If the Obama administration’s goal is to convince Alawites, Christians, Kurds and Shiites to unite against the Assad regime, it does not make sense to arm a Syrian opposition; these groups view it as the biggest threat to their future in a post-Assad Syria. Washington should instead encourage reconciliation between the factions, which is precisely what the administration did recently when Vice President Biden endorsed Syrian opposition leader Moaz Al-Khatib’s overture to Assad on negotiations. There are many obstacles precluding a successful agreement. But it is better to continue to try to hammer out those issues now, while all sides still have an incentive to compromise.
Ian Garner and Jeremy Presto are Research Associates at the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies. Please note that the views expressed in this article do not represent the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.
Comments
You are absolutely rightSome argue that the US must intervene in Syria and live up to its moral values. These people err when they present the Syrian conflict as a conflict between oppressed people and their dictator, i.e. they present the Syria conflict as good people vs. bad. There is not a clear end game for what is going on in Syria. There will be more violence and more bloodshed after the fall of Al-Assad. Unfortunately and sadly, thousands of Syrians will die at a higher pace once Assad is toppled. Of course, this does not mean that Assad must stay but, it means that we must move beyond the futile argument: To arm or not to arm. Arming the rebels will only usher Syria in another era of conflict. Massacres will continue. There is a reason why non-Sunni Muslims and Kurds are mistrustful of the opposition and have not joined them. Some argue that toppling Assad will harm Iran. True, Iran will suffer a strategic setback. However, the logic behind the need to defeat Iran is defeated by creating a far more capable and hostile force in the heart of the ME. The rise of Sunni fundamentalists cannot be the answer to containing Iran. The west, by supporting the rise of Sunni fundamentalists, will create a far larger anti-western force with greater resources, geographic scope, and numbers. Btw, Iran is losing a lot as a result of the sunni-shia divide. Shiites are a small minority in the mulsim world so, if Iran comes off as too shiite it loses its soft power with the Sunni majority. Without the ability to appeal to Sunnis—the majority—Iran remains an actor among many. This of course has been the result of the syrian conflict where, Iran LOST its appeal. Iran is a net loser not a winner at all. Turkey is pursuing the current course in Syria due to ideological reasons and, it hopes that syria would become their protectorate and, a sunni gate to the sunni arab worldWhat the US should do must be based on proper understanding of what is going on in Syria and, not on childish mischaracterizations of good vs. bad. So, the administration, foreign and security policy experts must move beyond discussing whether or not to arm one side against the other. They should start to think outside the box. It is must be crystal clear that what is going on in Syria is not pro-democracy protest. There is a sectarian, fundamentalist Sunni vs. fundamentalist Shiite war that is going on in the ME and, Syria has become the main front. Shiites are a minority in the Muslim world—approximately one sixth of Muslims controlling 3-4 states out of 56 Muslim states—and Sunnis are the majority. If Sunnis win, then, countries governed by fundamentalist Sunni regimes (Egypt, Ghaza, Syria, possibly in the future Jordan also) with very close ties to Turkey will be the new geopolitical reality in the Middle East. That jeopardizes vital US interests. Therefore, maintaining the Sunni-Shiite balance is vital. Only then, can America maintain the ability to shape events in the ME. Inside Syria, Alewites, Christians, and Druz are supporting Assad because their existence will be threatened under his opponents. Syria’s Alewites, Christians, and Druz are supporting Assad because their existence will be threatened under his opponents. They know this as they have been living in these areas for centuries and were subjected to various kinds of discrimination and were treated as inferiors by the majority. They do not buy the talks of a democratic Syria because they know better than westerners. The Kurds are unrecognized and prosecuted by the successive regimes in Syria. The opposition (SNC) also, so far, marginalizes the Kurds and sidelines them. To stop Syria’s civil war the administration must focus on making the groups that support Bashar Al-Assad feel safe to stop supporting the status quo and accept change. Therefore, self-determination must be a pillar of any strategy dealing with the revolutions in the ME in general and in Syria in particular given Syria’s diversity if, long term stability is what we seek; i.e. the Kurds must be recognized and given an autonomous region and, the Alewites must also have an autonomous region. Other minorities, judging by where they stand today, will chose to live with the Alewites. Both alewites and kurds could be allies of the US and, they could even be allies of Israel to balance against their newly found enemies. This will also keep Syrians occupied and, will prevent them from stirring problems. The US does not need to take sides in the sectarian war. It can get closer with parties from both sides and this will give the US tremendous leverage.The only hope for a soft landing and lasting peace is: A Syrian Union and the right of Self-determination granted to Syria’s components. This must be the US administration’s strategy. Otherwise fundamentalist regimes will form the new geopolitical reality in the ME and it would be very difficult to check, contain, and balance against emerging hostile regimes in the ME.