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Why Asia (and the World) Should be Worried: The Death of the Great Bargain

The Buzz

In 1972, Nixon and Mao met in Beijing to begin the Great Asia Bargain. Nixon called it the week that changed the world. The Republican and the Revolutionary ushered in a glorious period.

Almost as an aside—a prelude to the geopolitical plotting—they launched an economic engagement that turned China into the phenomenon of the modern age. As the man who took the U.S. dollar off the gold standard, Nixon started a process that will see the Yuan become a global currency to equal the greenback. Talk about unintended consequences. And that was just an aside.

Look back at what Mao and Nixon wrought because of what Shinzo Abe’s is now doing. Making Japan a security power—even claiming Japan’s right to be a “superpower”—marks the demise of an important residual element of the Bargain.

Of course, much else disappeared long ago. The central driver of the Bargain was the primary threat from the Soviet Union. For both leaders, Russia was the number one danger. Kissinger judged that following military clashes along the Soviet–China border, Beijing moved beyond ideology to deal with the U.S. “Their peril had established the absolute primacy of geopolitics. They were in effect freeing one front by a tacit nonaggression treaty with us.” With that tacit treaty, China was aiming to use “one set of barbarians to balance another.”

Today China and the U.S. see each other as their greatest threat, the binary reality rendering the Bargain an artifact of history. Even so, as with the economic deal, security elements of the Bargain have continuing effects, often of major importance. Losing those lingering security deals after four decades tells us how much uncertainty now envelops Asia.

Beyond China–U.S. national self-interest, the Bargain rested on understandings about U.S. interests in Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. The explicit understanding on South Korea also carried implications for what China would do to restrain North Korea—another area where the Bargain failed long ago.

Mao assured Nixon that Taiwan was not an important issue and China could show patience about its return to the motherland. Kissinger quoted Mao: “We can do without them [Taiwan] for the time being, and let it come after 100 years.” For all the push and shove since, that promise holds.

That long view on Taiwan was linked to acceptance of the U.S. alliance with Japan and a particular understanding of how the alliance should work. Kissinger quoted this from Mao: “Japan must not feel neglected by the U.S.; Japan was inherently insecure and sensitive. He would see to it that China did not force Tokyo to choose between the U.S. and China. That might polarize; it would surely enhance Japanese insecurity and might give rise to traditional nationalism.”

Kissinger wrote that China came to accept America’s argument that the U.S. alliance with Japan should be viewed “as a guarantee of America’s continued interest in the Western Pacific and a rein on Japanese unilateralism.”

The military balance in the Bargain was elegant. The U.S. would keep its troops in Japan to maintain a firm foot on Japan’s neck. China’s former occupier was not to return to any form of assertive nationalism, much less military power.

If Washington was to maintain boundaries on Japan, then Beijing should do the same to North Korea. Allowing North Korea to go nuclear rates as a major breach of Mao’s undertaking not to disturb Japan or South Korea.

All this is context for Japan’s Defense Minister, Itsunori Onodera, arguing Japan is more than just back. Japan, he says, is “drastically moving its security policy forward: because of “severe challenges” to Asia’s security order. Expanding defense cooperation with the U.S., Australia and Southeast Asia is normal: “It is natural for a great power like Japan to play a responsible role for the region based on the significance of the area and the increasingly acute regional security environment.”

That “great power” line led the Wall Street Journal to ponder Japan’s identity confusion and whether it is, indeed, a great power. The fascination in the piece was the link to Amy King’s analysis of Chinese writings, showing that Beijing certainly does not view Japan as a great power; that Great Bargain effect persists in Beijing, even if the U.S. and Japan have ditched it.

Asia has long outgrown the Bargain bequeathed by Mao and Nixon; I was going to say blessed rather than bequeathed, but that confers too much grace on a hard-eyed geopolitical compact. If the Republican and the Revolutionary—a pro and a tyrant—could do the deal, their successors should be as competent and as ambitious in seeking a new power-sharing order in Asia or a new responsibility-sharing order.​

Graeme Dobell is the ASPI journalist fellow. This article originally appeared in ASPI’s The Strategist website here.

Image: U.S. Navy Flickr. 

TopicsSecurity RegionsChina

Will Hamas Accept a Ceasefire?

