The Syrian civil war is not just a humanitarian crisis. There are also important strategic considerations—including Iran and other regional players like Turkey—that must be considered.
The past year has seen the slow-motion slaughter of many Syrians. Assad has carefully avoided the destruction of large populations. The world’s response has been countless international gatherings asserting sympathy for the Syrian opposition, feeble efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and the thunder of imprecations, mostly American, that skewer the Russians but pass little ammunition or other help to the besieged opposition. Once again, another UN resolution is under consideration to bring the Chinese and Russians around to a cease fire, while a tireless Kofi Annan is asked to produce his quiet magic as if Syria were Kenya.
The deepening humanitarian crisis is generating more militant proposals: significant support to the opposition, including the establishment of humanitarian zones and the direct provision of more arms and training. While welcome to the opposition, these zones would require the protection of outside military forces and do little to change the situation except by lowering the intensity of some fighting. And these measures have little support. Policy makers are concerned that such efforts will generate mayhem and civil war in Syria—as if what they are witnessing were not a civil war, or perhaps just a minor one. We seem to console ourselves with the notion that Assad’s fall is inevitable, that his Russian and Chinese friends will grow tired of isolation and embarrassment, and we can stand back knowing that right will ultimately triumph. The Syrian people will just have to suffer a little more.
Perhaps Washington believes Assad’s end is indeed close, and therefore a serious American military effort is unnecessary. That does not look likely from the latest fighting—nor from the increasing Congressional pressures to take aggressive military measures and the administration’s request for military options from the Pentagon.
The Post-Assad Region
The notion of a more serious and concerted U.S.-led military option to end Assad’s rule understandably has received little attention so far. Many fear it would deepen the existing civil war and spread disorder to other countries. There would, of course, be significant costs to such an operation—probably more than Washington bargains for. This is not another Kosovo war with no casualties, which gave Americans misleading notions about American power. Syria has air defenses whose destruction would be costly at a time when the United States is trying to reduce defense expenditures. And it would involve U.S. forces in a war of uncertain duration that they do not want.
A Syrian intervention would not be Iraq redux. But it would require something Americans are not very good at—bringing the various Syrian parties together (no mean problem with their strong sectarian differences) to help create a post-Assad world. Nor is a new Syria likely to be a short-term burden; the law of unintended consequences inevitably prevails in war. It would also be a terrible political problem for the Obama administration.
A military attack on Syria would need the whole-hearted political and material support of Turkey and Arab states. That is by no means assured. Until a year ago, the Turkish government romanced Assad. Now, it is at the forefront of trying to get rid of him, but it has done little to make that happen other than promoting international support, accepting refugees and providing a haven for Syrian opposition leaders. In a potential toppling of Assad, Turkey would need to establish a protected zone in Syria for the opposition and those fleeing any fighting. The Turkish government, however, is not enthusiastic about a military effort in Syria; it would not have a UN imprimatur or support of the Turkish public. The politically besieged Turkish military is averse to invading an Arab country and concerned that a Syrian Kurdish entity might emerge from Syria’s internal disorder.
Arab support, particularly the Saudis, who talk much about supplying arms to the opposition but apparently do little, is also politically indispensable. It is not clear that support would be available, and the Arabs could well split.
Containing Iran
Nevertheless, there are ample reasons for considering a dramatically different approach, and not only for humanitarian reasons. A Syrian intervention might help with a larger and pressing Iranian problem by removing its chief client and regional ally from the scene. Strategically, Washington would send a far tougher message to the Iranian leadership to halt their nuclear-weapon aspirations than any it has delivered to date.
To have this effect on Iran, President Obama must first send an unmistakable message to Assad: unless he is prepared to give up power, his government will be destroyed. Such a military effort cannot win UN approval and requires a coalition of the willing. Once again the U.S. military would be indispensable in doing the fighting—the destruction by air of many of Assad’s key facilities and his ability to manage a continuing war, rather than simply enabling and equipping the opposition to Assad.
Comments
I think we should all feel privileged: After all it's not often one gets to witness an Immaculate Conception. Immaculate here in the absolute, utter absence of any specific, concrete addressing of why a U.S. intervention in Syria would be in the United States' interest. None. Not a word, not a peep. Instead one supposes we're all just expected to accept on faith the assumptions that the "good" things that Abramowitz says would happen are indeed good for the U.S., and then worth the cost of getting same too. Thanks, but I got a better idea: Let's first just examine the assumption that Mr. Abramowitz's prescription would indeed primarily serve the U.S.'s interests, even before talking about the cost. After all when someone comes out telling us we should expend our blood and treasure getting involved in someone else's civil war far far away, in an utterly open-ended manner, and avoids like the plague any direct addressing of the most fundamental question possible which is why it is in our interest to do so, well, that raises a question it seems to me. If, for instance, the U.S. indeed has any interest in diminishing Iran, nothing could be clearer than that Israel has a far far greater interest in same. So how come we aren't seeing Mr. Abramowitz urging the Israelis to go stick their neck into this blatantly running noose? How come it's good for our servicemen and women and money to get poured into this smoking cauldron of indeterminate depth and breadth, but not Israel's?
In ordre of the priority, the following measures should be adopted: 1. Give anti-tank weapons to the Syrian opposition, at least 500 newest RPGs model required. If costs are the proble, send the weapons to Saudi Arabia to give them for free to the FSA, after. A little bit of deviding the war funds would not make any harm to the coalition. This process is the longer process, time wise (untile the effectives of the FSA will be at least of 2-3 divisions).2. Strategically, Homs is very important. Syrian security forces know this well. Homs is in the middle. Like in Starcraft: he who controls the center of the battlefield controld the battle. By keeping Homs in FSA's hands, Damascus gets isolated from the sea, from where Assad might get help from the Iranians and from the Russians. Homs must be again in FSA's hands, and maintained in their hands, by all means necessarily. Idlib must stay as well in rebels hands, in order to give them at the proper time the possibility to develop a full front, which to cut the country in half, North to South. Idlib not falling into Assad's hands or its retrival would strenghten the morale of the armed opposition.3. Let the no-fly anti-aircraft zone campaign begin, combined with aerial blows against Assad's artillery and his tanks, first cleaning the area around Homs.4. Announce to the world the USA's full commitment to destroy the Syrian dictator, to get him convicted for crimes against humanity. More defectors expected and more people will join the FSA (right now there are a lot more who would want to join but they are affraid of the uncertain outcome, more specifically they are affraid that the dictator would win (the announcement must not be given before the attacks, to not give time to goddamn russians to give the dictators more reinforcements).5. Once these objectives are achieved, it is time to create 1st a camp for the refugees, north-east and maybe east of Homs, defended by UN troops.6. Creation of the corridors for humanitarian aids as well as to assure a continous influx or weapons and ammunition to the Free Syrian Army.7. The encirclement of Damascus with combined forces (Syrian rebels + UN/US troops).OBSERVATIONS: if Assad's forces start to decimate the population and to use citizens as shields, the US Air Force must drop immense quantities of small weapons in these regions, to help the population in developing rapid resistance against the agressors as well as to try to create corridors to let the population get out of the hot zones. Massive resque operations driven by helicopters sustained with battle drones to get the population out of the conflict zones should be prepared, as well.
It seems to me, Mort, you've defeated your own thesis. But if readers need more reasons why going to war in Syria is not a good idea, consult http://www.peacefare.net/?p=7869Daniel Serwerwww.peacefare.net