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The Next Ebola? Beware of Marburg

The Buzz

Ebola and Marburg are both hemorrhagic fevers and belong to the same family of viruses. The hosts for both are identified as animals, especially fruit bats—both diseases crossover from animals to humans. Incubation periods are around twenty-one days. The two diseases have similar symptoms and similarly high mortality rates. Both diseases spread through contact with bodily fluids, making family members and health care workers especially vulnerable. There is no pharmaceutical that cures either disease, and patients are treated in much the same way. The ill are isolated and medically supported until they recover or die. Efforts must be made to trace all those who came into contact with the ill.

Ebola at present is centered in west Africa, but it was first publicized in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Marburg is also found in the Congo, where between 1998 and 2000 it is reported that there were 154 cases and 128 deaths attributed to the disease. In Angola in 2005, there were 374 cases of Marburg, and 329 deaths. In 2007, 2008, 2012 and 2014, in Uganda there were cases of Marburg in the single digits with very high mortality rates, ranging from 50 to 100 percent. When Ebola first appeared in west Africa, it was an unfamiliar disease, one reason among many why the response to it was slow. In east Africa, however, there is greater familiarity with Marburg, and officials move quickly to respond to the threat of an outbreak.

Accordingly, officials in Rwanda and Uganda are closely monitoring their common border for a possible outbreak of Marburg after a confirmed case in Kampala, Uganda. As a safety precaution the Ugandan government has isolated ninety-nine people, none of whom have tested positive.

The World Health Organization is saying that Ebola is now “entrenched” in Conakry, Monrovia, and Freetown – it has become an “urban” disease. Marburg, however, appears to remain primarily in rural areas. West Africa’s high rate of urbanization has helped facilitate the rapid spread of Ebola, especially in urban slums. Urbanization in east Africa could have a similar impact.

This piece first appeared in CFR’s Blog Africa in Transition here.

TopicsEbolaMarburg RegionsAfrica

When Congress Should Assert Itself, and When It Shouldn't

Paul Pillar

David Sanger's article in the New York Times about how the Obama administration is seeking a nuclear accord with Iran that would not require any early votes in Congress has garnered a lot of attention. Naturally, the administration in response has offered assurances that Congress has a role to play and no one is trying to shove it out of the picture. Just as naturally, opponents of the administration accuse it of such shoving.

We all know what's going on and what's at stake here. The more of a role Congress does play in the immediate aftermath of signing a deal, the greater the chance that elements opposed to anyone reaching any agreement with Iran on anything will be able to torpedo the deal. This is reflected in the substantial record Congress has already compiled, as cataloged by Navid Hassibi's review of that record, of past attempts that would impede the negotiations. It also is reflected in the fact that some of those quickest to complain about a supposed offense to Congressional prerogatives on this matter are those who have been most determined all along to sabotage any agreement with Iran. So for anyone who realizes the advantages of having a deal to restrict Iran's nuclear program versus not having a deal, the less Congressional involvement right now the better.

A major caveat to this conclusion is that any lack of confidence on the part of the Iranians in the staying power of a deal in which the the United States fulfills its part of the bargain only through executive action may also make it harder to complete the negotiations. If the Iranians believe all they are getting in the way of sanctions relief is tentative and reversible, in an accord that can be undone by Congress or a later president, they understandably will be reluctant to offer anything other than tentative and reversible things in return. This is why the assertion that has routinely accompanied past efforts to slap more sanctions on Iran during negotiations—that this supposedly would increase U.S. bargaining power—is fallacious (and if it really did increase, why wouldn't any president want to have the added power?) Instead, the effect would be to make negotiations more difficult by increasing Iranian doubts about the administration's ability to fulfill U.S. commitments. Probably the best way to deal with all this is to rely, as Hassibi suggests, on the combination of a couple of years of compliance with an agreement and confirmation of its terms in a United Nations Security Council resolution to make the saboteurs' task harder.

None of this appears to be really about high constitutional principles concerning the relative powers of branches of the U.S. government. It is about whether the United States is going to seize or to blow the best opportunity to preclude an Iranian nuclear weapon and to do it in a way that will have other benefits for U.S. interests in the Middle East. There are, nonetheless, some more principled things to say about the role of Congress on different types of national security matters.

