Strong State, Weaker Theory

Review

From the issue

A group of five Americans gathered in Paris a century ago to negotiate an end to the Spanish-American War. President William McKinley had already decided to take the Philippines from Madrid's decrepit empire but had cunningly included in the peace delegation two men of anti-imperialist persuasion (to be outvoted by the others if necessary), so he might appear modest and even hesitant in making his large demands.

The real force in the U.S. group was onetime GOP vice-presidential candidate Whitelaw Reid of the New York Tribune, an unabashed expansionist. As Reid relates in his published diary, Spain's ambassador to France begged him: "Do not forget that we are poor; do not forget that we are vanquished; do not forget that after all it was Spain that discovered America; do not forget that this is the first great war you have had with a nation on the continent of Europe, or with any foreign nation; that you have had an astonishing victory, and that you cannot complete it without showing magnanimity." Reid, unmoved, intended to have the United States act the part of a great power. He meant to see McKinley's instructions--issued in installments to accentuate the President's image of gravitas--carried out: take the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and effective control of Cuba. He approved when the U.S. delegates deliberately sat so that the late afternoon sun would blaze through the large Quai d'Orsay windows directly into the faces of their Spanish counterparts. No one could now mistake who held the whip hand.

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May 26, 2012