The Buzz

Nearly 800 Palestinian killed; 36 Israelis (the vast majority soldiers) lost in the line of fire; an estimated 150,000 Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip scurrying to safer places in order to protect themselves and their families from the fighting; hundreds of homes and buildings destroyed in strikes from the Israeli air force.  Operation Protective Edge, the code name for Israel’s latest military operation against Hamas militants in the sealed-off enclave, is now in its second week of combat.

As of July 24, those are the raw numbers—a set of disturbing figures that will continue to go up if Israeli and Palestinian factions are unable to arrive at an arrangement that would calm the waters, stop the rockets from flying, and cease the pounding that has pummeled Gaza’s already terrible infrastructure for the past two and a half weeks. 

After nineteen months in the job, Secretary of State John Kerry has guaranteed himself the label of the planet’s most famous, recognizable, and tireless negotiator.  The discussions over Iran’s nuclear and uranium enrichment programs, Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal, Ukraine’s war against pro-Russian separatists, and the attempt to arrive at an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, however different they may appear, have one thing in common: Kerry is the middle of all of them.  The flare-up in violence between Hamas and Israel, however, has stretched Secretary Kerry and the Obama administration’s national security team to a breaking point.  Right now, getting the quiet restored along the Gaza-Israel border—and saving countless Israeli and Palestinian lives in the process—is a foreign policy priority at the very top of the administration’s “to-do” list.

John Kerry and his State Department team have been camped in the region since July 21 and are doing as much as they can to send home the message to Israel and Hamas that a cessation of hostilities is in both of their best interests.  John McCain, Lindsey Graham, Elliot Abrams, and the folks at the American Enterprise Institute may like to remind him of his failures over the past year and a half as America’s top diplomat, but what the critics cannot do is call Kerry passé or lazy.  Indeed, just as he sought earlier in the year to create and push forth a two-state framework that both Israel and the Palestinian Authority could accept (with reservations), Kerry is again choosing to sacrifice more of his diplomatic capital on the Israel/Palestine portfolio.  The only difference this time is that his efforts today are far more immediate and could be the difference between life and death for the tens of thousands of civilians in the middle of the conflict through no fault of their own.

The United States, of course, is not the only powerbroker in these ceasefire discussions.  Qatar, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, the Arab League, and the European Union are all involved and each party is talking with the other for precisely the same objective: a full and immediate stop to the violence.  Qatar and Turkey, two countries that have the best relations with the Muslim Brotherhood to which Hamas is technically a part, will be crucial in getting Khaled Meshal to sign on any dotted line.  The U.S. and Europe will serve the same function for the Israelis.  The Arab League, the United Nations, and Egypt are important as well: for any ceasefire to stick, it will be vital for all three of these actors to endorse the accord in full and provide guarantees that longer-term issues—a loosening of Israeli restrictions in Gaza, demilitarization of the territory, the opening of the Gaza’s borders, post-war economic reconstruction, international investment, political reform, etc.—are addressed to the fullest extent possible.

It reports are accurate that Secretary Kerry has drafted a new ceasefire proposal, the war that has filled the world’s television screens and newspapers for the past two and a half weeks is now at its most dramatic point.  An acceptance to the proposal could pave the way for a difficult but much needed discussion on the grievances that have driven Gaza into war three times over the past five years.  A rejection by Hamas, on the other hand, could persuade Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his security cabinet that expanding the Gaza ground operation, deploying more troops into the field, and setting more ambitious goals for the campaign is the only way to deal Hamas a heavy blow over the long-term. 

The onus is on Hamas.  John Kerry and the rest of the international community hopes that the group will wise up and make the right decision.

Image Credit: Israeli Defense Forces/Flickr.    

TopicsHamas

Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 and Iran Air Flight 655

Paul Pillar

The heavy coverage by U.S. media of the downing last week of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over the rebellious portion of eastern Ukraine has made remarkably little reference to the prior event that most resembles it: the shooting down with a missile by the U.S. Navy cruiser Vincennes of Iran Air Flight 655 on July 3, 1988, killing all 290 persons aboard. The Vincennes was in the Persian Gulf as part of U.S. military operations there during the latter phase of the Iran-Iraq War, which had been affecting shipping to and from Arab countries on the south side of the Gulf. U.S. and Iranian naval forces already had clashed in the months before the downing of the airliner, and tensions were high.