Consider the issue of the Iranian negotiations alongside another subject on which relative powers of the legislative and executive branches have received considerable attention: the use of military force. One legislator whose stance is worth looking at is Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia. Kaine has taken a responsible position regarding the Iran negotiations, opposing any Congressional interference with them in the form of new sanctions. He also has become quite an activist in asserting a Congressional prerogative to approve or disapprove the use of military force. In fact, he has broken openly with the president of his own party by arguing that the current use of force in Syria and Iraq should have first obtained Congressional authorization. Kaine's positions should be emulated, and here's why.

There is good reason that the Constitution placed the power to declare war with the people's representatives in Congress. It is a major and potentially highly costly departure. Expending blood and treasure in warfare is one of the riskiest and most consequential things the nation can do. As has been demonstrated painfully and recently, going to war has a way of dragging the nation into even costlier and longer-lasting commitments.

An agreement of the sort being negotiated with Iran is none of those things. The agreement would impose no new costs on the nation; in fact, it would involve reducing the cost that sanctions inflict on the United States. It does not create, as warfare does, any new exceptions to normal peacetime relations with other states; instead, it would be a move toward restoring normality. It does not, as do some other matters that are appropriately codified in treaties subject to Senate confirmation, impose any new legal obligations on U.S. persons; instead it is a step toward reducing the costly and cumbersome restrictions on U.S. business that the sanctions involve. It does not mark a departure in national goals and objectives, because it is an almost unanimously shared objective that Iran not acquire a nuclear weapon. The issue instead is what is the best way of executing policy to achieve that objective; that is part of what the executive branch is supposed to do.

Recognition of that last point is reflected in the laws about sanctions that give the president waiver authority and thus the flexibility needed to achieve the objectives that the sanctions were supposed to be all about. Those were laws that the U.S. Congress enacted. That is why it is ridiculous for Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen—one of the most consistently Iranophobic hardliners in Congress—to say, as she does in a “dear colleague” letter she is circulating, that the president is “circumventing” Congress by making use of waiver authority that is written into sanctions legislation that she sponsored.

There is a time and place for Congress to assert itself, and different times and places for it to defer to the executive branch in execution of its proper functions.             

TopicsIran RegionsMiddle East

Property: How Beijing has Captured China's Middle-Class

The Buzz

In The China Fantasy (2007), James Mann debunked the hopeful delusion of Western liberals: that a Chinese “middle class” would emerge to countervail centralized state power. Mann instead argued that China's development model had co-opted this tribe through inducement and suasion.

The Government Next Door by Luigi Tomba explains exquisitely how Beijing's policies have been instrumentalized at the local and neighbourhood level.

The Chinese state has built a compartmentalized and highly controlled system of local bodies which manage housing privileges, welfare and livelihoods. As Tomba says, “The liberalization of housing markets has resulted, somewhat counter-intuitively, in the use of residential space as a tool to facilitate a wide range of governmental interventions.”

An observant visitor to a Chinese city notices two things: high walls and security guards. Tomba saw that “Chinese planners, real estate tycoons, and citizens alike appear to share a passion for gated communities.” For the rich they provide relative autonomy and security, and promote powerful conservative ideals. The omnipresent guards reinforce cellular segregation, in what Tomba calls the “forting-up” of Chinese cities.

His fieldwork shows the chasm between large rich cities, especially Beijing, and the many poorer ones. The reason is simple: property. “Early access to privatization of housing has become a major discriminant” of wealth and status. The current and retired professionals of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) see themselves as the deserving vanguard because of their professional skills and loyalty. This model middle class has been rewarded financially as well as with perquisites in education, welfare and healthcare. The 1990s privatization of danwei housing, often at knockdown prices, was the greatest windfall. Home ownership in pricey Beijing is 80%, more than two-thirds gifted to SOE employees. Almost 70% of SOE employees own one (and often multiple) homes. Tomba argues that “The middle-class strategy of the Chinese government has employed a redistribution of public assets...in a way that has greatly favored sectors of urban society with strong ties to the state.”

To this trusted elite, the state's hand is benign, and light.

