is a Hong Kong company not under the direct control of the Beijing government, it would still give Chinese interests a major commercial, and possibly strategic, beachhead in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, Wang Jing, the shadowy Chinese billionaire behind the funding of the project, is a man with close ties to the Beijing regime.

Since China regards loans and investments in foreign countries as having political and diplomatic as well as economic implications, Beijing’s growing interest in the Western Hemisphere has attracted the attention of U.S. officials and members of the U.S. foreign policy community. The extent of Beijing’s interest became even more apparent in May 2015, when Premier Li Keqiang made a high-profile trip to four key South American countries. The primary purpose of the trip seemed to be economic, and it was a solid success.

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