Cameron's Syria Failure Parallels 2003 Turkey Iraq Vote

Comparisons to the parliament's Iraq War struggles are apt—the Turkish parliament's, that is.

President Obama has agreed to have Congress vote on whether or not the United States should punish Syria militarily for its use of chemical weapons. Had it not been for the adverse decision by the British House of Commons last week, he would not have felt obliged to seek Congress’s approval.

Not since 1782 has the British House of Commons voted against the government in a matter of war and peace, according to Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times. But the British choice eerily resembles that of the March 1, 2003 Turkish parliament’s vote against authorizing the use of Turkish soil for a second American front against Iraq.

In both cases the vote was expected to pass easily. Both the Conservative-led coalition in Britain and the newly elected Justice and Development Party, AKP, in Turkey enjoyed comfortable majorities in their respective parliaments. Even if some MPs defected, there would have been enough to make up for the difference.

In both instances, however, the governments lost the vote by relatively small numbers. In fact, the final Turkish vote was narrowly in favor except for the fact that nonvoting parliamentary members yet present in the chamber are, by parliamentary rules, considered opposed to any resolution being considered. Hence some eleven members of the Turkish parliament who had elected to stay inside the chamber rather than going for a cup of tea made all the difference.

In both cases, the parliamentary whips came under much criticism for not taking the vote seriously, sitting on their laurels and believing in the hype that preceded the vote. In the case of Turkey one could attribute it to the inexperience and newness of the new government. It had just won elections in November 2002 and the party leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, had not yet won a seat in Parliament because he was subject to a political ban and Abdullah Gul, his comrade, was running the government in his stead. To boot, AKP’s own parliamentary leaders seemed unaware of parliamentary rules.

In a straw vote conducted that March morning, the AKP whips seemed to have all the votes they needed. Just as with the Conservatives in Britain, the AKP ranks quickly hemorrhaged. Assuming that the government had sufficient votes, individual MPs decided to vote their conscience. In fact, most MPs had genuine reservations about allowing American troops to traverse Turkish territory en route to Iraq.

Just as in Britain, the Turkish public was strongly opposed to participating in an American-led operation. In the case of Turkey, the American troops entering Iraq would have been followed by contingents of Turkish soldiers set on creating a buffer zone in Iraq’s Kurdish inhabited northern provinces. The Turkish MPs were responding to their own public sentiment just as many Conservatives did last week.

Ironically, in both countries the military establishment seemed unhappy about the deal their governments seemed to be negotiating with the Americans. The reasons were quite different though. In Britain, the military had been subjected to severe budgetary cuts and engaging in an expensive operation did not appear to be a priority for the brass. There were comments in the press by former military leaders to that effect.

In Turkey, the military was very suspicious of the AKP, a party whose roots were firmly anchored in Turkey’s Islamist movement. Hence the officers were looking for ways to embarrass the new government and make its relations with Washington as difficult as possible. On the Wednesday before the Saturday vote, then commander of the Land Forces and second-most-powerful person in the hierarchy, General Aytac Yalman, gave an interview to a columnist well known for his military sympathies. Although Yalman’s name never figured in the interview everyone in Ankara and Washington quickly found out his identity. Yalman in effect said that the military leadership was opposed to American troops coming in. This interview in many ways sealed the fate of the subsequent vote because it gave many undecided an excuse to vote against.

Pages