By contrast, in deprived regions like the northeast rustbelt, “visibility, rather than invisibility, remains crucial to the governing strategy.” Community officers, volunteers and patrols sloganeer about “saving the working class.” Public townships are a world apart from Beijing's enclaves, but they “share two characteristics: they are enclosed within walls and behind gates, and both require exclusive membership, in the form of registration or property rights or both.” He notices that “while the burden of governing in middle-class neighborhoods is becoming lighter,” in less affluent cities “social distress is attracting more resources, heavier governing practices, micro-governing.” A retired worker summarizes: “the poorer a place, the more numerous the cadres.”

Everyone acts for collective and self interest. As Tomba points out, “The grannies in Shenyang have mobilized to protect...what is left of their once generous industrial working class benefits. The Beijing homeowners watch over their right to see a contract honored and more autonomous lifestyle fulfilled, at least in their backyard.” The alleyway aunties tyrannising Shenyang parallel Beijing's imperious homeowner committees. A manager there trumpets “the 3-in-1 system: management company, developer and community, all under the supervision of the Party.” True, there are 450,000 civil representative bodies in China, but most are GONGOs, sinews of state power which strictly circumscribe real popular rights of dissent.

Officialspeak is harnessed by all: “community activists use the language of patriotism to justify their grievances against real estate developers; disgruntled ex-workers invoke the socialist spirit of central policies to frame their dissatisfaction with local leaders; the same discourses of 'harmony', 'quality' and 'security' are equally used by the state to justify intrusive policing...and by real estate developers to sell prestigious properties to status-hungry families.” Wrapping up in the flag
“shields limited social action from repression.” There are protests but they are highly localized, strictly controlled and often mediated positively by officials: “When limited conflicts erupt...their effect might well be to reinforce the overall legitimacy of the state rather than to undermine it.” The daily concerns of Chinese – real estate, pollution, healthcare – may be debated; the Party's authority may not.

Above all, Chinese urbanization is a civilizing project: “Morality, nation building, patriotism, human quality (suzhi), and modernization” transcend “the societal autonomy (normally) associated with the emergence of a civil society.” The concept of suzhi recurs repeatedly in social discourse. “The educated and affluent groups inhabiting the new compounds become exemplars of a self-responsible, well-behaved, high-suzhi citizenry,” and thus a strong nation. Importantly, though, “high suzhi citizens enjoy a significant (albeit spatially limited) autonomy to govern themselves and successfully avoid the direct control of public neighborhoods.”

Now we understand Mann's puzzle of the illiberal masterclass, “the most responsible citizens who, by virtue of their higher suzhi, will secure the reproduction and strengthening of Chinese civilization.” In Tomba's words, this “justifies the deficit of citizenship rights imposed on less accomplished social actors” such as migrant workers, who might otherwise resort to violence. “China's educated, increasingly wealthy, conflict-prone, but reliably nationalistic middle-class has become an agent for the development of a harmonious nation.” The homeowner class, and particularly the SOE families, “reproduce and amplify the dominant discourses of the state: order, suzhi, patriotism.” As Tomba concludes: “my middle class neighbors appeared more as staunch supporters of than as challengers to the Chinese regime, particularly with regard to social stability.”

This piece was first posted on The Interpreter, which is published by the Lowy Institute for International Policy.

Image: Flickr/Creative Commons. 

TopicsEconomics RegionsChina

Myanmar on a Nonproliferation Roll

The Buzz

On September 30, Myanmar’s parliament approved the government’s proposal to accede to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The proposal to accede to this convention, which bans the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons and which Myanmar had signed the year of its inception, was submitted to parliament by Thant Kyaw, deputy minister for foreign affairs, who stated that “Over 170 countries have already ratified the BWC. All ASEAN countries have except us.” Later, he added that Myanmar’s accession would demonstrate its commitment to abide by nonproliferation rules.