The crew of the Vincennes mistakenly believed the airliner on their radar was an Iranian F-14 about to attack their ship. All indications are that the shooting down of the Malaysian airliner was a similar case of mistaken identity, not an intentional downing of a civilian aircraft. Indeed, part of the evidence made public to support the case that Ukrainian rebels were responsible involves conversations among the rebels expressing consternation when they discovered that what they had thought was a Ukrainian military plane was not.

One of the first thoughts that this pair of tragic incidents should elicit is: there, but for the grace of whatever force determines fate in such circumstances, go we. A frequent comment about the downing of the Malaysian airliner is that it was terribly irresponsible for Russia to put highly sophisticated weapons in the hands of a poorly controlled rebel force. Probably so, but the Iranian airliner was downed by a well-trained U.S. Navy crew that was part of a well-established chain of command and manning a ship with the most advanced available systems for tracking and identifying aircraft.

The comparison should be a reminder that our responses to the actions of other states should not hinge on accidents of fate, or probably on accidents at all. This certainly is not to excuse in any way what happened in the skies of eastern Ukraine. But we need to assess the behavior of the rebels and their patron on grounds that do not depend on such accidents. Any U.S. policy response needs to be fully defensible if the only planes the rebels had ever shot down were in fact Ukrainian military craft.

President Obama spoke of the Malaysia Airlines crash as a “wake-up call”. It is acceptable to refer to such an event in this way to try to elicit greater cooperation from others—in this case, to get more European cooperation in responding to Russian behavior in Ukraine. We need to distinguish clearly in our own minds, however, between this kind of tactical reference to a single salient, however accidental, event to persuade others to support our policies, and the sort of unemotional analysis, not dependent on accidents, required to formulate sound policies in the first place.

There are many differences, of course, in the circumstances surrounding these two tragic events. The events in the Persian Gulf do not have a clear counterpart to the Putin government's trouble-making in Ukraine. But before we too quickly use any differences to dismiss any comparison to the two episodes, we should note some of the other characteristics about what happened in 1988. In getting involved in the Iran-Iraq War, the United States was in effect intervening on the Iraqi side—the side of the original aggressor, Saddam Hussein. Tactically, it would be very hard to find grounds to excuse away what the Vincennes did, despite the tensions of the time and place involved. The airliner was flying on a well-established commercial route to Dubai and emitting all the proper signals for identification. It was increasing, not decreasing, in altitude at the time it was assumed to be an F-14 coming in for an attack. Other U.S. Navy ships in the immediate area did not identify it as hostile. The airliner was in Iranian airspace, and the Vincennes was in Iranian territorial waters, at the time of the shootdown.

Our own responses to the incident in the Persian Gulf ought to provide some perspective for looking at how others have responded to similar incidents. The downing of Iran Air Flight 655 was not taken in the United States as a black mark on American military history. The United States never issued a formal apology, although it did pay monetary compensation and expressed regret over the civilian deaths. The career of the captain of the Vincennes did not suffer; he received an award for his time as skipper of the ship, notwithstanding the 290 innocent civilians who were killed on his watch.

We also can use our own strong feelings about the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 to gain some perspective on how others view U.S.-caused accidents, whether or not they are viewed as accidents. The prevailing Iranian interpretation of the shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655 was, and probably still is, that it was intentional. Given the circumstances of the incident, including the advanced capabilities represented by the Vincennes and its crew, Iranians have found the description of the incident as an accident to be not credible. The episode, along with other indications of what Iranians take to be ill intentions of the United States, helps to explain why many Iranians still regard the United States as hostile and untrustworthy, with its statements of intentions not to be believed.                         

 

 

TopicsUkraine Russia Iran

Westphalia with Chinese Characteristics

The Buzz

What will be the future implications of China’s rise in power?  The towering political scientist Stephen Krasner has produced a lucid synopsis for the Hoover Institution.  One of the biggest take-away points is that the organization of global governance stands to undergo a significant overhaul if Beijing’s capabilities continue to expand vis-à-vis the United States.