BWC endorsement is Myanmar’s latest nonproliferation achievement. It follows a series of important nonproliferation actions that Myanmar has taken since the government’s decision in early 2011 to break away from the junta’s traditional authoritarianism and to implement sweeping reforms and open the country to the world. In June 2011, Myanmar announced that it had abandoned its nuclear research program to allay international concerns about its nuclear capabilities and intentions, which had been brewing since the early 2000s. Ahead of US President Barack Obama’s historic visit to the country in November 2012, Myanmar then stated that it would sign an Additional Protocol (AP) and submit a modified Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), both of which would allow international inspectors to verify that its nuclear activities are strictly for peaceful purposes. Less than a year later, on September 17, 2013, Myanmar signed an AP and has since been working relentlessly toward its entry into force and the submission of a modified SQP.

In addition to burnishing its nonproliferation credentials in the nuclear realm, Myanmar stressed in December 2013 that it was making preparations to endorse the conventions banning biological and chemical weapons. Now that it has acceded to the BWC, next on the list is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which it signed in 1993, the year it was concluded. In recent months, Myanmar has beenworking with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (the CWC’s verification body) and other entities to prepare implementation of CWC requirements when it accedes to the convention, which Myanmar officials and experts now say is “imminent.” CWC accession is particularly important given past accusations by armed rebel groups that the Myanmar military had used chemical weapons in their war in the country’s borderlands and, as recently as this year, the allegations made by the Unity Journal that the military had built a chemical-weapon production facility in central Magway district. These allegations, which the government flatly denied, led to the arrest of several journalists and raised important concerns in the nonproliferation community that only CWC accession will be able to resolve: the CWC includes an intrusive verification regime that will allow international inspectors to ensure that no chemical weapons are produced – or have been used – in Myanmar.

In its efforts to become a nonproliferation role model, Myanmar will also need to demonstrate commitment in other areas. At present, for instance, it does not subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). Endorsement of the HCOC, which politically binds its members to curb the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, exercise maximum restraint in developing, testing, and deploying such missiles, be transparent regarding missile inventory, and issue pre-launch notifications, would be a positive development. Thorough implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls for the adoption of appropriate and effective legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and their means of delivery, would be another important move. This should begin with the drafting of a national action plan that maps out implementation priorities and plans, thereby enabling donor states to provide Myanmar with the assistance it needs. Adoption of stringent strategic trade controls and endorsement of the Proliferation Security Initiative (a multilateral effort that commits participating countries to interdict shipments of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile technology and materials) would also considerably raise Myanmar’s nonproliferation profile. Finally, Myanmar needs to comprehensively implement United Nations sanctions resolutions imposed on North Korea and, if it wants an unblemished nonproliferation record, it will have to cease military trade with Pyongyang, which continues to this day. Avoiding all military trade with North Korea is critically important. The United Nations Security Council bans weapons sales from North Korea as part of its efforts to prevent funds from going to its nuclear and missiles programs, which the Council deems a threat to international peace and security.

Myanmar is committed to nonproliferation. During the First Myanmar-US/UK Nonproliferation Dialogue run by the Pacific Forum CSIS in partnership with the Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies (the ministry of foreign affairs’ think tank), and held in Yangon in February 2014, one Myanmar participant stressed that “All these [nonproliferation] conventions are on our radar; we’re working hard to adopt them.” Throughout the dialogue, Myanmar participants made clear that they want their country to be “in full compliance” with the nonproliferation regime. But they also pointed out that Myanmar has limited resources and multiple priorities as it opens to the world and transitions toward democracy. In other words, while it is willing to endorse nonproliferation rules and norms, it lacks the capacity to do so.

This means that efforts should be made to build nonproliferation capacity in Myanmar. Building technical expertise is particularly essential because as Myanmar endorses nonproliferation instruments, it will need a critical mass of highly specialized people to implement them. Endorsement of a nonproliferation instrument, after all, is only the beginning of a long and often complex implementation process. Myanmar, for instance, is still working toward the adoption and entry into force of the AP it signed in September 2013. Now that it has acceded to the BWC, Myanmar will need to put in much work to implement it in its national laws and regulations and, after it accedes to the CWC, turn its attention to implement this convention as well. These processes are time-consuming, resource-intensive, and demand a solid pool of experts, and Myanmar only has so many.