In terms of the international economic order, Krasner notes that:

“[t]he existing trade and investment regimes more or less assume that corporations are independent of the state; this assumption is comfortable for the United States. It is not so comfortable for China: a more powerful China might press for principles, norms, and rules that were more accepting of state direction of the economy.”

It warrants pointing out that China’s preferences for statism in economic affairs are not simply because of its communist leadership.  Rather, developing economies in general tend to rely upon government intervention for growth.  This was true of the so-called Asian Tigers in the 1970s and is certainly true of China and the other BRICS nations today, all of which blend an appreciation for markets with a dyed in the wool commitment to a form of dirigisme.

The difference between the newly industrialized countries (NICs) of the 1970s and the BRICS of today, of course, is that the latter entertain hopes of refashioning the international economic architecture to better suit their particular interests.  Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan never aspired to global leadership.  Whether the BRICS will succeed in their bid any time soon is far from certain; as yet, the BRICS lack the cohesion, the will and the means actually to lead a new global order.  Nevertheless, their dissatisfaction and rise in power do combine to produce a long-term potential threat to the western-made status quo.

China’s rise might also portend implications for how states engage with each other politically and diplomatically.  “China’s internal divisions make it one of the strongest proponents of the sanctity of sovereigntist principles that totally reject external interference in the internal affairs of other states,” Krasner points out. “The United States as a proponent of human rights, and as target for transnational terrorist, has a much weaker commitment to non-intervention.”

There is some irony to this mismatch in attitudes.  Sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention are the cornerstones of the Westphalian system, a model of international relations that emphasizes the centrality of state actors to global politics and which is supposed the epitomize the western approach to international organization.  Yet Krasner is correct that the U.S. and Europe have been at the forefront of enervating Westphalia over the past several decades while China has emerged as a champion of Westphalian principles.

Just as the Westphalian ideal has been at times convenient for western powers and inconvenient (and ignored) at other times—a system of “organized hypocrisy” in Krasner’s own words—so too are Westphalian norms a valuable (and pliable) resource for China’s leadership.  As Stephen Hopgood argues in his book The Endtimes of Human Rights, the logic of Westphalia affords Beijing a rationale for maintaining authoritarian rule at home and opposing the imposition of western influence abroad (including, recently, in Syria).

Westphalia can also be applied by China to legitimize its actions, at least rhetorically, regarding its various territorial and sovereignty disputes: from Xinjiang and Tibet to Taiwan and the islands of the East and South China Seas.  All of this means that Westphalia can probably be expected to remain firmly in place as a core tenet of international order under Chinese leadership, even if the application of Westphalian norms will look cynical and opportunistic to observers in the west.

If China does reassert sovereignty as an inviolable cornerstone of international organization then it will be a hammer blow to western interventionists on both the right and left.  This is partly what Krasner means when he concludes that “the world would be a very different place than it is now if an autocratic China became the indispensable nation.”

Not everybody in the west would be sad to see a reduction in of overseas interventions, of course, but if it takes Chinese preponderance to curtail the west’s adventurism then this might leave a bitter taste—especially if it comes accompanied by other changes to international order.  An uncertain future impends.

TopicsSecurity RegionsChina

Asia's Next China Worry: Xi Jinping's Growing Power

The Buzz

Since Mao Zedong died in 1976, power in China has slowly decentralized. Deng Xiaoping’s reforms promoted the lifting of the hand of the state from the economy while ultimate authority within the Chinese Communist Party has become more dispersed. Part of this process is generational: no Chinese leader has enjoyed the authority of either Mao or Deng and in its place collective rule has become the norm.

The ascendance of Xi Jinping to the top position in China has challenged those trajectories. During his short period in office, Xi has brought back executive authority, serving as secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party, president of the PRC, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and as an ex officio member of the Standing Committee of the Politboro. If that resume wasn’t impressive enough, he has also claimed the chairs of two groups established at the Third Plenum of the CCP, held last fall: the National Security Commission and the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms. Those gavels go along with the two older Leading Small Groups he also chairs, one on Foreign Affairs and the other on Taiwan Affairs. He is chairing yet another new group to oversee military reform. Observers see Xi’s hand in economic affairs as well, usurping in many ways the role traditionally held by the prime minister. Xinhua reported that he chaired a leading group of financial and economic affairs, and described him as its director, a position usually held by the premier.