The Pacific Forum CSIS, with the support of the US Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, has initiated an ambitious nonproliferation capacity-building initiative, which includes a biannual training course taught in Yangon (the first round of which took place last month) and fellowship opportunities for Myanmar nationals. Several governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organization (notably the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre, known as VERTIC) are also providing Myanmar with important forms of capacity. This is encouraging, but more efforts are needed to help Myanmar’s quest for nonproliferation excellence.

David Santoro is a senior fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS where this was first published.

Image: Creative Commons/Flickr. 

TopicsNonproliferation RegionsMyanmar

A Trilateral Whose Time Has Come: US-Japan-India Cooperation

The Buzz

The Asia-Pacific region is witnessing the increasing convergence of economic and security interests of the United States, Japan and India, and their burgeoning trilateral cooperation. Washington has leveraged its strong ties with Tokyo of nearly 70 years to deepen economic ties and to remain a net provider of security across Asia. Since returning to power in 2013, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has explicitly articulated his vision for an enhanced role of Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. Similarly, India's Look East Policy has seen it expand its economic and security engagement across Asia over the past decade, and the spring 2014 electoral triumph of Narendra Modi has injected a new level of dynamism and foreign policy activism from New Delhi.

In many ways, the three countries are natural partners. They are three of the world's largest countries by population (India is # 2, the US # 3, and Japan # 10), three of the largest democracies, and three of the largest economies (the US is # 1, Japan # three, and India # 10). They are linked by the Indo-Pacific strategic construct that makes explicit the geographical connections and overlaps that each of them shares. All three are part of a dynamic and growing region, with each government eager to find new partners, or old partners with new capabilities, to raise its profile and extend its reach. Each eyes the other two as economic and strategic partners, possessing assets and resources that it values.

India seeks US and Japanese investment and knowhow to accelerate its economic development. With each government working to create more business-friendly policies and regulations, there has been a substantial growth in cross-border investments, joint ventures, mergers & acquisitions, technology transfers, and other corporate activities. India is actively modernizing its military, and the United States has rapidly become its top defense supplier. Delhi and Tokyo have expanded the scope of their joint naval exercises and have elevated their defense dialogue to focus more attention on maritime security and anti-terrorism measures.

For the United States and Japan, India is becoming increasingly central to their economic and security calculations. India can emerge as a low-cost manufacturing hub for American and Japanese companies to sell to the large and rapidly growing Indian market, but also for exports to emerging markets across Asia, Middle East, and Africa. On the security front, an India with robust military capabilities can provide much-needed stability in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). South Asia is home to a large and growing population but also beset with protracted security challenges. India can also be a vital partner across the IOR in safeguarding and promoting US and Japanese interests, especially in ensuring freedom of navigation and other maritime security objectives. Conversely, Japan and India look at the United States as a potential energy supplier as the shale gas revolution turns the US into a major gas exporter.

The alignment of interests and ambitions is facilitated by the energy of the new governments in Tokyo and Delhi. Abe and Modi see each other as kindred spirits and both are eager to seize the moment. They are proving to be indefatigable diplomats and have reached out to each other to consolidate relations between their two countries. Meanwhile, in the Joint Statement released during Modi's visit to the US last month, the United States and India "committed to work more closely with other Asia Pacific countries through consultations, dialogues, and joint exercises." The statement highlighted trilateral dialogue with Japan, with the three agreeing to elevate the existing Trilateral to a minister-level dialogue. All the while, the US and Japan are modernizing and updating their alliance as well.

There is a lot the three countries can do together. The starting point, and a focal point of each country's engagement, is helping India develop faster. Its economic potential remains under-realized, and while the major causes of that underperformance are be found within India, businesses in both Japan and the US see great opportunities. Prime Minister Modi is initially focused on creating a stronger industrial base to complement India's world-class service sector.  To meet this objective, Modi is putting much effort into upgrading India's infrastructure, with a focus on establishing multiple industrial corridors. Japan has committed substantial funds to upgrade the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor while the United States has outlined specific ways that it can contribute its expertise and resources to this massive Indian endeavor.  