This consolidation of power is impressive but Xi’s authority is also being boosted by his anti-corruption campaign. Record numbers of party members – tens of thousands – are being disciplined and prosecuted for misconduct. Senior officials, referred to as “tigers” in the media, are being hunted as well, including senior PLA figures previously thought untouchable. The country waits with baited breath to see if Xi will take down a former Politboro Standing Committee member, a position long considered immune from investigation.

The drive to purge the party of its corruption cancer at its core – and the fear that the initiative is as much aimed at political opponents as corrupt party members – has prompted many bureaucrats and officials to lower their heads and withdraw from decision making in an attempt to ensure that they don’t attract attention. There is a marked increase in suicides among officials. In this environment, such an activist leader can be even more assertive and Xi seems to relish the opportunity.

The desire to centralize authority is also evident in the government’s pursuit of advocates of transparency. Rather than seeing them as erstwhile allies in the anti-corruption effort, the government has gone after them as doggedly as it has corrupt officials. Plainly, Xi wants to retain control of the anti-corruption campaign, in particular who it targets.

This is consistent with the effort to assert tighter control over the media, both in broadcast and print, and the internet. Analysts speak of unprecedented censorship and oversight in the last year.  It may not be a coincidence that Xi also chairs a new small group that oversees internet security.

Some argue that Xi’s “new authoritarianism” is a prerequisite to economic reform: he has to shore up his left flank from attacks by the old guard.  Others worry about an old-fashioned power grab, in which Xi isolates, marginalizes, and ultimately crushes any challenge to his authority.

Whatever his ultimate aim, Xi’s support for reform has very clear limits. Cleaning up the party is intended to rehabilitate and legitimate the CCP, not loosen its grip on China’s politics. 

How should outsiders feel about what is happening in China?

Elements of Xi’s program might improve governance in China.  In principle, the anti-corruption campaign could lighten the burden imposed on the Chinese people resulting from unjust treatment by avaricious officials.  It reflects a degree of increased, if indirect, accountability of the ruling party to the public.  And if Xi uses his accumulated power to break through the resistance of special interest groups and successfully transform China's economy (which former Premier Wen Jiabao called “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable”) to a stable and sustainable maturity with more reliance on domestic consumption rather than exports, then  he would bless both his people and the global economy.

However, Xi does not seem interested in promoting the liberal values that Americans and many friends in the region believe are conducive to justice, prosperity, and peace.  His accumulation of power represents a step back toward the dictatorial paramount leadership of the Mao era – ironically, an inclination that got Bo Xilai in trouble. Still, there is little danger of a return to a cult of personality in China and events as calamitous as the Cultural Revolution are extremely unlikely. China has changed too much. The appropriate analog for Xi is more Putin than Mao.

A selective purge of corrupt officials, combined with continued crackdowns on dissent, may not be enough to satisfy the demands of an increasingly empowered and savvy civil society, however.  The CCP’s domestic insecurity is likely to continue during Xi’s tenure, which means continued risk of Chinese overreaction to a perceived challenge to China's dignity by foreigners.

A relatively high concentration of power in a paramount leader might increase consistency and predictability in Chinese foreign policy-making, simplifying  the task of reaching agreement on how to achieve and maintain a stable peace as China becomes the region’s second great power.  There is only one guy we need talk to, Xi Jinping.  But any advantage is lost if he insists China’s vital interests require encroaching on other states’ vital interests.  And the likelihood of an intemperate foreign policy is greater if a smaller number of people are in charge, with a one-man dictatorship being the worst case (well exemplified by Pyongyang). 

If Xi’s foreign policy is an extension of his domestic political agenda, outsiders may be unqualified to judge whether it is successful.  Based on China's external interests, however, Xi seems to have walked China into the trap that Deng Xiaoping warned about: alarming neighbors into security cooperation against China before the difficult task of Chinese economic development is completed.

Brad Glosserman is executive director of Pacific Forum CSIS. Denny Roy is senior fellow at the East West Center in Honolulu. This article originally appeared in CSIS:PACNET newsletter here

Image: Flickr. 

TopicsDomestic Politics RegionsChina

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