Beyond the economic domain, the three governments can advance a diplomatic agenda that emphasizes the rule of law, peaceful resolution of disputes, and adherence to international norms and legal standards. The US and India primarily, but increasingly even Japan, have a stake in a peaceful Afghanistan and stability throughout Central Asia. The three governments can work concertedly to promote democracy, peace, and prosperity across South and Central Asia. India has made notable contributions to UN peacekeeping missions over the decades, but can increasingly deploy resources to become a net provider of security across Asia.

The three governments have demonstrated prowess in civilian applications of space technologies, and can cooperate to create rules that ensure that outer space remains peaceful and not used for offensive or disruptive purposes. The US and Japan are also seeking to initiate civilian nuclear power cooperation with India. While such cooperation has important commercial benefits, the most striking aspect of sharing such sensitive technology is the level of trust that their cooperative endeavors engender.

Cyberspace is another area suitable for closer cooperation. All three nations face regular cyber-attacks from state and nonstate actors, and the intensity of such attacks is likely to increase. Sharing information on the sources of these attacks, targets, and methods of deterrence can help all three nations safeguard their defense and commercial interests.

To be sure, there are obstacles to deeper cooperation between India, Japan, and the United States. Deeply entrenched domestic constituencies in each country can, and often do, block progress toward reform and the reciprocal measures that are a prerequisite to diplomatic engagement. Fueling those economic and political fires are powerful nationalist impulses in each country. On occasion, that nationalism surfaces as anti-Americanism in both India and Japan. The persistence of such beliefs makes trilateral engagement even more compelling, since the presence of a third party dispels the false image of a heavy-handed United States bending another nation to its will. Finally, one must not lose sight of the plain fact that for all the convergence, the US, Japan and India are three distinct countries, at different stages of economic development with variations in their strategic orientation on some issues, and so at times their interests are bound to diverge.

Analysts sometimes paint this trilateral arrangement as a "counterweight to China." All three countries have complex relationships with China that are a mix of cooperation and competition. All three see China as a vital partner: it ranks among the top trade partners of each country and all reach out to Beijing to build confidence and cooperation on security issues. This summer, China joined the US-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) maritime exercise for the first time.

Yet each also has significant areas of contention with Beijing. Japan and India both face claims to their territory by China, and the US regularly squares off against China over a range of security concerns. In addition, all three nations are attempting to moderate their large trade deficits with China.

Nevertheless, the prospect of a formal alliance or even an alignment of the three that targets China or explicitly identifies China as a focus of concern is very low. India zealously protects its sovereignty and independence and will never be part of an initiative that could be portrayed as jeopardizing its foreign policy autonomy. Delhi and Beijing are founding members of the BRICS group and both seek a multipolar world that gives emerging countries a greater say over international governance. China and India are neighbors, and seeking a good relationship will be a mainstay of any Indian government's diplomacy. And while the US and Japan both have issues with China, they also insist that good relations are preferred - it is up to Beijing to pick which relationship prevails.

In other words, an anti-China coalition cannot drive US-Japan-India cooperation. But then, it should not have to. The three countries have many shared interests and reasons to cooperate. Pragmatic pursuit of shared interests, undergirded by realistic expectations of what their trilateral cooperation can accomplish, is the most effective approach to ensure that it realizes that potential.

Managing a trilateral relationship will be a complex and sometimes frustrating process.  There will rarely be total uniformity of interests on any issue amongst all three partners, and this holds true for the US-Japan-India trilateral.  But all three share a vision for security and prosperity for Asia and beyond.  There are tangible steps the three countries can take to make this vision a reality. Doing so would not only advance their enlightened national interests but also lead to positive outcomes for all nations in Asia.

Richard Rossow is the Wadhwani Chair in U.S. India Policy Studies at CSIS. Dr. Toru Ito is an associate professor at Japan's National Defense Academy specializing in South Asia. Dr. Anupam Srivastava is a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia and former Managing Director of Invest India, the official investment facilitation agency. Brad Glosserman is executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS. This paper is drawn from a US Embassy sponsored tour of Japan that the four authors recently joined.  All views expressed are personal opinions. This article is drawn from a US Embassy sponsored tour of Japan that the four authors recently joined. It was originally published by CSIS: PACNET newsletter here.

Image: Wikicommons. 

TopicsSecurity RegionsAsia-Pacific

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